See, e.g., Stephens, 982 So. 2d at 1147-48, rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Stephens, 982 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. 2006). See also Shaw, 207 So.3d at 111 ; Reynolds v. State, 114 So. 3d 61 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ; and Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, Phillips is not entitled to relief on this claim.
See, e.g., Stephens, 982 So. 2d at 1147-48, rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Stephens, 982 So. 2d 1148 (Ala. 2006). See also Shaw [v. State], 207 So. 3d [79] at 130 [ (Ala. Crim App. 2004) ]; Reynolds v. State, 114 So. 3d 61 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ; and Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Thus, Phillips is not entitled to relief on this claim."
”Hyde v. State, 13 So.3d 997, 1017 (Ala.Crim.App.2007). Considering all the circumstances of the case, we cannot conclude that the Tuscumbia Police Department officers instigated the search of the Stanleys' apartment; the Berryhills were not acting as instruments or agents of the State in the initial entry into the Stanleys' apartment, and there is no indication that the Berryhills engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigation.
" Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Considering all the circumstances of the case, we cannot conclude that the Tuscumbia Police Department officers instigated the search of the Stanleys' apartment; the Berryhills were not acting as instruments or agents of the State in the initial entry into the Stanleys' apartment, and there is no indication that the Berryhills engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigation.
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a showing of prejudice is not required to establish the ineffectiveness of counsel in circumstances "that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified," United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), those circumstances are extremely rare and limited. See Hyde v. State, 13 So.3d 997, 1021 (Ala.Crim.App. 2007) ("Rarely has the United States Supreme Court applied a 'presumed prejudice' standard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."). Indeed, they are limited solely to those "situations in which counsel has entirely failed to function as the client's advocate."
Christopher Shane HYDE, petitioner, v. ALABAMA.Case below, 13 So.3d 997. *397Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama denied.
We find no plain error in the use of the stun belt. See Floyd v. State, 289 So.3d 337, 369-71 (Ala.Crim.App.2017); Reynolds v. State, 114 So.3d 61, 81-82 (Ala.Crim.App.2010); McMillan v. State, 139 So.3d 184, 228-29 (Ala.Crim.App.2010); Belisle v. State, 11 So.3d 256, 281-82 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), aff'd, 11 So.3d 323 (Ala. 2008); and Hyde v. State, 13 So.3d 997, 1005-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).
See Johnson v. State, 611 So. 2d 506, 510 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)." Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997, 1009-10 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).
Hyde v. State, 13 So.3d 997, 1009-10 (Ala.Crim.App.2007).
Given the fact that Stanley was on trial for capital murder, the CCSO requiring him to wear ankle shackles during his trial was a reasonable and appropriate safety measure. See Hyde v. State, 13 So. 3d 997, 1007 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). That Mr. Marthaler and Mr. Gardner did not object to Stanley being tried in ankle shackles, without more, does not prove that they were ineffective.