Opinion
H045641
06-29-2018
H.Y., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 16JD024008)
Petitioner H.Y. (father) seeks writ relief from the juvenile dependency court's order terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In the petition, father argues the court erred, as follows: (1) by finding that placing the minor child (child) in father's care would create a substantial risk of detriment to child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being; (2) by finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided to father; and (3) by declining to exercise its discretion and extend reunification services an additional six months.
We find no error and will deny the petition.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Initial dependency petition and proceedings
On July 22, 2016, the Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (c), alleging that child, born in 2011, was at substantial risk of harm due to mother not supervising child and subjecting him to both verbal and physical abuse. The petition further alleged that mother had a substance abuse problem and was presently incarcerated following her arrest on a probation violation. The Department had no information about father's identity or whereabouts.
Based on statements made by child after he was taken into protective custody, the Department amended the petition to include allegations that mother sexually abused child and would allow a registered sex offender to have unsupervised access to child for "multiple hours."
Mother told the social worker that father was from Eritrea but she believed he returned to Africa, possibly to Ethiopia. She reported that he had no contact with child. She and father worked together at the San Jose airport, but he no longer worked there, and she did not know anyone who had his contact information.
At a December 16, 2016 dispositional hearing, the juvenile court directed that mother was to be bypassed for reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 for April 14, 2017. At the time of the December hearing, father's identity was still unknown.
B. Proceedings upon discovery of father's identity
The Department subsequently asked that the section 366.26 hearing be continued to publish notice to the alleged father, and the court continued the hearing to August 29, 2017. Counsel was appointed to represent father, and a DNA test was ordered on May 30, 2017. In June 2017, father filed a JV-505 statement regarding parentage, declaring that he believes he is child's parent. In that statement, father noted that he and mother worked together at the San Jose airport and had one sexual encounter in 2010. While he was aware of her pregnancy in 2011, mother led him to believe that another man was the father. He first learned that he could be the father in May 2017 when he met with a private investigator. He immediately contacted the social worker assigned to child's case and expressed his desire to be involved in child's life if the DNA test confirmed that he was the biological father.
At a hearing on July 11, 2017, the juvenile court found, based on the positive DNA test, that father was child's biological father. On the Department's motion, father was granted weekly one-hour therapeutic visits with child, to be increased in frequency and duration at the social worker's discretion.
Father brought a motion seeking to be designated as the presumed father pursuant to Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816. In that motion, he further requested that child be placed with him, or in the alternative, that he receive reunification services. The Department agreed that father should receive reunification services, so that he could "develop the skills to appropriately parent" child. The Department also indicated that therapeutic visitation should continue so that father and child could "develop a parent-child relationship."
At a hearing on August 8, 2017, the juvenile court granted father's request to be named a Kelsey S. presumed father and ordered that he be provided reunification services. The juvenile court further ordered that father complete a number of services, including "Triple P Parenting class," and a childhood sexual abuse group, as well as participate in child family team (CFT) meetings and engage in family therapy with child. Father was permitted to continue supervised therapeutic visitation at least once per week for one hour. The social worker retained discretion to expand visitation including permitting unsupervised and/or overnight visits with 72-hours prior notice to child's counsel. The matter was set for a six-month review hearing pursuant to section 366.21 on January 30, 2018.
In the report prepared for the October 4, 2017 interim hearing, the social worker noted that child's foster parents had signed the concurrent home agreement for legal guardianship in September 2017. Child was doing well in his placement and had started school in August, which he seemed to enjoy. He was still receiving therapeutic services and was showing improvement. The therapist was concerned that when she asked child about his father, he did not respond. Child's family specialist also reported that child would not respond when the specialist "mentions his father during sessions."
The social worker and her supervisor visited father's residence on July 21, 2017. Father was living in a studio apartment with two other adults (his cousin and sister). The apartment was clean, but the social worker did note there appeared to be cockroaches present. Father told the social worker that, if child were to live with him, child could take his place on the couch to sleep and father would sleep on the floor. Father was seeking a larger apartment, but the high rent in the Bay Area made this difficult. The social worker advised father "that his current living situation will not affect him having [child] in his care[, but] he would have to create an area for [child] to sleep in the home . . . as long as the environment was healthy and safe for him."
