Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-08-CV-0384-B ECF.
August 13, 2008
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Judgment, filed May 8, 2008. (doc. 9). Defendant did not file a response to the motion. After due consideration and review of the record and all evidence presented, including without limitation the motion and its supporting affidavit, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background
An employee welfare benefit fund, IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund and its Trustees (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), brought this action against employer G M Electric, Inc. ("Defendant") for violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. ("ERISA").In their Original Complaint, filed March 5, 2008, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to timely submit contribution reports and to timely pay contribution payments, liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys' fees thereon to the Plaintiff Fund in violation of Defendant's Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Fund's trust agreement, and ERISA. (doc. 1). Because Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, Plaintiffs requested entry of default. (doc. 5). The Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Judgment on April 25, 2008 because a valid return of service had not yet been filed and, therefore, the Clerk had not entered the default. (doc. 7). Subsequently, the summons was returned executed as to Defendant G M Electric, Inc., and the Clerk entered default against Defendant on May 12, 2008. (docs. 8, 12). Subsequent to the filing of the suit and the service of summons, Defendant paid the principal indebtedness of $4,804.00. Plaintiffs requested that the Court enter a final judgment against Defendant for its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132, § 1145, and 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Plaintiffs requested $2,250.00 for attorneys' fees incurred to date and reasonably anticipated through the conclusion of this matter in the United States District Court.
On July 10, 2008, the Court entered an Order denying without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Judgment. (doc. 15). The Court found that Plaintiffs were entitled to mandatory reasonable attorneys' fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). The Court moved on to consider whether $2,250.00 was a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees. However, the affidavit submitted by Plaintiffs' attorney did not state the number of hours he expended on the matter. Therefore, the Court did not have sufficient information to make the lodestar calculation. The Court denied without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Judgment and permitted Plaintiffs' counsel to file an affidavit detailing the hours he expended within 14 days. Following the Court's instructions, the Plaintiffs filed an affidavit on July 17, 2008. (doc. 15). The Court may now determine the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees.
II. Analysis
The Court has previously determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees (doc. 14) and will now consider whether attorneys' fees of $2,250.00 are reasonable using the lodestar method. Louisiana Power Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1996). Under this method, the Court determines the reasonable hours expended on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating attorneys and then multiplies the two figures together to arrive at the lodestar. Id. at 324. This Court's determination of the reasonableness of the time and rate and the appropriateness of an adjustment is guided by the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). In determining a reasonable attorneys' fee award, a court should consider the Johnson factors as follow: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the case; (3) the skill required; (4) the preclusion of other employment; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed; (8) the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id.In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavit of Mr. Tom D. Matthews ("Matthews"), Jr., a partner in the law firm of Matthews, Stein, Shiels, Pearce, Knott, Eden, and Davis, L.L.P. (doc. 10). In his affidavit, Matthews states that he has been licensed to practice law in Texas since 1960; he has subsequently practiced law in Dallas County, Texas in the area of general business litigation with an emphasis on cases similar to this one; and his hourly billing rate is $250.00 per hour. Matthews further states that two individuals performed legal assistant work on this case: Sheryl Haskell, who has over five years of experience and a billing rate of $75.00 per hour, and Pat Weaver, who has over ten years of experience and a billing rate of $90.00 per hour. The affidavit opines that the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees incurred to date and reasonably anticipated through the conclusion of this matter is $2,250.00. Matthews claims that the attorneys' fees were $1,250 through the trial court and that reasonable fees for post-judgment collection efforts are $1,000. The affidavit describes the nature of work performed and states that the case involves a specialized area of law and requires specialized skills and knowledge that Matthews attests to possessing. Matthews also swears that the fee charged and hourly rates applied in this case are customary, considering the nature of the case and the amount in controversy, in Dallas County, Texas. The affidavit further addresses all of the Johnson factors.
Matthew's second affidavit filed July 17, 2008 includes billing records that specify the hours worked on this matter and show that fees of $1,756.50 have been incurred. (doc. 15). Having considered this evidence and the Johnson factors, the Court finds that the requested amount of $1,250 in fees for work already performed is appropriate. However, the Court will not award fees of $1,000 for future post-collection efforts that have not yet been incurred. See IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health Benefit Fund v. Anahuac Electric, Inc., 2003 WL 21294757, at * 2 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (refusing to award fees based on future legal services). In the event that these fees are incurred, Plaintiffs may move for additional fees at that time.
Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest and court costs. The federal post-judgment interest rate is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which sets the rate at the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment. Therefore, the Court will award post-judgment interest calculated at the date of the entry of judgment. As for costs, the Court will not award a specific amount of costs at this time, but Plaintiffs may file an appropriate bill of costs after the Court issues its judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The post-judgment interest rate may be found at: http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/publications/pjrate.html.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,250 plus post-judgment interest. In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, a judgment will issue by separate document.