Hyatt v. Branker

5 Citing cases

  1. Winston v. Kelly

    592 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2010)   Cited 209 times
    Holding that a habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims by presenting to the state court the operative facts underlying the claims and the controlling legal principles

    " Beck requires a lesser-included offense instruction when the evidence at trial . . . casts `some doubt' on a necessary element of the capital charge." Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2009). Because each state inevitably has its own rule for when its courts should instruct a jury on lesser included offenses, a federal court first determines whether the state rule offends the federal rule.

  2. Cobb v. Kernan

    346 F. App'x 206 (9th Cir. 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Holding the question "Can Iโ€”can I talk to you with a lawyer or I have to talk to you?" was not an unambiguous request for counsel

    See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1996). The dissent invokes a Fourth Circuit case, Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2009), to suggest that if police overheard the defendant ask a relative for counsel, such an overheard request binds police as an unambiguous request under Davis. Dissent at 208-09. But because this is not a Supreme Court case, the state appellate court's failure to follow it cannot violate the AEDPA.

  3. Smith v. Bradshaw

    591 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2010)   Cited 233 times
    Holding that an attorney's failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel

    See id. ("Consequently, we reject Smith's argument that evidence of purpose was lacking."). But a Beck analysis is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry. Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2009) ("A Beck challenge does not question whether the prosecutor presented evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of a capital offense."); Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (observing that Beck "requires a court to consider whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant instructing a jury on a lesser included offense, not whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction on the greater offense"). The Ohio Supreme Court conducted no analysis to consider whether the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find that Smith intended only to rape Autumn and not to kill her. Instead, the Court focused its attention solely on whether the evidence supported a finding that Smith intended to kill Autumn, thereby overlooking its duty to consider whether the evidence cast "some doubt" as to Smith's intent to kill.

  4. Taylor v. Culliver

    Case No. 4:09-cv-00251-KOB-TMP (N.D. Ala. Sep. 26, 2012)   Cited 8 times

    The Fourth Circuit recently phrased this inquiry in a somewhat different manner by stating: "Beck requires a lesser-included offense instruction when the evidence at trial merely casts 'some doubt' on a necessary element of the capital charge." Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In the underlying state court conviction at issue in Hyatt, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder, and the trial court had denied his "request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder."

  5. RABB v. BALLARD

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-0159 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2011)

    Respecting timing, the focus is not Supreme Court precedent at the conclusion of state habeas proceedings, but rather the shape of things on the date when direct appellate review terminated. See Hyatt v. Branker, 569 F.3d 162, 172 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The Supreme Court issued its opinion inGonzalez-Lopez four years after the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled on Hyatt's direct appeal. . . . Because Hyatt's challenge fails even under Gonzalez-Lopez, we need not parse precisely what federal law was `clearly established' on this point at the time of the Supreme Court of North Carolina's ruling."); Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 195 n. 4 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Although Hartman forswears reliance on Jones and Apprendi, he asserts that `[i]f those decisions were to apply retroactively . . ., they would support [his] position.' However, even if Jones and Apprendi applied to cases on collateral review, they would not assist us in determining whether the decision of the state court was entitled to deference under ยง 2254(d)(1), because those cases were decided long after the ruling of the North Carolina Supreme Court [on direct review]."); Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477, 493 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The phrase `the time of the relevant state court dec