After father missed child's August 25, 2017 CFT meeting, the social worker called father on August 31, 2017, to inform him about the next scheduled meeting. Father seemed upset during the call, saying he " 'cannot handle' " the different appointments he is supposed to attend as they conflict with his work schedule driving for Uber.
On September 7, 2017, the foster mother called the social worker with concerns about something father said at child's therapeutic visit the day before. Father appeared upset and told the foster mother that if child " 'continues to not talk to him, he cannot accept him and he cannot take [child] to his family members.' " Father continued that the Department could put child " 'up for adoption because no one [in] his family will accept him if [child] continues to not respond to him.' "
The next day, when the social worker brought these comments to father's attention at a meeting, to discuss his case plan, father denied making them, suggesting that the foster mother may have misinterpreted what he said. Father then said he needed an interpreter, as Amharic is his native language. When the social worker asked if father needed an interpreter for their meetings or for his court-ordered classes, father said he did not. Father signed his case plan that day.
Although the case plan provided that father was to complete a course entitled "Triple P," the interim report indicates that the social worker had prepared a referral for him to attend a course entitled "Nurturing Fathers" which would begin on October 24, 2017. The social worker called father on September 26, 2017, to see when he could meet and sign the referral. He told her he would come by the following day. As of the date of the report, however, father had not come to the office to sign the referral or contacted the social worker about it.
The social worker noted that, after he was ordered to participate in services on August 8, 2017, father missed the CFT meetings scheduled on August 25 and September 22, despite being informed of them in telephone conversations and via text messages.
The report also discussed father's therapeutic visits with child beginning on August 3, 2017. At the first visit, father tried to engage child in conversation, but child would get frustrated, grunt and push his body away from father. The social worker spoke to the therapist on September 20, 2017, who reported there were times during the visits that child would acknowledge father and engage in play activity with him, but other times he would not engage or communicate with father. The therapist did note that child referred to father as "dad" during the August 30, 2017 session.
In the assessment/evaluation portion of the report, the social worker noted that father continues to participate in services, though he missed the two scheduled CFT meetings. She "continues to be concerned about [father]'s view of [child]'s behaviors and his lack of understanding that [child]'s behaviors reflect the trauma he has gone through."
At the October 4, 2017 hearing, the juvenile court ordered that all prior orders were to remain in effect. The Department's oral request to vacate the January 30, 2018 six-month review hearing and reset the matter for an 18-month review hearing on or before January 22, 2018, was denied, without prejudice.
1. The Department seeks to reset the matter for 18-month review
On December 13, 2017, the Department filed a request to vacate the then-January 30, 2018 six-month review hearing under section 366.21 and reset the matter for an 18-month review hearing under section 366.22 on January 22, 2018. The Department noted that child was removed from mother's care on July 22, 2016, which began the reunification period under the statutes, regardless of whether mother was bypassed for services. According to the Department, father is only entitled to reunification services up to 18 months from child's removal, regardless of when he became involved in the case. The juvenile court scheduled a hearing on the request for January 11, 2018. At the conclusion of that hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department's request in part, vacating the six-month review hearing and setting an 18-month review hearing for the same date, January 30, 2018.
2. 18-month review hearing and contested hearing
On January 12, 2018, the Department filed a notice of review hearing in which it recommended that reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. At the January 30, 2018 hearing, father requested a contested hearing on the matter which was set for March 15-16, 2018.
At the outset of the contested hearing, the Department offered into evidence the January 30, 2018 status review report (January report), the March 15, 2018 addendum report (March report), as well as the October 4, 2017 interim review report. The social worker was called to testify and the parties stipulated to her testifying as an expert witness in the areas of risk assessment, permanency planning, and the provision of reunification services.
Prior to the social worker testifying, father's counsel clarified on the record that the Department was not offering her as an expert witness on the subject of attachment.
a. The January report
In the January report, the social worker noted that child was doing well in his concurrent placement. As to father, the social worker indicated she was not certain if father was currently working, as he reported he did not have an operational car and had to take the bus. He continued to share a studio apartment with two adult relatives.
According to the report, father had previously told the social worker he worked for Lyft, but the October 4, 2017 interim review report stated that father worked for Uber. The social worker clarified in her testimony that father initially said he drove for Uber, then switched to driving for Lyft.
