Opinion
A139642 A140030
10-31-2017
JUNHO HYON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HAROLD J. LIGHT et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS041402)
These appeals, like several before them, arise from a dispute that began in the early 1990s concerning a sand mining operation on an island in the Sacramento River. Appellant Junho Hyon ultimately secured a multi-million dollar verdict and agreed to a global settlement of the original dispute, but the division of the settlement proceeds led to further extensive litigation that had a conclusion unsatisfactory to Hyon. Hyon, acting in propria persona (pro. per.), filed the instant action in 2013 against respondents Harold J. Light and the Law Offices of Harold J. Light (collectively, Light) and Robert J. Stumpf, Jr. of the firm Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (collectively, Stumpf), who represented him at certain points during the extensive history of this dispute. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers to Hyon's complaint on the grounds that his claims are time barred and are precluded as a result of the application of res judicata principles. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Hyon's status as a pro. per. litigant does not exempt him from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve his burden on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) We treat pro. per. litigants like any other party, affording them " 'the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' " (Ibid.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We give a very brief overview of the facts as relevant to our analysis from the various litigations at issue, as drawn from Hyon's complaint, documents of which the trial court took judicial notice, and previous opinions in this litigation.
A more complete history can be found in Hyon v. Selten (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 463 (Selten) and Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1489 (Shopoff & Cavallo).
I. Decker Island Litigation
Decker Island is located in the Sacramento River in Solano County. (See Hyon v. Shopoff (Jan. 20, 2015, A138623) [nonpub. opn.], at p. *1.) In the early 1990s, Hyon and a business partner, Laurence Colangelo, agreed to find individuals interested in investing in a sand mining operation on Decker Island under an agreement with the owner of the island. (Ibid.) In 1993, after disputes arose between the parties to the agreement, Hyon and Colangelo filed suit in Solano County against Decker Island's owner (the Decker Island litigation). (Ibid.) A jury returned a $42 million verdict in favor of Hyon and Colangelo, but the trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial was ordered on appeal. (Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.)
Hyon and Colangelo retained Jeffrey Shopoff to retry the case. (Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) On retrial, Shopoff succeeded in securing a $7.6 million verdict for Hyon and Colangelo. (Ibid.) However, faced with obstacles to enforcing the $7.6 million judgment, Shopoff negotiated a global settlement agreement that finally resolved the litigation. (Id. at p. 1499.) Shopoff acted as trustee over the settlement proceeds pursuant to an agreement between Hyon and Colangelo. (Id. at pp. 1499-1500.)
II. The San Francisco Interpleader Litigation
In September 2004, Shopoff, in his capacity of trustee of the settlement proceeds, filed a complaint in interpleader in San Francisco Superior Court (the SF interpleader litigation). (Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1501.) Shopoff sought a determination of the shares of the settlement proceeds to which each claimant was entitled, the appointment of a receiver over the settlement proceeds, and an order discharging the trustee from all liability to the claimants. (Ibid.) Hyon, represented by Light, filed a cross-complaint against Shopoff for legal malpractice, conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, misappropriation of assets, and constructive fraud. (Id. at p. 1502.) The trial court ultimately granted Shopoff's motion for appointment of a receiver, and Division One of this court affirmed that order in an unpublished opinion. (See Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon (June 15, 2006, A111396) [nonpub. opn.], at p. *1.) The interpleader action returned to the trial court for resolution of the parties' competing claims to their percentage shares of the settlement proceeds. (Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) The trial court filed an amended order that approved the receiver's final report, terminated the receivership, discharged the receiver, and distributed the assets on September 12, 2007. (Id. at p. 1505.)
Hyon again appealed, and was represented on appeal by Stumpf. Division One of this court reversed and remanded in part. (See Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) Stumpf's representation of Hyon ended when the Supreme Court denied review of that decision on January 14, 2009 (S168948). (See ibid.)
