"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 454, 817 N.E.2d 799 (2004), quoting from Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). "Contract formation requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange.
"An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain made in such a way as to justify the other person in understanding that his assent will conclude the agreement." I&R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455 (2004) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981)). "A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent."
"An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain made in such a way as to justify the other person in understanding that his assent will conclude the agreement." I & R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). "An offer ripens into a binding contract when it is accepted. Acceptance occurs when the offeree gives the return requested in the offer.
Thus, the communication constituted a solicitation of an offer to buy unregistered securities. See I R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455 (2004) (advertisements are usually considered requests for offers). See also 1 Williston, Contracts § 4:10, at 475 (4th ed. 2007).
Further appellate review denied. Reported below: 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452 (2004). 817 N.E.2d 799
As there is nothing in the record that would warrant disturbing the judge's credibility assessment, we discern no error in the judge's conclusion that the husband failed to prove the existence of an agreement entitling him to any additional credits beyond those to which the parties stipulated at trial. See I & R Mechanical Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 455 (2004) (Where there is no “meeting of the minds” between the parties, there can be no agreement). As previously discussed in note 8, supra, though the judge did not expressly find the separation agreement to be integrated, the separation agreement does contain an integration clause.
Here, notwithstanding Greene's assertions that he was unaware of the IP policy, he objectively manifested the intent to be bound by that policy when, without reservation, he signed the employment agreements that incorporated it by reference. See I & R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (2004) (“The manifestation of mutual assent between contracting parties generally consists of an offer by one and the acceptance of it by the other.”). Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that Greene intended to be bound by his employment agreements in their totality.
An indispensable element in the pleading and proof of a breach of contract claim is the promise that the plaintiff seeks to enforce. See I R Meek, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (2004). Here, the plaintiff asserts that he was promised the balance of his stock options regardless of whether he continued to work for the defendant.
"In contract formation, the element of agreement or mutual assent is often referred to as a 'meeting of the minds.' " I & R Mech. Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 817 N.E.2d 799, 800 (2004) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 cmt. C (Am. L. Inst. 1981)). i. Massachusetts Law Applies
Assuming a breach of contract theory, plaintiffs' claims are doomed by the failure to allege the existence of any contract (or even that, absent a written contract, Ivanova nonetheless manifested “mutual assent to” treating the payments as a loan). I & R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 455 (2004). Assuming a quasi-contract theory, plaintiffs' claims are doomed by the failure to allege that Ivanova made any promise or representation that she would pay back the sums.