Opinion
B325870
07-12-2024
GRACE S. HWANG, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HOON SIL BAIK, Defendant and Appellant.
Ferber Law, Jennifer R. Lucas, Jessica M. Di Palma; Chun Yong Jeong for Defendant and Appellant. Benedon &Serlin, Wendy S. Albers and Judith E. Posner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 19STCV42784 Michael L. Stern, Judge.
Ferber Law, Jennifer R. Lucas, Jessica M. Di Palma; Chun Yong Jeong for Defendant and Appellant.
Benedon &Serlin, Wendy S. Albers and Judith E. Posner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Hoon Sil Baik appeals from a judgment finding she committed financial elder abuse upon James Dukhwan Tak (Mr. Tak), the stepfather of plaintiff Grace S. Hwang. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded Baik, through the use of undue influence and with the intent to defraud, caused Mr. Tak, a widower in his 80s, to create a trust, transfer ownership of his condominium-his primary asset-to the trust, designate Baik as the trust's successor trustee and sole beneficiary, and execute a pour-over will placing the rest of his estate into the trust for distribution to Baik upon his death. The court further found that, after Mr. Tak died, Baik: (1) ignored his testamentary wishes to leave $100,000 to his church and $50,000 to Hwang, (2) quickly agreed to sell Mr. Tak's condominium to one of her family members, without first obtaining a legitimate appraisal; (3) kept the sale proceeds for herself; and (4) collected $9,700 from Mr. Tak's life insurance policy. Based on these findings, the trial court awarded Hwang $318,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.
Baik contends the judgment must be reversed because: (1) Hwang lacked standing to file a financial elder abuse claim; (2) the record lacks substantial evidence to support a finding that she committed financial elder abuse; and (3) both damages awards are excessive and unsupported by evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude her arguments are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Hwang is Mr. Tak's stepdaughter. She met Mr. Tak for the first time a few years after he married her mother, Young Kwi Tak (Mrs. Tak).
After immigrating to America and living in Chicago for a few years, Hwang moved to Los Angeles, where she lived with Mr. and Mrs. Tak in their condominium for a month. In that time, she and Mr. Tak shared a loving, supportive, and close relationship. Hwang then moved into an apartment nearby and continued to visit Mr. and Mrs. Tak regularly.
Hwang later married and had two children, whom Mr. Tak loved and treated as his own grandchildren. Subsequently, Hwang and her family moved to Florida due to her husband's job. Hwang maintained contact with Mr. and Mrs. Tak, and continued to have a loving and supportive relationship with Mr. Tak, in which Mr. Tak treated her, her children, and her husband as his own family.
Following Mrs. Tak's death in February 2015, Hwang did not make the same efforts to stay in touch with Mr. Tak, as she was ill herself and shocked by the loss of her mother. Instead, Hwang primarily kept herself apprised of Mr. Tak's well-being through other family members.
Baik is a distant, non-blood relative of Mr. Tak, who had limited contact with Mr. Tak while Mrs. Tak was alive, but grew more involved in his life and affairs following Mrs. Tak's death. We discuss the evidence relating to Baik's relationship with Mr. Tak in section II.B of the Discussion below.
At some point, Mr. Tak told Baik that, when he died, he wanted to leave $100,000 to his church and $50,000 to Hwang. Thereafter, on March 15, 2017, Baik drove Mr. Tak to We the People, a paralegal service that assists with document preparation, so he could create a trust. There, he met with Helen Yi, who asked him the questions in We the People's Single Living Trust Workbook, a worksheet used to acquire information required to prepare trust documents. She then wrote his answers onto a copy of the worksheet.
Using the information obtained from Mr. Tak during the interview, Yi prepared the James Dukhwan Tak Living Trust Revocable Living Trust Agreement (Trust Agreement), which created the James Dukhwan Tak Living Trust (Trust). The Trust Agreement designated Mr. Tak as the initial trustee, Baik as the first successor trustee, and Baik's husband as the second successor trustee. Baik was also designated the Trust's sole beneficiary, to whom 100% of the Trust's net income and principal were to be distributed upon Mr. Tak's death. Baik's husband was designated the Trust's alternate beneficiary.
On March 22, 2017, Baik drove Mr. Tak to We the People for a follow-up appointment, at which time he signed the Trust Agreement. He also executed a quitclaim deed transferring ownership of his condominium to the Trust, along with a pour-over will appointing Baik as his personal representative and leaving the rest of his estate to the Trust for distribution in accordance with the Trust Agreement's terms upon his death.
