In Joppy v. Hopkins, 231 Md. 52, 188 A.2d 545 (1963), an automobile accident case, we held that a prior statement by the plaintiff was admissible both to impeach her testimony and as an admission against interest, citing with approval and following both Terry and Lambros. See Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664, 69 A.L.R.2d 585, 590 (1958); Tellez v. Canton R.R. Co., 212 Md. 423, 431, 129 A.2d 809, 813 (1957); Hynes v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 363-64, 128 A. 70, 71 (1925); and Bartlett v. Wilbur, 53 Md. 485 (1880). See also 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1048 (3rd Ed. 1940), McCormick, Evidence § 239 at 502-04 (1954), 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 600 at 655-56 (1967) and 31A, C.J.S. Evidence § 272 at 697 (1964).

From the evidence it was a question for the jury as regards the liability of the defendant. ( Hoffman v. Roehl, 61 Mont. 290, 203 P. 349, 20 A.L.R. 189; Brown v. Montgomery Ward Co., 104 Cal.App. 679, 286 P. 474; Marchand v. Russel, 257 Mich. 96, 241 N.W. 209; Hynes v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 128 A. 70; Lang Floral Nursery Co. v. Sheridan, (Tex.Civ.App.) 245 S.W. 467; Wait v. Morrison, 129 Kan. 53, 281 P. 906; Barton v. McDermott, 108 Cal.App. 372, 291 P. 591.) That there may have been a departure for a social evening before returning from his visit to Butte on business, cannot affect the liability.

This rule applies with equal force to the negligence of the borrower of an automobile who is using it for his sole benefit and pleasure, and not upon the business of the owner. Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645; Hynes v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 128 A. 70; Salowitch v. Kres, 147 Md. 23, 127 A. 643; Fletcher v. Meredith, 148 Md. 580, 129 A. 795; Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498. The same reasoning which this and other courts have applied to hold the owner of a car immune from damages resulting from negligence of the borrower of his car, when employed in a case such as now before us, renders unavailable the defense of contributory negligence of the borrower, at the suit of the owner of the car against a third party. We have been referred to no case in this court where this precise question has been passed upon; but, from examination of authorities elsewhere, we find, in those jurisdictions where, like Maryland, the owner is not liable to third parties for injury caused by negligence of one to whom the car has been loaned, it is uniformly held that such negligence is not a bar to recovery by the owner against a third party whose negligence contributed to the injury.

It is settled that the mere fact that it may afford an owner pleasure and satisfaction to have members of his family transported in his car, entirely on their own affairs, does not render their expedition his business, so that he will be liable for the results of negligence in its conduct. Whitelock v. Dennis, 139 Md. 557; Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380; Baitary v. Smith, 140 Md. 437; Hynes v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360. Nor can the request by Ludwig of James in this case, that the latter drive their parents on their visit, render the visit or the transportation the business of Ludwig. He merely asked James to accommodate the parents when he, Ludwig, could not do so. James was completely independent of Ludwig, not at all subject to Ludwig's direction, and, indeed, as an infant, was subject to the parental control of his passengers.