Magistrate Judge Latimer dismissed the Wahlstroms' state law claims because those claims "`would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law.'" Wahlstrom, 800 F. Supp. at 1063 (quoting Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn. 1989)). According to Magistrate Judge Latimer, because Connecticut tort law would permit recovery of damages by nondependent beneficiaries and maritime law would not, the Supremacy Clause mandates preemption of state law in this case.

Application of the § 145(2) factors suggests a strong case for applying Nigerian law because the Nigerian contacts to this litigation are stronger than Connecticut's. See Williams, 229 Conn. at 372, 641 A.2d at 789 (applying New York law where the accident happened in New York); Norton v. Michonski, 368 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D. Conn. 2005) (applying Massachusetts law where automobile accident occurred in that state); N. Tankers (Cyprus) Ltd. v. Backstrom, 934 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (D. Conn. 1996) (New York law applied because "the place of the injury . . . [was] New York");Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Techs. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 949 (D. Conn. 1989) (noting that "a strong case [could] be made for the application of Icelandic law," where the helicopter crash occurred off the coast of Iceland). First, Plaintiffs' injuries occurred in Nigeria.

Rather, whether such a tort-based claim may be brought depends on "a direct and continuous causal chain" between the property damage and the economic loss. Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. General American Transportation, 73 Ohio St.3d 609, 615-16 (1995) (holding that "in order to recover indirect economic damages in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the indirect economic damages arose from tangible physical injury to persons or from tangible property damage"); see Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942 (D.Conn. 1989) (recovery in tort for economic losses permitted where losses were "attributable to and are inextricably tied to" injuries). In Berish v. Bornstein, the SJC held that the economic loss doctrine did not bar suit to recover "the substantial expense" plaintiffs would incur in correcting alleged "defects and deficiencies" in the construction of a condominium development.

Courts have held that Coast Guard activities have a substantial relationship to maritime activities. See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that the operations of the Coast Guard "conducted on navigable waters do in fact bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction."); see also Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Conn. 1989) ("Flights by a coast guard aircraft in preparation for or connected with marine rescue and patrol operations clearly bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction."). Also, it should be noted that the very purpose of the United States Coast Guard is to promote the safety of life and property on the navigable waters of the United States. See 14 U.S.C. § 2.

See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2nd Cir. 1976) (rescue operations of the Coast Guard conducted on navigable waters bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities); Hiner v. Longstaff, 543 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (W.D.Wash. 1982) (emergency first aid rendered by paramedics was fortuitously and incidentally connected to navigable waters and bears no relationship to traditional maritime activity); Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D.Conn. 1989) (flights by coast guard aircraft in preparation for marine rescue bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activities). Therefore, the court finds that the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. at *2.Compare McKernan v. United Tech. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60, 64 n. 4 (D.Conn. 1989); Resnick v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 660 F. Supp. 415, 418 n. 5 (D.Conn. 1987); Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1242, 1247-48 (D.Conn. 1987), with Valtec Int'l, Inc. v. Allied Signal Aerospace Co., 1997 WL 288627 at *2 (D.Conn. 1997); Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Tech. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 948 (D.Conn. 1989); Feldt v. Sturm Ruger Corp., 721 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D.Conn. 1989); Katz v. Gladstone, 673 F. Supp. 76, 80 n. 2 (D.Conn. 1987). In Afflerbach v. Furry and Fiori v. Oliver, two more Connecticut state trial courts adopted the view espoused in Howe v. Stuart Amusement Corp., viz. that the significant relationship test applies generally in tort cases.

We are unable to locate a single decision after Tallentire in which a lower court required a maritime nexus before applying DOHSA Plaintiff has cited one case for the proposition that this issue is still unsettled. See Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Tech. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D.Conn. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has not reached the question of whether a maritime nexus is required for torts on the high seas"). However, the court in Icelandic Coast Guard was not addressing a claim under DOHSA, but was instead addressing a claim for economic losses.

Where the application of Connecticut law would produce an arbitrary or irrational result, however, Connecticut may follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts approach and apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the contract. Galvin v. Newton, WESTLAW 1991 WL 218485 No. B-88-597 (WWE) (D.Conn. Sept. 18, 1991); Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1242, 1246-48 (D.Conn. 1987), aff'd 829 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1987); Hoffman v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 671 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.Conn. 1987); but see Prescott Investor, Inc. v. Blum, 762 F. Supp. 1553, 1555-56 (D.Conn. 1991) (criticizing Restatement approach); Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 948-49 (D.Conn. 1989) (same). The court finds that application of Connecticut law is appropriate in this case under the vested rights approach.

See also Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (W.D.N.Y. 1991) 772 F. Supp. 124. We find the analysis in Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp. (D.Ct. 1989) 722 F. Supp. 942, cited by plaintiff, to be more persuasive. In that decision Judge Cabranes assessed tort claims asserted in the aftermath of a helicopter crash off the coast of Iceland.

However, "it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion . . . [because plaintiffs' state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law". Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F. Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn. 1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that "reverse-Erie" doctrine requires that substantive remedies afforded by state law conform to federal maritime standards); Complaint of DFDS Seaways (Bahamas) Ltd., 684 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("It is well settled that federal maritime law is to be applied to the exclusion of conflicting state law even in state courts" (emphasis in original and citations omitted)). In other words, defendants' call for preemption is mandated here not by application of abstract choice-between-laws principles but by the force of the Supremacy Clause standing alone.