As to the case plan, the social worker stated that father has "made efforts to complete" it, but it "does not appear that [father] has integrated what he is supposed to have learned from these services into his interactions with and expectations of [child], and, more importantly, [child] has not been able to connect with [father]." The social worker was also concerned about the comments made to her by father, questioning why he must "do all this 'work,' " when it is child who " 'needs to do that.' "
At a meeting with father in November 2017, the social worker asked about how his visitation with child was going, and father said it was going well. The social worker, who had not heard from father in about a month, asked why he had not been in contact or returned her calls. Father said his phone was broken. When the social worker stressed the importance of meeting with him monthly, father said that she could contact him via regular mail.
The social worker also raised the issues of father missing CFT meetings and child not bonding with him. When father accused the social worker of trying to take child from him, she tried to explain that the reunification process is not about "wasting his time but about what is in the best interest for [child]." Father said he needed to end the meeting " 'right now because I don't need to be tortured and ordered.' "
As to child, the social worker reported that child was taking psychotropic medications to help manage his behavior, but that the foster mother reported he was still smearing feces on the wall once a week or so. He was getting along with his peers in school, but sometimes had behavioral problems, such as laying on the floor in the classroom and refusing to participate.
Child's weekly therapy was continuing and he was "engaging and receptive during . . . sessions." Child was starting to talk about his trauma, but not in detail. The therapist's "biggest concern is the lack of rapport/attachment between [child] and his father."
The social worker reported she had contact with father "on 7/21/17, 8/2/17, 11/8/17, 12/12/17 and 1/16/18." In September and October, she only had phone contact with father.
With regards to father's case plan progress, the social worker reported that father completed the childhood sexual abuse class in December 2017. She asked what he learned from attending this group and he said " 'it is sad to hear what other people have gone through.' " The social worker was concerned that, despite this class, father did not fully understand what child had gone through, or shown the "ability to meet [child]'s needs in this way."
The social worker reported she could not enroll father in the Nurturing Fathers parent education class, because he missed the September 2017 CFT meeting where she expected to get his signature on the enrollment form. When she contacted him afterward, he said he could come into her office to sign the form, but did not do so. The next class was scheduled to begin in February 2018, and thus father would not be able to participate in it before the statutory time limits for dependency cases expired.
In addition, father attended only two of six scheduled CFT meetings, despite the social worker advising him of the meetings in both phone conversations and text messages. Of the two meetings father attended, he was 30 minutes late for one of them.
Father had also not begun participating in family therapy sessions with child as provided in the case plan. The therapist had left voicemails for him on two occasions, but he did not return her calls.
As to visitation, father was participating regularly in the weekly, one-hour therapeutic visits. The foster mother reported her concerns that child is not bonding with father and, on many occasions, child does not want to go. At the November 22, 2017 visit, child was underneath a table, refusing to interact with father. During her monthly visit with child on December 1, 2017, the social worker asked how the visits were going and child said he " 'd[id] not now [sic].' " She asked if he wanted to continue to see his father and child said " 'No,' " because he " 'do[es] not like him.' "
Father told the social worker he enjoys visiting with child, as it makes him " 'feel happy and [his] whole day is better.' "
The social worker concluded that it was not in child's best interests to be placed with father as he had "not completed significant elements of his case plan . . . [and] has not learned the skills and techniques that will be necessary for him to be able to help [child] through his trauma as he grows up in life." The social worker was also concerned about the lack of attachment between child and father despite the weekly therapeutic visits. Because child was "clearly attaching to his foster parents," the social worker observed that child can form connections with people, but for whatever reason, child "has clearly demonstrated continued discomfort" around father.
b. The March report
The social worker noted in the March report that father had not yet started family therapy with child as required by his case plan. The therapist had continued to reach out to father without response. The social worker brought this to father's attention at a therapeutic visit with child on February 14, 2018. Father said he had not received any calls from the therapist but he would contact her. The therapist later advised the social worker that she finally received a call from father on February 27, 2018 and they would begin play therapy sessions with child on March 5, 2018. However, father failed to attend the appointment, claiming that he was unable to find the clinic despite the detailed directions the therapist gave him.
The foster mother reported on March 1, 2018, that child's behavior "has escalated" and he is destroying property, hitting his foster siblings, and using profanity. Child's teacher told the foster mother that child was hitting his peers at school and touching them inappropriately.
