B Pioneer separately asserts that the CONNUM-specific reporting requirement is unlawful because it is inconsistent with the Tariff Act and our decision in Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States , 424 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We disagree.

"Commerce's use of hypotheticals, generalizations . . . and conditional language suggesting possible distortions in antidumping calculations offer conjecture rather than a reasoned explanation founded on substantial evidence." Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 27 CIT 1719, 1722, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (2003), rev'd in part, 424 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While Commerce may not find this line of inquiry relevant, the court does, and when an agency does not comply with the court's remand instructions, its remand results will not be sustained.

See Pioneer Br. at 22-25. Pioneer relies on the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") in Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005), contending that the Federal Circuit held that Commerce must explain why a respondent's records that were kept according to generally accepted accounting practices ("GAAP") are not reasonably reflective of its costs before finding that those records are unsuitable for FOP calculations. Id. at 23.

While acknowledging the Second Remand Results' conformity with Hyundai II, Micron argued that an intervening opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the "Federal Circuit") had indirectly overruled the conclusions of law underpinning Hyundai II. Def.-Intvr.'s Br. at 1 (citing Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ( "HynixIV")). Plaintiffs submitted Rebuttal Comments in Response to Defendant-Intervenor's Memorandum ( "Pls.' Br."), arguing that the Federal Circuit's decision in Hynix IV was based on conclusions of fact particular to the investigation at issue in that case rather than general conclusions of law.

In so doing, we apply anew the same standard used by the court, and will uphold Commerce's determination unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir.2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "While we essentially step into the shoes of the Court of International Trade and duplicate its review, . . . we do not altogether ignore its informed opinion.

I & D Mem. Cmt. 1 at 9;Def.'s Br. at 16. See also SAA at 835; Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed.Cir.1999); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2001)). Plaintiff's reported per-unit costs shifted costs away from the subject merchandise, and thus Commerce reasonably recalculated Plaintiff's costs by averaging them in order to prevent large discrepancies in costs between merchandise that was physically similar.

See Nakornthai II, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 ("Commerce's use of hypotheticals, generalizations . . . and conditional language suggesting possible distortions in antidumping calculations offer conjecture rather than a reasoned explanation founded on substantial evidence." (quoting Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 27 CIT 1719, 1722, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (2003),rev'd in part, 424 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). Thus, Commerce's hypothetical scenario, indicating that Nakornthai — had it and its U.S. customer not amended the contract — would have breached the contract when delivering its particular quantity of the relevant line item, is of limited persuasiveness. Because it is Commerce's practice to disregard changes that are not significant, see Nakornthai II, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 1309, Commerce cannot simultaneously rely on contractual changes that it has found insignificant to claim that such changes demonstrate that a contract's terms are not established.

CARMAN, Judge. This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") in Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reversing in part and remanding the judgment of the Court in Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 28 CIT ___, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (2004) ("Hynix III"). Based on the CAFC's decision, this Court remanded this matter to the United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce"). Commerce was instructed to recalculate Hynix's antidumping duty rate by expensing research and development costs. See Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, No. 01-00988 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 16, 2006).

red from the administrative determinations cited by the government and CFMT to support the notion that these expenses are indirect, selling, and associated with U.S. sales, and that certain aspects of the referenced determinations might be interpreted as supportive of Agro Dutch's rather than the government's position, but without more, Agro Dutch's arguments reduce to a difference of opinion with Commerce. For example, if there is a precise generally accepted accounting principle that would require that these moving expenses be accounted a direct cost of the foreign sale to which the recalled merchandise was ultimately delivered, taking into account their intermediate return to inventory in India, Agro Dutch does not elaborate. It does not, therefore, successfully attack Commerce's general cost methodology, with which the instant administrative determination appears consistent.Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f) (requiring consideration of all available evidence on proper allocation of costs); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (respondent's methodology insufficient to undermine agency's preferred method so long as agency method supported by substantial evidence on the record); Thai Pineapple, supra, 187 F.3d at 1365 (methodologies relied upon by Commerce in making its determinations are presumptively correct) (citation omitted). In short, Agro Dutch's arguments do not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the administrative treatment of the movement expenses of the recalled sales from the United States to India, as indirect expenses associated with United States sales, was unreasonable.