Opinion
FBTCV186079058S
01-09-2020
Rose Michelle Ibrahim v. Milford Transit District et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Jacobs, Irene P., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#115.00] DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION AND CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#118.00]
Jacobs, J.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff alleges personal injuries sustained in a December 14, 2016 motor vehicle collision caused by the operator ("tortfeasor") of a car that had turned left into the path of the defendant Milford Transit District’s bus in which the plaintiff was a passenger. The plaintiff and other bus passengers settled their claims as against the tortfeasor, the plaintiff receiving $15,000.00 (#115.00, Ex. B) of the tortfeasor’s liability insurance coverage of $20,000.00 per claimant/$40,000.00 per incident (#115.00, Ex. B).
The plaintiff brought an action for underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the defendant Milford Transit District’s single limit underinsured motorist coverage of $40,000.00. In count 4 of her November 8, 2018 amended complaint (#103.00), the plaintiff alleged the following relevant facts. While a passenger on a bus in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision caused by the tortfeasor, William Rodriguez. At the time of the collision, Rodriguez was insured under an automobile policy issued by GEICO Insurance Company (GEICO), which provided liability coverage in the amount of $20,000.00 per person/$40,000.00 per occurrence. A global tender by GEICO of the policy limits to the plaintiff and other claimants involved in the collision satisfies the contractual requirement for exhaustion. Milford Transit District gave the plaintiff permission to settle the underlying claim, however, the GEICO policy was inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries. At the time of the accident, Milford Transit District had a contract with the defendant, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, for automobile insurance, which included coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorists (Hartford policy). The plaintiff, as a passenger on the bus, was a covered individual under the Hartford policy for said uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s excess damages pursuant to the terms of the Hartford policy and in accordance with General Statutes § 38a-336.
The plaintiff originally filed a three-count complaint on September 21, 2018, against Milford Transit District, Connecticut Transit District Consortium D/B/A Milford Transit District, and Connecticut Transit District Consortium D/B/A Greater Bridgeport Transit. Subsequently, on October 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in, as an additional defendant, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company (#102), which was granted by the court on October 23, 2018 (#102.10). On November 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended four-count complaint (#103). On January 15, 2019, the plaintiff filed a withdrawal of counts one, two, and three of her amended complaint (#110). Therefore, count four of the amended complaint against The Hartford Fire Insurance Company is the only count left, and for convenience, all references to the defendant in this memorandum are to The Hartford Fire Insurance Company.
General Statutes § 38a-336 provides in relevant part: "Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury ... from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles ..."
In its December 5, 2018 special defenses (#106.00), the defendant alleged that: (1) at the time of the accident, the underinsured motorist coverage afforded under the Hartford policy was in the gross amount of $40,000 each accident; (2) pursuant to the terms of the policy, the defendant is entitled to a credit in the amount of the payment received by the plaintiff from the tortfeasor; and (3) the defendant is entitled to a reduction in coverage for all amounts paid to the plaintiff and other persons involved in the accident by the tortfeasor.
On September 11, 2019, the plaintiff filed the current motion for partial summary judgment (#115.00) on the special defenses. On October 25, 2019, she filed exhibits in support of her motion (#117.00). On November 25, 2019, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion and a cross motion for summary judgment (#118.00) as to count four of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. Both motions and the objection were placed on the December 16, 2019 short calendar and were taken on the papers.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that underinsured motorist coverage is available to the plaintiff. They disagree, however, as to the amount of reduction the defendant is entitled to after the payment the plaintiff already received from the tortfeasor’s insurance provider. The plaintiff argues that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because on its face, the language in the Hartford policy clearly requires reduction on an individual basis. She asserts, pursuant to the Hartford policy, the $40,000.00 single limit coverage should be reduced by the $15,000.00 that she recovered from the tortfeasor’s carrier. The plaintiff further argues that if the court were to find the language in the Hartford policy to be ambiguous, she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the policy should be construed in her favor.
As a result of the settlement between GEICO and the plaintiff and others injured in the accident, the plaintiff received $15,000, and the other injured passengers received the remaining $25,000 of the $40,000 policy. (Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B.)
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 414-15 (2018).
The court’s resolution of the present motions centers on its interpretation of the language of the Hartford insurance policy. "Interpretation of an insurance policy, like the interpretation of other written contracts, involves a determination of the intent of the parties as expressed by the language of the policy ... Unlike certain other contracts, however, where absent statutory warranty or definitive contract language the intent of the parties and thus the meaning of the contract is a factual question ... construction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 307 Conn. 706, 711-12 (2013).
"The Connecticut rule of construction of insurance policies is well settled. If the terms of an insurance policy are of doubtful meaning, that permissible construction which is most favorable to the insured is to be adopted; but if they are plain and unambiguous the established rules for the construction of contracts apply, the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning, and the courts cannot indulge in a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, supra, 307 Conn. 712.