The social worker reported that father's therapeutic visits with child also appeared to be regressing. "From the visitation notes, at times when things appeared to have been going well at the visits, they have been positive in large part due to [the therapist] coaching [father] or [child]." Without the therapist's coaching, the social worker did not believe father would be able to respond appropriately to child's "special needs and behaviors."
Father's housing situation also concerned the social worker, who noted that "[g]iven [child]'s significant trauma history, specifically his experiences with sexual abuse, it will not be in [child]'s best interest to go into [father]'s home with him not having any privacy or space, or a caregiver that is attuned to and responsive to his needs." Instead, "[child] will be living with people that he does not know or who he has any attachment to, including his father."
c. Social worker's testimony
The social worker testified that, although the juvenile court's order specified that father was to take a parenting class entitled Triple P, she believed the Nurturing Fathers class would be more appropriate for father to learn how to support child. According to the social worker, the Triple P class "focuses . . . on basic parenting[,] . . . [whereas] the Nurturing Fathers [class] is from 0 to 12 years old, and they focus more on how to work within that age group." She also believed father would benefit from being in a class with just fathers. However, father never signed the referral form to participate in any parenting class, although he agreed to come in and do so in September 2017. She also did not believe it was necessary to apply to the juvenile court to change the court's order, since Triple P and Nurturing Fathers were both parenting classes.
The social worker had no record of telling father about the August 2017 CFT meeting, but did have a note in her records that she advised him of the September 2017 meeting. Father responded "with several concerns about multiple appointments and being able to meet them because of his work schedule." He did not attend the September 2017 CFT meeting.
The social worker had sent him several text messages in October but he never responded to her. The text messages did not inform him there was a CFT meeting schedule for October 20, 2017, and father missed that meeting as well. The social worker testified that she attempted to call and text father numerous times but he would not respond or return her calls.
Father attended the November and December 2017 CFT meetings and elected to proceed with those meetings even though no interpreter was present. He showed up an hour late for the January 2018 CFT meeting, by which time the meeting was over.
When asked about increasing visitation between father and child, the social worker testified that she did not do so because of the quality of the visits. At the August 2017 CFT meeting, there was a discussion about increasing the visits' length, due to child's difficulty in transitioning at the beginning and the end of the visits. There was also some discussion about allowing visits in the community, but that never occurred either. Given child's increased behavioral issues, the social worker did not believe that community visits would be appropriate. She said child acted out at every visit, in varying ways. He would say he did not want to go, he would cry, he would hide and refuse to go inside for the visit. Child never expressed a desire to have more visitation time with father and did not really talk about his visits. On one occasion, the social worker asked him about visits with father and child "shrugged his shoulder[s], . . . then he stated he does not like his dad."
During the visits she attended, the social worker "observed that the father needs a lot of prompting and coaching on how to handle [child]'s behavior." Child did not really interact with father either, without being prompted by the therapist overseeing the visits.
In the social worker's opinion, it would be detrimental to child if he were placed in father's care. Given the "significant trauma" he experienced, child "needs a caregiver who is going to be attuned to his needs[] [and] has some type of experience in working with children who has difficult behaviors."
The social worker acknowledged that she initially believed the January 30, 2018 status review hearing would be a six-month review and that there would be more time before making a recommendation.
Following counsels' arguments, the court found that the Department had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was a substantial risk of detriment to child's physical and emotional well-being if he were placed in father's care. The court noted that father "failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his court-ordered treatment programs." Father's explanations for "his lack of full participation" were not persuasive. He told the social worker he would come in and sign the referral for the parenting class, but failed to do so. Father initially failed to respond to the family therapist's calls, but even once he did so and confirmed the appointment, father failed to show up for it. The court was also not persuaded by father's excuses that his phone was broken or that he had language issues.
The juvenile court also found that the Department had demonstrated reasonable services were offered to father. The court noted that the Department identified the issues which caused child to not be with father and offered services designed to remedy those issues. The social worker visited with father in person monthly for six of the seven months, and often called or texted him, but with no response. The court rejected father's broken phone explanation, stating that it appeared to only be a problem in October, whereas there was evidence of phone contact with father in the following months.
The court further found that the Department made reasonable efforts to help father in areas where compliance was difficult. Father told the social worker he was "overwhelmed with all the things he needed to do" so she "specifically delayed the start of family therapy to accommodate him." The juvenile court specifically noted that it found the social worker's testimony, her memory and recollection to be "both reliable and credible."
