Kugel v. Angell, 74 Conn. 546, 550, 51 A. 533; Nolan v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 70 Conn. 159, 176, 39 A. 115. As to a conclusion of ultimate fact drawn from subordinate facts by process of reasoning, there is a reviewable error of law when it appears that in drawing its conclusion from subordinate facts the trier has violated some plain rules of reason, and the conclusion is, therefore, illogically drawn. Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 143, 52 A. 744; Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 379, 380, 119 A. 341. In dealing with the correction of a finding by seeking the exclusion from it of a fact because it was found without evidence, or the insertion in it of a material fact as an admitted or undisputed fact, we are dealing purely with subordinate facts.

oad tracks was not annexed to his employment by consent, acquiescence or agreement of his employer; that, on the contrary, he was in the act of trespassing on railroad property contrary to warning by both the Railroad Company and by the Chelsea Silk Company, and that his death did not therefore arise out of and in the course of his employment." This was a conclusion drawn by the commissioner from the subordinate facts and the Superior Court could not find it to be erroneous in law, unless it was reached "as a result of an incorrect application of some rule or principle of law to subordinate facts, or because of an inference illogically drawn from subordinate facts," Palumbo v. Fuller Co., 99 Conn. 353, 357, 122 A. 63; or, as we have also expressed it, unless it was "found in violation of some rule or principle of law, or is in conflict with the rules of logic and reason, or is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the subordinate facts;" Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 379, 119 A. 341; Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 143, 52 A. 744; Kugel v. Angell, 74 Conn. 546, 550, 51 A. 533; or, as we have more tersely said, unless there was not "evidence from which the court below [the commissioner here] could have reasonably reached the conclusions complained of." Maley v. Hugo, 87 Conn. 323, 324, 87 A. 734. See also Bailey v. Mitchell, 113 Conn. 721, 725, 156 A. 856, and cases cited.

In Nolan v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 70 Conn. 159, 176, 39 A. 115, we speak of the review of an erroneous conclusion from subordinate facts as an error of law: "It [this principle] is not only supported by the true ratio decidendi of a long line of decisions, but is embedded in the very structure of our jurisprudence." In Hyde v. Mendell, 75 Conn. 140, 143, 52 A. 744, MR. JUSTICE HAMERSLEY, whose opinions have done much to elucidate this difficult question, wrote: "The error assigned, in effect, is that the trial court has erred in basing its ultimate conclusions as to the facts of negligence upon the specific facts set forth. Such a conclusion is reviewable when it appears that the trial court in drawing its inferences of fact from conceded, subordinate or evidential facts, has violated the plain rules of reason, or when some one or more of the facts found are legally inconsistent with the conclusions reached.

A judgment rendered upon facts found will not be reviewed unless some erroneous rule of law material to the case has been applied, or unless a material conclusion has been reached or a material inference drawn, legally or logically necessarily inconsistent with the facts, or so illogical and unsound, or so violative of the plain rules of reason, as to be unwarranted in law. Gray's Appeal, 80 Conn. 248, 251, 67 A. 891; Spencer v. Merwin, 80 Conn. 330, 337, 68 A. 370; Brown v. Clark, 80 Conn. 419, 423, 68 A. 1001; General Hospital Society v. New Haven Rendering Co., 79 Conn. 581, 586, 65 A. 1065; Metcalf v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 78 Conn. 614, 619, 63 A. 633; Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 143, 52 A. 744; Lawler v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 72 Conn. 74, 81, 43 A. 545; Broughel v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 72 Conn. 617, 627, 45 A. 435; Ryan v. Chelsea Paper Mfg. Co., 69 Conn. 454, 460, 37 A. 1062. The judgment of the City Court must be upheld unless its conclusion upon the facts before it violated this rule.

PRENTICE, J. The plaintiff persistently and wilfully disregarded the warnings and disobeyed the reasonable and proper instructions and directions repeatedly and emphatically given to him by the defendant's superintendent with respect to his safety, in view of the particular source of danger, specifically pointed out to him, which occasioned his injury. His disobedience thus deliberately persisted in exposed him to his injury, which otherwise would not have befallen him. Under such conditions it cannot be said that the court below was not justified in finding, as it did, that he was guilty of negligence, and that this negligence directly contributed to produce his injury. Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 144, 52 A. 744; Cavanaugh v. Windsor Cut Stone Corporation, 80 Conn. 585, 592, 69 A. 345; Smithwick v. Hall Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 268, 21 A. 924. The plaintiff, however, insists that this is not a correct synopsis of the situation, and that by his disobedience he assumed no other risks than those which were incident to the fall of the hammer when the machine was in perfect working order, and did not assume those which would attend its fall from the defective condition of the machine.

It does not clearly appear from the finding that in drawing its inferences of fact the trial court has violated the plain rules of reason, or that any fact found is legally inconsistent with the conclusions reached. Owens PotteryCo. v. Turnbull Co., 75 Conn. 628, 631, 54 A. 1122; Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 143, 52 A. 744; Metcalf v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 78 Conn. 614, 619, 63 A. 633.

The error of fact appearing and the correction having been made, it must further appear, either that the court's conclusions were reached by adopting some erroneous rule of law, or that some one or more of the facts found are legally inconsistent with the conclusions, or that upon the amended finding the judgment of the court was impossible without a violation of the plain rules of reason, or that the error, being a material one and relating to a controlling feature of the case, was relied upon by the court as material and controlling, and thus lay at the very foundation of the judgment. Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, 142; Lawler v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 72 id. 74, 81; Levy v. Metropolis Mfg. Co., 73 id. 559, 564; Broughel v. Southern New Eng. Telep. Co., 72 id. 617, 627; Stanley v. Steele, 77 id. 688, 691. It is contended that the situation in this case with respect to the court's conclusion that there was an absence of contributory negligence on the deceased's part, satisfies the third of these conditions.

" In Kirbell v. Pitkin, 75 Conn. 301, 307, HALL, J., speaking for the court, says: "The impropriety and futility of thus attempting by appeal to retry in this court questions of fact, which have been conclusively settled by the finding of the trial court, has frequently been pointed out by us. See Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140"; and in Hyde v. Mendel (p. 142) we say: "Claims that the court erred in weighing the evidence supporting the facts on which its judgment was founded cannot be considered. In this case, and in some others recently before us, such claims seem to have induced an injection into the appeal record of much unnecessary and confusing matter.

The impropriety and futility of thus attempting by appeal to retry in this court questions of fact, which have been conclusively settled by the finding of the trial court, has frequently been pointed out by us. See Hyde v. Mendel, 75 Conn. 140, in which many of the decisions upon this subject are cited; Hayes v. Candee, ibid. 131; Smedley v. Fair Haven W. R. Co., 73 id. 410.