Mr. Tak died on June 8, 2019, four months after being hospitalized with lung cancer. Soon thereafter, Baik agreed to sell Mr. Tak's condominium to Chong Hee Lim, a relative of hers, for $250,000. The sale proceeds were wired directly to Baik's bank account. Baik also collected $9,700 from Mr. Tak's life insurance policy and deposited those funds into her bank account. To date, Baik has not distributed any funds to Hwang or Mr. Tak's church.
Hwang's operative first amended complaint asserted six causes of action against Baik: financial elder abuse; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of confidential relationship; accounting; common count: money had and received; and constructive trust. Prior to trial, however, Hwang dismissed her second through sixth causes of action, leaving only her financial elder abuse claim for trial.
The complaint also asserted numerous claims against Chong Hee Lim and her husband, neither of whom is a party to this appeal.
Following a nine-day bench trial, the trial court issued a detailed written order finding: (1) Hwang had standing to pursue her financial elder abuse claim; (2) Baik "violated the Elder Abuse Act by wrongfully taking, appropriating and retaining the real and personal property of [Mr. Tak] for a wrongful use with an intent to defraud by undue influence through excessive persuasion that caused [Mr.] Tak to act or refrain[ ] from acting by overcoming [Mr.] Tak's free will"; and (3) Hwang "has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to the full panoply of damages under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5[,]" which "include[s] . . . the full value of [Mr.] Tak's trust or estate, $309,000 (the amount [Hwang] personally believed was the value of the condominium), plus the $9,000 [life] insurance proceeds [Baik] took, attorneys' fees and costs."
Unless otherwise specified, all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Subsequently, Hwang filed an ex parte application asking the trial court to "bifurcate the issue of the amount of punitive damages to be awarded and set[ ] the date for the second phase of the trial . . . to determine the amount, if any, of punitive damages to be awarded to [her] ...." In support of her request, Hwang argued that, in its order finding Baik liable for financial elder abuse, the trial court "made findings which would support an award of punitive damages" and, consequently, "it is appropriate to set the second phase of the trial so that a [f]inal [j]udgment including such an award can be issued by the [c]ourt." Over Baik's objection, the trial court granted the application and set a date for the punitive damages phase of the trial. On that date, the trial court received evidence relating to Baik's financial condition, which we discuss in section IV of the Discussion below.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Hwang and awarded her $318,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Baik appealed.
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, we address Hwang's contention that we need not consider Baik's arguments on the merits because: (1) Baik failed to support nearly all of the factual assertions in her opening brief with citations to evidence in the record, instead citing to her various memoranda/points of authorities filed in the trial court; and (2) in disputing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's findings, Baik did not "cite all the material evidence" presented on those points and, therefore, "forfeit[ed] her substantial evidence challenge[s] ...."
Having reviewed Baik's briefs, we agree with Hwang and acknowledge we could deem Baik's arguments forfeited based on her non-compliance with several well-settled rules of appellate practice. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 ["'[t]he appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error[,]'" and, therefore, an argument unsupported by "'necessary citations to the record . . . [will be] deemed to have been [forfeited]'"]; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590 ["[c]iting points and authorities filed in the trial court is not appropriate support for factual assertions in a brief" because "[m]atters set forth in points and authorities are not evidence"]; Pope v. Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 (Pope) [a substantial evidence challenge is deemed to be forfeited when the appellant focuses entirely on their own evidence and fails to "'set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point" (original italics)].)
"[I]n the interests of justice," however, we will address Baik's contentions on the merits. (Pope, supra, at p. 1246.)
I. Standing
A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
"'Standing' is a party's right to make a legal claim and is a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the merits of an action." (Said v. Jegan (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1382.)
"[S]ection 15657.3, subdivision (d), delineates who has standing to bring an elder abuse lawsuit after the death of an elder or dependent adult." (Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 227, italics omitted.) Subdivision (d)(1) states that, in general, "after the death of the elder . . ., the right to commence or maintain an action shall pass to the personal representative of the decedent." (§ 15657.3, subd. (d)(1).) Where, as here, however, "the personal representative refuses to commence or maintain an action," the persons enumerated in subdivision (d)(1)(A) through (C) "shall have standing to commence or maintain an action for elder abuse." (Id., subd. (d)(2).) Those individuals include "[a]n intestate heir whose interest is affected by the action." (Id., subd. (d)(1)(A).)
"Both standing and the interpretation of statutes are questions of law to which we typically apply a de novo standard of review. [Citations.] However, where the superior court makes underlying factual findings relevant to the question of standing, we defer to the superior court and review the findings for substantial evidence." (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, "our review 'begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.' [Citation.] 'Substantial' refers to the quality, not the quantity of the evidence. [Citation.] 'Substantial evidence is evidence that is "of ponderable legal significance," "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value," and "'substantial' proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case."' [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence as long as it is not physically impossible or inherently improbable. [Citations.]