Section D(2)(b) of the Hartford policy states in relevant part: "The Limit of Insurance shall be reduced by ... All sums to ‘insureds’ because of ‘bodily injury’ by or for anyone who is legally responsible ..." (#115.00, Exhibit C). The plaintiff asserts that the plural term "insureds" is used in section D(2)(b) solely to maintain uniformity throughout the Section D. This court disagrees. The policy does not state that the policy coverage is to be reduced by sums paid to only one claimant, but, rather, to "insureds." The court concludes that the use of the term "insureds" in section D(2)(b) of the policy refers to all claimants who sustained bodily injury in the subject incident.
"It is a basic tenet of insurance policy interpretation that the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nichols v. Salem Subway Restaurant, 98 Conn.App. 837, 843 (2006), citing Stephan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 758 (1993); see also Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 696, 703 (1990) ("words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings").
In the current matter, the plaintiff asserts that an e-mail between plaintiff’s attorney and the claims adjuster, who was employed by Sedgwick, CMS and in charge of her claim with the defendant- in which the adjuster agreed that there would be $25,000 available to the plaintiff under the Hartford policy- $40,000 less the $15,000 the plaintiff received from GEICO- is evidence of the ambiguity of the policy language. (#117.00, Exhibit B) This court disagrees. Applying Nichols, this court concludes that the colloquy between the adjuster and the plaintiff’s attorney concerning the policy is not conclusive evidence that the policy language is ambiguous.
In Stephan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., supra, 224 Conn. 758, our Supreme Court interpreted particular language of insurance policies providing underinsured motorist benefits and held that the plaintiff’s insurers could not reduce the coverage limits by payments made to other persons involved in the incident at issue. In Stephan, the court stated, "The policies do not say ’a bodily injury, ’ or ’any bodily injury, ’ or ’all bodily injuries, ’ but are expressly limited to the singular ’the bodily injury.’" ( Id., 764, Emphasis in original.) The court held that the phrase "the bodily injury" unambiguously "refers to the claimant’s bodily injury, and not to any other bodily injuries." Id. In the present case, however, the policy language unambiguously states, "The limit of insurance shall be reduced by all sums paid to "insureds’ because of ‘bodily injury’ by or for anyone who is legally responsible ..." No language such as that which formed the basis of the decision of the court in Stephan is found in the subject policy in the present case.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lenda, 34 Conn.App. 444 (1994), the policy stated: "The limits of this coverage will be reduced by: (1) all amounts paid by the owner or operator of the uninsured auto or anyone else responsible. This includes all sums paid under the bodily injury liability coverage of this or any other policy." Id., 452. The Appellate Court distinguished this policy from the policy at issue in Stephan, holding "that under the terms of the policy, Allstate [was] entitled to reduce the amount of underinsured motorist benefits payable to [the plaintiff] by all the amounts paid by or on behalf of [the tortfeasor] to all injured parties ..." Id., 453. See also Jacaruso v. Lebski, 118 Conn.App. 216, 234 (2009), ("amounts payable under this coverage ... will be reduced by ... any amount paid by or for any liable parties"); see also Renaldi v. Geico Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-10-6006975-S (May 17, 2011, Cosgrove, J.) (51 Conn.L.Rptr. 902, 903) ("amount payable under this coverage will be reduced by all amounts ... paid by or for all persons ... liable for the injury"). This court concludes that the distinction found in Lenda applies to the language in the Hartford policy.
Section § 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part that underinsured motorist policy benefits "may provide for the reduction of limits to the extent that damages have been ... paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury ..." "[Our Supreme Court has] held repeatedly that an insurer may not, by contract, reduce its liability for such uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage except as § [38a-334-6], of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies expressly authorizes." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lenda, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lenda, supra, 34 Conn.App. 453, supra, 454, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ferrante, 201 Conn. 478, 483 (1986).
Under § 38a-334-6, "[i]t is clear that an insurer may draft an underinsured motorist provision that allows an award of underinsured motorist benefits to be reduced by amounts paid by or on behalf of a tortfeasor to all injured parties ..." (Emphasis added.) United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pitruzello, 35 Conn.App. 638, 644, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 933 (1994).
Connecticut General Statutes § 38-334-6(d) and the relevant provision of the Hartford policy allow the defendant to reduce the available underinsured motorist coverage by the total amount GEICO paid to the plaintiff and the other passengers involved in the collision. The amount payable under the Hartford policy is $40,000, and GEICO has paid a total of $40,000.00. This court concludes that the defendant is entitled to reduce the amount of underinsured motorist benefits payable to the plaintiff by "all sums" paid by GEICO to all injured passengers. The defendant is entitled to a reduction in the amount of $40,000.00, reducing the underinsured motorist coverage to zero.
CONCLUSIONS
As to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the special defenses, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, this court concludes that there remain genuine issue as to material facts and that the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Motion #115.00 is denied.
As to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count 4 of the amended complaint, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, this court concludes that no genuine issues of material facts remain and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Motion #118.00 is granted.