Our reading of this statute is in accord with the contemporary jurisprudence in many jurisdictions. Morgan v. Susino Const. Co., 1943, 130 N.J.L. 418, 33 A.2d 607; Patterson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 1964, 110 Ga. App. 23, 137 S.E.2d 549; American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 1955, 91 Ga. App. 891, 87 S.E.2d 661; Ide v. Scott Drilling Inc., 1954, 341 Mich. 164, 67 N.W.2d 133; C.F. Wheeler Co. v. Pullins, 1942, 152 Fla. 96, 11 So.2d 303; Lippard v. Southeastern Express Co., 1935, 207 N.C. 507, 177 S.E. 801; Garner v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1940, 136 Ohio St. 397, 16 Ohio Ops. 568, 26 N.E.2d 203; but cf. Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 1959, 237 La. 101, 110 So.2d 541. The totality of this authority is summed up in an annotation at 18 A.L.R.3rd 900, 902, as follows:

Id., 224. Moreover, "`[a] child en ventre sa mere at the time of the father's death is deemed to have been born so far as it is for the benefit of such child, and will be entitled to claim compensation as a legal dependent, . . . and the posthumous child of a deceased workman would have the same rights to compensation as other children.'"Id., 224-25, quoting S. Harper, Workmen's Compensation (2d Ed.) p. 261; see also S.L.W. v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 490 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska 1971); Ide v. Scott Drilling, Inc., 341 Mich. 164, 166-68, 67 N.W.2d 133 (1954); Workers' Compensation Division v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 766-67 (Wyo. 1990); see generally 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 62.22(d), pp. 11-45 — 11-49; annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 900. When the legislature adopted the "wholly or mainly supported" test for determining a worker's entitlement to a dependency allowance for children, it did not address the question of whether a child en ventre sa mere is supported by the worker, albeit indirectly, at the time of the injury. Because the test set forth in 31-308b does not appear to have been formulated in contemplation of the circumstances in the present case, we should not apply the "wholly or mainly supported" test in a mechanical fashion.

Although the status of a posthumous child is specifically governed by the particular workmen's compensation statute adopted by the particular state, the interpretations that other states have placed on their statutes are helpful in considering Wisconsin law. Judge Currie in his memorandum decision referred to numerous textbook authorities and judicial authority of other states which support the conclusion that death benefits should be accorded to posthumously born children. See, Annot. Workmen's Compensation: Posthumous Children and Children Born After Accident As Dependents, 18 A.L.R. 3d 900 (1968); Ide v. Scott Drilling, 341 Mich. 164, 67 N.W.2d 133 (1954); Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 207 Tenn. 411, 340 S.W.2d 896 (1960); Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 189 P.2d 892 (1948). Given the liberal interpretation this court has generally accorded to the worker's compensation statutes and given the legislative design and purpose to compensate the dependents of deceased employees, I would hold that the legislature intended that a posthumously born illegitimate child could qualify as a dependent under sec. 102.51(1) and (2), Stats.

It should be mentioned that this case was later dismissed upon rehearing in Westfall v. J.P. Burroughs Son, 303 Mich. 186, because there was no evidence of the child's dependency on its father as provided in the workmen's compensation act. In the case of Ide v. Scott Drilling, Inc., 341 Mich. 164 (7 NCCA3d 219), involving a workmen's compensation claim, this Court said (p 166): "It should be noted that `questions of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as the fact may be at the time of the injury.'

The amendment of 1947 leaves the existing statute in a curious state. It might well be contended that the definition of words eliminated from the statute can no longer be considered, and was repealed by necessary implication. If the only requirement is now proof of dependency in fact at the time of the injury resulting in death, it might be contended that a posthumous child could not qualify. In Ide v. Scott Drilling, 67 N.W.2d 133 (Mich.), the Court relied heavily upon the definition in holding that a posthumous child was entitled to recover on the theory that it was considered as in being at the time of the father's death, and could qualify as a dependent although not in fact a member of the household. On the other hand it might be contended that an illegitimate child could now recover, even though not a member of the household or receiving contributions as limited by the definition section.