In exercising substantial evidence review, an appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses but defers to the trier of fact. [Citations.] Similarly, the court does not reweigh the evidence, but will uphold a judgment that is supported by substantial evidence even if substantial evidence to the contrary also exists." (DeNike v. Matthew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 371, 381-382, italics omitted (DeNike).) "'In applying this standard of review, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor ...." [Citation.]'" (Pope, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245.)
B. Analysis
In asserting reversible error, Baik does not dispute that, if Mr. Tak had no living issue, Hwang had standing as an "intestate heir whose interest is affected by the action" pursuant to section 15657.3, subdivision (d) and Probate Code section 6402.5, subdivision (a)(1). The latter statute provides that, for purposes of intestate succession, "if the decedent had a predeceased spouse who died not more than 15 years before the decedent and there is no surviving spouse or issue of the decedent, the portion of the decedent's estate attributable to the decedent's predeceased spouse passes as follows: [¶] (1) If the decedent is survived by issue of the predeceased spouse, to the surviving issue of the predeceased spouse ...." (Prob. Code, § 6402.5, subd. (a)(1).)
Baik contends Hwang failed to prove Mr. Tak had no living issue and, therefore, did not establish Probate Code section 6402.5, subdivision (a) applies here. In so doing, she suggests the record lacks substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Tak did not "ha[ve] a natural daughter from a prior marriage in Korea ...." Instead, Baik argues, the evidence shows he had a "living biological daughter" named Myung Ja Tak (Myung Ja).
Baik's argument fails because, contrary to her assertions, the record reflects Myung Ja was not Mr. Tak's biological daughter. Specifically, Hwang testified that, when she first met Mr. Tak, he told her that Mrs. Tak was his second wife, that his first wife had a daughter named Myung Ja at the time they married, and that he did not know the identity of Myung Ja's father. Hwang therefore testified Myung Ja "was not the biological daughter of [Mr. Tak]" and that Mr. Tak did not have any other biological or adopted children. Her testimony is consistent with Mr. Tak's statements in multiple documents reflecting he had no children, including his answers to the questions in the Single Living Trust Workbook, the Trust Agreement, and his pour-over will.
Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that Mr. Tak had no living issue when he died. The trial court, therefore, did not commit reversible error by finding Hwang-i.e., the living issue of Mrs. Tak, Mr. Tak's predeceased spouse-had standing to initiate and pursue her financial elder abuse claim. (§ 15657.3, subd. (d)(1)(A) &(2); Prob. Code, § 6402.5, subd. (a)(1).)
II. Sufficiency of Evidence Demonstrating Elder Abuse
A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
Relevant to this appeal, a person commits financial elder abuse if he or she "[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder . . . for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both[,]" or [t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains . . . real property or personal property of an elder . . . by undue influence, as defined by Section 15610.70." (§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(1) &(3).) For purposes of section 15610.30, "a person . . . takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property when an elder . . . is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder ...." (Id., subd. (c).)
Section 15610.70, subdivision (a) defines "'undue influence'" as "excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person's free will and results in inequity." "In determining whether a result was produced by undue influence, section 15610.70 directs courts to consider: (1) the victim's vulnerability; (2) the influencer's apparent authority; (3) the tactics used by the influencer; and (4) the inequity of the result." (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1125; § 15610.70, subd. (a).) "Evidence of an inequitable result, without more, is not sufficient to prove undue influence." (§ 15610.70, subd. (b).) "Because perpetrators of undue influence rarely leave any direct evidence of their actions, plaintiffs typically rely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence to prove their case." (Keading v. Keading, at p. 1125.)
"As has been said many times and by many courts, when the 'findings of fact are challenged in a civil appeal, we are bound by the familiar principle that "the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted" to support the findings below. [Citation.]'" (Pope, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245.)
B. Analysis
Baik contends the record lacks sufficient evidence to support a finding that she committed financial elder abuse by taking assets from Mr. Tak for wrongful use, with the intent to defraud, or by undue influence. In so doing, she emphasizes the evidence reflecting that Mr. Tak created the Trust and appointed her as successor trustee per his sister-in-law's recommendation- rather than as a result of any wrongdoing on Baik's part-and that Mr. Tak was not vulnerable to undue influence under the factors set forth in section 15610.70, subdivision (a) because he was "emotionally and mentally healthy."
