Rather, “a court should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). And ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court.
Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890 (citation omitted). So, “a court should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).
Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890 (citation omitted). So, “a court should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).
So, “a court should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988))
. However, “[a] district court may reconsider and revise a previous interlocutory decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of controlling law.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (“A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own . . . in any circumstance.”).
NetJets argues that the bankruptcy court failed to consider new evidence that: (1) RS Air had not reported any income since at least 2004; (2) Perlman's alleged tax benefit flowing from his ownership of RS Air was not a benefit and but rather a loss because the cost of producing the benefit exceeded the amount of the tax benefit itself; (3) the financial model supporting RS Air's income calculations treated expenses as "income," did not comply with GAAP, and was inconsistent with the definition of "disposable income" under the Code; and (4) RS Air's disposable income would be negative using a strict definition of "disposable income." NetJets contends that the bankruptcy court's decision was particularly egregious because the subchapter V designation was an interlocutory ruling. SeeAmarel v. Connell , 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (interlocutory orders are subject to modification at any time prior to final judgment); Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (court may reconsider and revise an interlocutory decision for any reason, even absent new evidence or an intervening change in the law). The problem facing NetJets is that all of the alleged new evidence it argues that the bankruptcy court should have considered relates to the fact that RS Air had no net profit.
NetJets contends that the bankruptcy court's decision was particularly egregious because the subchapter V designation was an interlocutory ruling. See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (interlocutory orders are subject to modification at any time prior to final judgment); Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (court may reconsider and revise an interlocutory decision for any reason, even absent new evidence or an intervening change in the law). The problem facing NetJets is that all of the alleged new evidence it argues that the bankruptcy court should have considered relates to the fact that RS Air had no net profit.
To determine the merits of a request to reconsider an interlocutory order, courts apply the standard required under a Rule 59(e) reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
Courts “should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court.
Courts “should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F.Supp.2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).