Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700, 345 A.2d 563; Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1, 13, 266 A.2d 396; Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623, 238 A.2d 413; Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508, 242 A.2d 705; Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26, 232 A.2d 330; I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545; Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 660, 211 A.2d 687; Tucker v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 510, 514, 199 A.2d 685; Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 662, 145 A.2d 832; see 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law, pp. 538-41. The plaintiffs contend that their standing to appeal "must be judged by the relevant statutory scheme" and claim in their brief that they "fall well within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statutory scheme.

"Upon appeal, [a zoning appellant] must establish his aggrievement and the court must decide whether he has sustained the burden of proving that fact." I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545 (1967). It is in light of the formidable barriers to access to the courts for a zoning appeal that we ascertain the legislative intent in granting certain persons statutory aggrievement.

To be an aggrieved person, one must be affected directly or in relation to a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all members of the community, and the appellant must be specially and injuriously affected as to property or other legal rights. I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545 (1967). The situation is different with respect to any person owning land which abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of the land involved in any decision of a zoning board.

Upon appeal, he must establish his aggrievement, and the court must decide whether he has sustained the burden of proving that fact." I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545 (1967). Consequently, the Superior Court was not limited to the record before the planning commission on the issue of aggrievement.

The question of aggrievement is essentially one of standing; unless the plaintiff could establish that she was aggrieved by the decision of the state standards committee, she had no standing to appeal. General Statutes 19-402 and 4-183 (a); Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 508; I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545. The trial court must be satisfied, first, that the plaintiff alleges facts which, if proven, would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and, second, that the plaintiff proves the truth of those factual allegations.

An appellant is required to establish that he is aggrieved "by showing that . . . [he] had a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of all members of the community and that . . . [he is] specially and injuriously affected in . . . [his] property or other legal rights." Krejpcio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 660, 211 A.2d 687, cited in I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545. Although the plaintiff did allege that he was aggrieved and listed in his complaint the respects in which he claims to be specially and injuriously affected by the commission's actions, the court made no findings of fact relating to those allegations. The finding reveals that when the defendants attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff on his alleged aggrievement, the court sustained the plaintiff's objection and stated that "the court would limit its consideration of aggrievement to the statutory allegation in the complaint."

The plaintiff appealed from the defendant's decision to the Court of Common Pleas, claiming that the action taken by the defendant was illegal, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and unconstitutional. The court found that the plaintiff was an aggrieved person, entitled to appeal from the decision of the defendant; see I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545; and held that the conditional approval by the defendant was invalid and modified the decision to the extent of eliminating the condition. Upon certification granted, the defendant has appealed to this court.

Aggrievement is a jurisdictional condition precedent to the taking of an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas; General Statutes 20-322, 20-324j, 20-329l and 20-329aa; and a question of fact for that court to determine. I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545; Luery v. Zoning Board, 150 Conn. 136, 140, 187 A.2d 247; Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 665, 667, 154 A.2d 520. The court made no finding with respect to aggrievement. "Proof of aggrievement was an essential prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction of the subject matter of the appeal. The parties could not confer jurisdiction of the subject matter of the appeal by agreeing to that prerequisite."

Schwartz v. Hamden, 168 Conn. 8, 10, 357 A.2d 488; Tazza v. Planning Zoning Commission, 164 Conn. 187, 191, 319 A.2d 393; East Side Civic Assn. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 560, 290 A.2d 348; Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1, 10, 266 A.2d 396; Long v. Zoning Commission, 133 Conn. 248, 252, 50 A.2d 172. Under 8-8 of the General Statutes, aggrievement is a prerequisite to a right of appeal. "Except in cases involving the sale of alcoholic beverages, aggrievement requires a showing that the plaintiffs have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of the community as a whole, and that the plaintiffs were specially and injuriously affected in their property or other legal rights. Hughes v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507, 242 A.2d 705; I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545; Hickey v. New London, 153 Conn. 35, 37, 213 A.2d 308; Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 662, 145 A.2d 832; see `The Connecticut Law of Zoning (Part B),' 41 Conn. B.J. 453, 485-88." Sheridan v. Planning Board, supra, 13. Since the amendment in question did not affect the plaintiffs in their property or other legal rights, they were not specially and legally injured by its adoption.

More significant than the inapplicability of the case on which the plaintiffs rely, however, is the fact that the issue of aggrievement is not a federal issue, but a requirement of Connecticut law. It has long been established that aggrievement in Connecticut requires "a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision as distinguished from a general interest." See I. R. Stich Associates, Inc. v. Town Council, 155 Conn. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 545; Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1, 13, 266 A.2d 396. Finally, we briefly discuss the plaintiffs' claim that in finding that the city of New Haven was the only party aggrieved, the remaining plaintiffs were "deprived of active participation and presentation of their arguments by counsel of their choice.