The gravamen of Baik's argument is that reversal is required because the record contains substantial evidence demonstrating she did not commit financial elder abuse. It is well-settled, however, that "'[t]he fact that there [is] substantial evidence in the record to support [a finding for the appellant] does not compel the conclusion that there [is] no substantial evidence to support the judgment.'" (Verrazono v. Gehl Co. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 636, 652.) Instead, we must "uphold a judgment that is supported by substantial evidence even if substantial evidence to the contrary also exists." (DeNike, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Applying these principles, we reject Baik's argument because, as discussed below, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Baik "violated the Elder Abuse Act by wrongfully taking, appropriating and retaining the real and personal property of [Mr. Tak] for wrongful use with an intent to defraud by undue influence through excessive persuasion that caused [Mr.] Tak to act or refrain[ ] from acting by overcoming [Mr.] Tak's free will."
During their marriage spanning almost 50 years, Mrs. Tak took care of Mr. Tak. She managed their social activities and addressed Mr. Tak's domestic needs, such as by doing the cooking and cleaning. Following her death in 2015, Mr. Tak, then in his 80s, was unable to maintain his home and care for himself independently. He required the help of Min Jeong Kim, an inhome supportive services caregiver, who worked for him five days per week for four to five hours at time. If he was in urgent need, Kim also cared for Mr. Tak on Saturdays, at his request. Kim assisted Mr. Tak with grooming, cooked for him, cleaned the condominium, and accompanied him to the grocery store. Despite having her help, Kim testified, Mr. Tak's condominium was in bad condition. According to Kim, his home smelled of mold and was so dirty that she was unable to wash the dirt off from certain areas.
Baik is a distant, non-blood relative of Mr. Tak. While Mrs. Tak was alive, Baik saw Mr. Tak periodically at church and gave him money on special occasions. After Mrs. Tak died, however, Baik built a relationship with Mr. Tak. In addition to communicating with him via a messaging app and e-mail, Baik visited Mr. Tak at least once per month, often bringing him takeout foods that he liked and spending time with him if he invited her into his home. Baik also gave Mr. Tak $100 to $200 per month. According to Mr. Tak's sister-in-law, Baik "provided a lot of comfort to [Mr. Tak]" after Mrs. Tak's death.
After forming a relationship with Mr. Tak, Baik informed him "many times" that a person receiving Medi-Care benefits like himself may be at risk of having their assets, such as their home, seized by the government upon their death, and that he could only stay in his home for the rest of his life if he set up a trust. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that that these representations, if made, were false. Baik's statements caused Mr. Tak concern about his ability to reside in his condominium for the rest of his life. He told Hwang that he created a trust to ensure he did not lose his home.
Before he was hospitalized, Mr. Tak drove himself around and paid his own bills. Nonetheless, on March 15, 2017, Baik drove Mr. Tak to We the People and paid Helen Yi $925 for her services. There, Baik posed as Mr. Tak's niece and sat next to Mr. Tak while Yi interviewed him. Although Mr. Tak previously told Baik that he wished to leave $100,000 to his church and $50,000 to Hwang upon his death, this information was not conveyed to Yi during the interview. Instead, through this meeting, Baik was designated the Trust's first successor trustee and sole beneficiary. Her husband, to whom Mr. Tak had no biological relation, was designated the alternate beneficiary and the secondary successor trustee.
A week later, on March 22, 2017, Baik drove Mr. Tak back to We the People-again, even though he could drive himself- where Mr. Tak signed the Trust Agreement, the quitclaim deed transferring ownership of his condominium to the Trust, and the pour-over will leaving the rest of his estate to the Trust. These lengthy and complicated legal documents were written entirely in English. Mr. Tak, however, only spoke Korean and did not read or speak English fluently.
In a letter dated May 17, 2017, Baik told Mr. Tak that she "will do everything according to [his] wish[es]" by giving $100,000 to his church, $50,000 to Hwang, and any remaining funds to missionaries or people in need.
In the months leading up to his death in June 2019, Mr. Tak believed he had taken the steps to ensure his testamentary wishes would be fulfilled. When Hwang visited him in April 2019 after learning of his cancer diagnosis, Mr. Tak told her that he was leaving her an inheritance through his trust. According to Hwang, Mr. Tak "did not mention the amount" of her inheritance, but "said he had [Baik] write down . . . in the trust that he would leave some inheritance to [Baik], Grace [Hwang], and then the church." This was the third time Mr. Tak had told her that he intended to leave her an inheritance.
