Specifically, it refers to a suit in which the plaintiff sues a wrongdoer's liability insurer without joining or first obtaining a judgment against the insured. Kong , 750 F.3d at 1300 ; accord Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 885 F.3d 482, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2018) ; Rosa v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 981 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1992) ; Beckham v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. , 691 F.2d 898, 901–02 (9th Cir. 1982) ; seeVelez v. Crown Life Ins. Co. , 599 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1979) ; Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co. , 369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966) ; see also 7A Couch on Insurance § 107:4 (3d ed. updated 2018) (collecting additional cases). Section 1332(c)'s legislative history strongly supports this reading.
. The Seventh Circuit explained that the “judgment must provide relief to which the prevailing party is entitled, ” citing Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir. 2018), and Exelon Generation Co., LLC v. Local 15, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 540 F.3d 640, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.See also Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 482, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing cases).
We repeat our reminder for district courts to enter final judgments that contain their essential components and for parties to take steps to ensure that the courts do so. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2018); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1999).
A document providing that "[j]udgment is entered" does not satisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co ., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018) ; Cooke v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co ., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2018) ; Reytblatt v. Denton , 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987) ; Azeez v. Fairman , 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does not do that. It shows that the district court is done with the case, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the parties' dispute.
But an award may be final if the district court lays out a formula for calculating the award's amount. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 885 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2018) ; Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp. , 954 F.2d 1397, 1401–02 (7th Cir. 1992) ; Parks v. Pavkovic , 753 F.2d 1397, 1401 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 15B Federal Practice & Procedure § 3915.2 at 279 (2d ed. 1992) ("[M]erely ‘ministerial’ proceedings to calculate a specific award do not defeat finality.").
Thus, the case is not a “direct action” against Continental within the meaning of the diversity statute. See, e.g., Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 917 F.3d 269, 273 (4th Cir. 2019); Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2018); Kong v. Allied Prof'l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 2014). Because Hutton and Continental are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the court has diversity jurisdiction over the case.
The Seventh Circuit has declined to affirmatively endorse one approach over the other. Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. , 885 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 2018) ("We are reluctant to get into this dispute about the meaning of Illinois insurance law"). Under both approaches, however, an insured is typically entitled to reimbursement for costs incurred during litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Under Illinois law, "[w]hen judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at [9% per year] from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering judgment upon the same." 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-1303; see Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2018). Defendants do not dispute the applicability of this provision.