As to extending services for father, the juvenile court found that doing so would be contrary to child's interests, especially given child's "need for prompt resolution of his custody status and the need to provide him with a stable environment." The court noted that child's recent regression in behavior and acting out demonstrated the importance of moving the case to a more permanent resolution. Accordingly, the court terminated father's reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for July 10, 2018.
Father timely filed a notice of intent to bring a petition for a writ of mandate, and the writ petition was filed on May 18, 2018.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial evidence supports the detriment finding
1. Applicable legal principles and standard of review
Section 361.5, subdivision (a) generally mandates that reunification services be provided whenever a child is removed from the parents' custody. (See In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 678 (Luke L.).)
When a child is three years of age or older at the time of removal, reunification services are presumptively limited to 12 months. (§361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Reunification services may be extended up to 18 months from the date of removal if the juvenile court finds a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within that extended time period or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian. (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A).) At the 18-month review hearing, "the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) A parent's failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. (Ibid.)
An appellate court reviews the juvenile court's decision following a section 366.22 hearing to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705 (Constance K.).) We examine the evidence in favor of the juvenile court's order, and indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the court. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545; In re Walter E. (1992) 13 Cal.App.4th 125, 140.)
"It is the trial court's role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence. We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) "The 'clear and convincing' standard is for the edification and guidance of the juvenile court. It is not a standard for appellate review." (In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911.) "Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, 'the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent's evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant's evidence, however strong.' " (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; In re J.I., supra, at p. 911.)
"In determining whether it would be detrimental to return the child at the 18-month review, the court must consider whether the parent participated regularly in any treatment program set forth by the plan, the 'efforts or progress' of the parent, and the 'extent' to which the parent 'cooperated and availed himself or herself of services provided.' (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)" (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) "The [Department] has the burden of establishing detriment. [Citations.] . . . [T]he risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child's physical or emotional well-being." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.)
"Compliance with the reunification plan is certainly a pertinent consideration at the section 366.22 hearing; however, it is not the sole concern before the dependency court judge." (Constance K., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 704.) Other pertinent considerations include "limited awareness by a parent of the emotional and physical needs of a child." (Id. at p. 705.)
2. Analysis
Here, the juvenile court concluded father's failure to fully participate in his case plan was enough to establish a prima facie case of detriment. In rendering its decision, the court found that father did not participate in family therapy or a parenting class and missed the majority of the scheduled CFT meetings. The court found credible the social worker's testimony about not just her many unsuccessful efforts to contact father, but also the times father would agree to do something but then fail to follow through, e.g., show up to sign the parent referral, or attend the scheduled family therapy session.
In addition, the record contained ample evidence of child's exceptional needs and challenging behaviors. Child was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder and prescribed multiple psychotropic medications. He inappropriately touched his classmates in kindergarten, would frequently use profanity and sexualized language, and would sometimes smear his feces on walls. There was little to no evidence father was making progress in gaining the necessary skills and knowledge to meet child's severe emotional problems. (See Constance K., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 704-705 ["a trial judge can consider . . . [the] limited awareness by a parent of the emotional and physical needs of a child"].)
Even though father was diligent in attending his weekly therapeutic visits, the social worker noted that, in most of those visits, interactions between father and child required prompting and coaching from the therapist. Child was increasingly resistant to attending the visits at all, and when the social worker asked why that was, child said that he did not like father. Given this record, it was clear that placing child with father would create a substantial risk of detriment to child's emotional well-being.
Father suggests that the juvenile court improperly compared his bond with child to the bond between child and the foster parents, but the record does not support this claim. The juvenile court specifically noted that such a comparison would not be appropriate. Rather, the court's statements about child's relationship with the foster parents were made to illustrate the point that, even in an environment where child appeared to otherwise feel safe, he was continuing to exhibit challenging behavior.
Father also argues the court incorrectly applied a best interests standard in making its detriment determination, but this contention is also not supported by the record. The juvenile court clearly articulated the correct standard at the outset of its ruling, stating "the first question is whether by a preponderance of the evidence return would create a substantial risk of detriment to [child]'s physical and emotional well-being." As discussed above, the court explained the reasons behind its finding that placing child with father would "create a substantial risk of detriment to [child]'s emotional well-being." The juvenile court's occasional chance reference to child's "best interests" does not demonstrate that it failed to apply the appropriate standard and without more express evidence the court misunderstood the standard it was to apply, we presume it followed the law. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547-550.)