III. The Los Angeles Selten Litigation
Roughly one week after Shopoff filed the SF interpleader litigation, Hyon, represented by Light, filed his own lawsuit in Los Angeles County against Eric Selten, Colangelo, and others for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, among other causes of action (the LA Selten litigation). (See Selten, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) Selten cross-complained against Hyon, Colangelo, and others. (Ibid.) The LA Selten litigation proceeded on a parallel and sometimes overlapping track with the SF interpleader litigation. (See Shopoff & Cavallo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1501-1505.) Ultimately, after a motion for summary judgment, trial, and two appeals, only Selten's quantum meruit claim remained to be resolved. (See Hyon v. Selten (Apr. 29, 2011, B218942) [nonpub. opn.], at pp. *3-4.) A bench trial on that claim took place from June 23 to July 2, 2009, judgment was entered on July 17, 2009, and the trial court entered an order relieving Light as counsel on August 20, 2009. (Id. at p. *4.) Hyon appealed in pro. per., and the Second District affirmed. (Id. at p. *5.)
Selten helped retain counsel and provided other litigation support services for Hyon and Colangelo in connection with the Decker Island litigation. (See Selten, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.)
IV. The Instant Litigation
Hyon filed this action in Solano County Superior Court against Light and Stumpf on March 15, 2013. Hyon's first amended complaint brings claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive and actual fraud, negligence, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, all based on the defendants' representation of Hyon in the SF interpleader litigation and the LA Selten litigation. Light and Stumpf separately demurred to the complaint. Both argued that Hyon's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and Light argued in addition that Hyon's claims were barred by the res judicata effect of the previous actions filed in October 2009 and May 2012. The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to amend. Hyon appeals.
Before filing this lawsuit, Hyon brought two additional lawsuits in pro. per. related to the SF interpleader litigation and the LA Selten litigation. The first, filed in San Francisco Superior Court in October 2009, named Light as a defendant and brought breach of contract claims based on Light's handling of the SF interpleader litigation. The second, filed in Solano County Superior Court in May 2012, again named Light as a defendant and brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence, in connection with Light's representation of Hyon in both the SF interpleader litigation and the LA Selten litigation. In the October 2009 action, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, and in the May 2012 action, Hyon voluntarily dismissed his claims against Light with prejudice after the trial court issued a tentative ruling sustaining Light's demurrer without leave to amend. Various appeals arising out of the May 2012 action were decided by Division Three of this court in January 2015. (See Hyon v. Shopoff, supra, at p.
Hyon appealed separately with respect to Light and Stumpf.
DISCUSSION
The legal standards which govern these appeals are well settled. "We review de novo the trial court's order sustaining a demurrer." (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1468.) We accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, and treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) We will also consider facts and documents of which the trial court properly took judicial notice. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751-52.)
We first consider defendants' argument that the statute of limitations bars Hyon's claims. The statute of limitations usually commences when a cause of action "accrues," and it is generally said that "an action accrues on the date of injury." (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109.) "An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the 'discovery rule,' which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) "The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action." (Ibid.) A plaintiff relying on the discovery rule must plead " '(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.' " (Id. at p. 808.) The plaintiff has an obligation to plead facts demonstrating reasonable diligence. (Ibid. [" 'conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer' "].)
On September 12, 2014, Hyon filed a "Request for Submitting New Evidence Against Robert J. Stumpf and Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP; Request for Judicial Notice" before this court. The request attaches a March 22, 2009 letter from one Tom A. Nunziato to Light, and a July 7, 2004 e-mail from Eric Selten to various unidentified e-mail addresses discussing a letter sent by Shopoff. Stumpf opposed this request, and we deferred consideration of it until reaching the merits of Hyon's appeal. Hyon does not explain how these documents, which were evidently not before the trial court, are relevant to his appeal or are properly the subject of judicial notice. Accordingly, Hyon's request is denied.
Again on April 6, 2017, Hyon filed a "Request for Submitting New Evidence Against Harold J. Light and Robert J. Stumpf; Request for Judicial Notice" before this court. This request was unopposed and we issued an order indicating that it would be considered together with the merits of Hyon's appeal. This second request attaches a copy of a April 3, 2017 preemptory challenge to Judge Paul L. Beeman filed by Hyon in Solano County Superior Court in Hyon v. Brown, case No. FCS048068, and two exhibits thereto: (1) a March 28, 2017 letter from the Solano County District Attorney declining criminal prosecution in connection with the sale of Decker Island, and (2) a March 29, 2017 letter from the California Department of Justice to Hyon attaching a proposed order in Hyon v. Brown declaring Hyon a vexatious litigant. Hyon does not offer any argument in support of judicial notice of these documents, which relate to a different trial court matter than the one at issue on appeal, were not before the trial court, and which postdate the judgment on appeal. Accordingly, Hyon's second request is likewise denied.
