But "[r ]es ipsa loquitur is no substitute for the lack of evidence of the defendant's negligence." Ide v. Foreign Candy Co. , 2006 Mass. App. Div. 165, 167 (Mass. App. Div. 2006). I find the majority of Mr. Panish's report inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702.
In Massachusetts, a distributor is strictly liable for a breach of warranty, even when acting "merely as a conduit for the [injurious] product." Mitchell v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 523 (1996); see also Ide v. Foreign Candy Co., 2006 Mass. App. Div. 165 (Dist. Ct. 2006) (noting that it is "a fair statement of the law" that the distributor "stood in the shoes of the manufacturer and had the same obligations toward potential consumers."). A plaintiff is entitled to relief for a breach of implied warranty from a manufacturer or distributor so long as the product at issue is shown to have been "defective and unreasonably dangerous."
"Simply stated, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does no more than recognize that negligence and causation, like other facts, may be established by circumstantial evidence." Ide v. Foreign Candy Co., 2006 Mass. App. Div. 165, 167, quoting Hemenway v. Shaw's Supermarket,Inc., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 97, 98. Evidence that an accident occurred, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the doctrine. See Enrich v.Windmere Corp., 416 Mass. 83, 87 (1993); Reardon v. Boston Elevated Ry.Co., 247 Mass. 124, 125 (1923).