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court's finding of detriment.
B. No error in finding father was provided reasonable services
Section 361.5, subdivision (a), generally mandates that reunification services are to be provided whenever a child is removed from the parents' custody. (See Luke L., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) "Reunification services must be 'designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.' (§ 362, subd. (c).) Accordingly, a reunification plan must be appropriately based on the particular family's 'unique facts.' " (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696.) " ' "[T]he record should show that the [Department] identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . ." ' " (Id. at p. 697.)
"The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Department's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164.) That additional services might have been possible, or that the services provided were not the services the parent thought were best for the family, does not render the services offered or provided inadequate. " 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' " (In re T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.)
On appeal, the applicable standard of review is sufficiency of the evidence. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.) " 'In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the [Department]. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the [juvenile court's findings]. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.' " (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.) "We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence." (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.)
Father asserts that most, if not all, of his noncompliance with his case plan is due to the social worker. He points to her decision to refer him to the Nurturing Fathers class rather than the Triple P class listed in his court-ordered case plan, as well as her refusal to contact him by regular mail, rather than by phone or text message.
The problem with all of father's arguments in this vein is that the juvenile court expressly found credible the social worker's testimony on her many, often unsuccessful, efforts to contact father. Father would agree to do something, such as come by and sign a referral form, and then not show up as promised. He failed to return the family therapist's calls, and even after finally scheduling a session, failed to show up for the appointment. His claims that his failures to engage with services are mostly, if not entirely, the fault of the Department and the social worker is contrary to the record.
There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that father was offered reasonable reunification services.
C. No error in denying an extension of reunification services
Father finally asserts that the juvenile court erred in not extending reunification services under section 352 because of his status as a Kelsey S. presumed parent. Specifically, he argues that, because mother hid his parentage status from him, he was only able to present himself as child's father with just under six months of reunification services available. We disagree.
In general, if the child is not returned to the parent at the 18-month review hearing, "the court must terminate reunification services and set a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan." (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1015 (Mark N.).) However, "upon a showing of good cause," the juvenile court has discretion under section 352 to continue the 18-month review hearing and extend reunification services up to 24 months from the date of removal. (In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 564.)
"[S]ection 352 provides an emergency escape valve in those rare instances in which the juvenile court determines the best interests of the child would be served by a continuance of the 18-month review hearing." (In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1798-1799.) "In considering the minor's interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements." (§ 352, subd. (a).)
Cases have upheld a juvenile court's extension of reunification services beyond the 18-month statutory period where there were "extraordinary circumstances 'involv[ing] some external factor which prevented the parent from participating in the case plan.' " (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510.) In exercising its discretion to extend services beyond 18 months, the juvenile court should also consider "the failure to offer or provide reasonable reunification services; the likelihood of success of further reunification services; whether [the child's] need for a prompt resolution of [his or] her dependency status outweighs any benefit from further reunification services; and any other relevant factors the parties may bring to the court's attention." (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) As the juvenile court's decision is discretionary, we will not overturn it unless it is shown to be arbitrary and capricious. (Ibid.)
Father has made no such showing. The juvenile court considered the claim that father is entitled to an extension of services due to his belated discovery of his parentage status, but found such a continuance of services would be contrary to child's interests. Child's need for a resolution of his custody status outweighed father's interest in gaining an additional six months of services.
We observe that father appears to love his child, and to his credit, he has faithfully attended the weekly therapeutic visits. His compliance with the remainder of his case plan, however, was minimal. There is no evidence that father is anywhere close to being able to care for child, and child was beginning to express outright resistance to his visits with father, going so far as to tell the social worker that he did not "like" father. Given child's escalating behavior issues, coupled with father's lack of participation in most of his case plan besides visitation, the juvenile court acted within its discretion in finding that any further continuance of services would be contrary to child's interests. With such an extension, child's life still would not be permanently settled. (See § 352, subd. (a).)
III. DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied.
/s/_________
Premo, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Greenwood, P.J. /s/_________
Grover, J.