The statute of limitations for all claims against an attorney other than actual fraud is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a), which provides: "(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first."
Hyon's actual fraud claim is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), which provides a three-year statute of limitations for an action "on the ground of fraud or mistake," which is deemed to accrue upon "the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).)
Hyon's allegations against Light all relate to actions that Light took or should have taken during his representation of Hyon in the SF interpleader litigation and the LA Selten litigation. For example, Hyon alleges Light should not have "let Judge Karnow assume Shopoff was plaintiff's trustee," should have "done all means to stop Judge Karnow's proceedings," and that Light "knew an interpleader lawsuit does not require a jury trial when Shopoff filed the lawsuit." Hyon alleges Light's "wrongful conduct" caused him to lose the trial in the SF interpleader litigation. Similarly, Hyon's allegations against Stumpf all relate to Stumpf's handling of Hyon's second appeal in the SF interpleader litigation. Hyon alleges Stumpf argued in his opening brief on appeal that Hyon was entitled to a jury trial despite the fact that "Stumpf knew that an interpleader lawsuit does not require a jury trial," and that Stumpf should have argued instead that there were no "multiple, conflicting claims" to the settlement proceeds and that "Shopoff was never plaintiff's trustee." According to Hyon, this "wrongful conduct" caused him to lose the appeal.
Judge Curtis A. Karnow presided over the SF interpleader litigation.
As the trial court found, and as Hyon does not dispute, Light's and Stumpf's representation in the SF interpleader litigation ended no later than January 14, 2009, when our Supreme Court denied Hyon's petition for review in that case, and Light's representation in the LA Selten litigation ended no later than August 20, 2009, when the trial court entered an order relieving Light as counsel. Thus, each of Hyon's claims against Light except his actual fraud claim accrued by August 20, 2010, and each of Hyon's claims against Stumpf, with the exception of his actual fraud claim, accrued by January 14, 2010. Hyon's actual fraud claim against Light accrued by August 20, 2012, and Hyon's actual fraud claim against Sheppard Mullin accrued by January 14, 2012, all well before Hyon filed suit on March 15, 2013. Hyon's claims are therefore barred by the statute of limitations, unless the discovery rule applies.
On appeal, Hyon's only argument that his claims are not time barred in his assertion that he first discovered Light's and Stumpf's conduct was wrongful "from a paralegal" in November of 2012. In the first place, Hyon's argument fails because it is not any discovery that the conduct at issue was "wrongful," but discovery of the underlying facts themselves that triggers the statute of limitations. (See Worton v. Worton (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1638, 1650 ["Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, however, the one-year period is triggered by the client's discovery of 'the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission,' not by his discovery that such facts constitute professional negligence, i.e., by discovery that a particular legal theory is applicable based on the known facts"].) Hyon has not alleged that he was unaware of the "wrongful" conduct of his attorneys when it took place, nor has he alleged any inability to learn of that conduct (which was largely available in pleadings filed on his behalf) despite reasonable diligence. In addition, other facts in the record are not consistent with any delayed discovery of Hyon's causes of action. For example, Hyon admits in his opening brief that he "wanted to sue Light following the Los Angeles trial" as early as July of 2009. In fact, Hyon did sue Light, in October of 2009 for claims arising out of the SF interpleader litigation, and again in May of 2012, for claims arising out of both the SF interpleader litigation and the LA Selten litigation.
Because we conclude that Hyon's claims are time barred, we need not reach the question of whether they are also barred by the res judicata effects of the October 2009 and May 2012 actions brought by Hyon against Light. --------
In short, Hyon has failed to plead any facts demonstrating an "inability to have made earlier discovery" of his claims "despite reasonable diligence," and accordingly defendants' demurrers were properly sustained on the ground that his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
REARDON, ACTING P. J. We concur: /s/_________
RIVERA, J. /s/_________
STREETER, J.