(Emphasis supplied.) There is a vast difference between such a reservation and the unreasonable restriction actually imposed here, for the restriction has no reasonable relationship to the safety of or benefit to the traveling public and is, therefore, a nullity ( Chili Plaza v. State of New York, 25 A.D.2d 491; Idylbrook Farms v. State of New York, 22 A.D.2d 761). Should the Superintendent decide to allow a reservation of access (Highway Law, ยง 3, subd. 2), he can do so for reasons of safety, but he cannot so condition the reservation as actually to restrict the use to which the land itself can be put ( Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y.2d 249). While the restriction itself is null and void, that part of the reservation which created an easement of access "only to an extent which will not interfere with the use of said property for highway purposes" was statutorily authorized; and the State could, in the future, block the access upon this condition which could then give rise to substantial consequential damages.
The adjustment map also granted sewer easements desired by the claimant as well as two additional access rights of way. The consequential damages awarded amounted to 11% of the amount the court below would have awarded had the restriction not been removed. It is unnecessary to determine the existence or source of the authority which the Superintendent of Public Works attempted to utilize in initially applying the restriction in view of our construction of the meaning of the phrase "retail store purposes only". (See, however, Idylbrook Farms v. State of New York, 22 A.D.2d 761. ) There are two separate and distinct reasons for concluding that the award of consequential damages cannot be sustained. First, in considering use of the access allowed for "retail store purposes only", we conclude that the words in their common and ordinary sense, and in the sense in which the Superintendent of Public Works must have intended them to be taken, includes use for shopping center purposes.