On the date of Mr. Tak's death in June 2019, Baik asked a family member for assistance in selling Mr. Tak's condominium. A week or two later, without hiring a real estate agent, listing the condominium for sale on the market, or having the condominium appraised, Baik agreed to sell the condominium to Lim, a distant relative whom she had previously never met or spoken to, for $250,000. Baik did not inform Hwang of the sale until after escrow had been opened for the transaction. Escrow closed at the end of July 2019, less than two months after Mr. Tak's death.
The proceeds of the condominium sale, along with payments she collected from Mr. Tak's life insurance policy, were deposited into Baik's bank account. Rather than sending any funds to Hwang or Mr. Tak's church, Baik testified she has spent all the money on attorneys' fees in defense of the underlying lawsuit.
Viewing the evidence set forth above in the light most favorable to Hwang, and drawing all inferences in her favor, as we must, we conclude the trial court could reasonably make the following findings. Upon Mrs. Tak's death, Baik inserted herself into Mr. Tak's life and sought to gain his trust by providing him emotional, physical, and financial support. At the time, Mr. Tak was vulnerable, as he was a recently widowed octogenarian who knew little English and could not care for himself independently.
From 2015 through 2017, under the guise of providing comfort and care, Baik repeatedly misrepresented to Mr. Tak that the government could seize his condominium before or after his death unless he created a trust. Fearing the loss of his home and worrying about his ability to reside in it for the rest of his life, Mr. Tak acted upon Baik's misinformation to create a trust.
Subsequently, in March 2017, Baik actively facilitated Mr. Tak's creation of the Trust by driving him to We the People and paying Yi for her services. As a result of her efforts, Mr. Tak signed a slew of complicated legal documents, which he could not read or understand. He believed that, by creating the Trust and signing those documents, he was protecting his home from government seizure and ensuring his testamentary wishes would be carried out. Instead, Mr. Tak unwittingly granted Baik the exclusive rights to his entire estate, including his condominium, upon his death. Two months later, Baik quelled any concerns Mr. Tak may have had by assuring him, in writing, that she would carry out his wishes by distributing $100,000 to his church and $50,000 to Hwang when he died. Her actions taken following Mr. Tak's death, however, reflect that this promise was false.
Rather than following Mr. Tak's testamentary wishes, Baik immediately commenced efforts to sell Mr. Tak's condominium as quickly and surreptitiously as possible. Less than two months after his death, she sold the condominium to a distant family member through a closed sale, after initially concealing the transaction from Hwang. Ultimately, through the relationship she formed with Mr. Tak, her campaign of misrepresentations causing him to fear the loss of his home and believe she would carry out his testamentary wishes, and her active efforts to ensure the Trust's creation, Baik pocketed nearly $200,000 from the sale of Mr. Tak's home, as well as $9,700 from his life insurance policy. As a result of her actions, Mr. Tak's wishes remain unfulfilled: Hwang and Mr. Tak's church have been deprived of gifts they would have received had Baik not kept the entirety of his estate.
On this record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Baik took and retained Mr. Tak's property with the intent to defraud and by undue influence. Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding Baik committed financial elder abuse under section 15610.30, subdivision (a)(1) and (3).
III. Damages
A. Compensatory Damages
Baik contends the trial court erred by awarding Hwang $318,000 in compensatory damages. She advances two arguments in support of her position, which we address in turn.
First, Baik argues that the trial court "should not have awarded anything to Hwang" because the record contains uncontradicted evidence showing Mr. Tak disinherited her. This argument is meritless because it misconstrues the record. At trial, Baik testified Mr. Tak disinherited Hwang after she took things from his home without his permission during her April 2019 visit. Baik's testimony, however, is not undisputed, as she contends. As discussed above, Hwang testified that, during her visit in April 2019, Mr. Tak verbally reaffirmed his intention to leave her an inheritance. She also testified Mr. Tak gave her the keys to his condominium, instructed her to collect certain items that belonged to Mrs. Tak, and did not express any displeasure after she followed his instructions.
Next, Baik contends Hwang's compensatory damages should have been limited to $50,000, the amount Mr. Tak desired to leave to Hwang, because the trial court did not rescind the Trust. We reject this argument because it is unaccompanied by reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority. "[A]n appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the . . . law books to test h[er] claim. The appellant must present an adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities ...." (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) Thus, where an appellant fails to furnish a legal argument with citation of authorities on a particular point, we "'may treat it as [forfeited] and pass it without consideration.'" (In re Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1164.)
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Baik has not shown reversal of the compensatory damages award is required.
B. Punitive Damages
Baik mounts a three-part challenge to the portion of the judgment awarding Hwang $50,000 in punitive damages. Again, we address each argument in turn.
1. Bifurcation of Punitive Damages Phase of Trial from Liability Phase
First, Baik argues that the trial court erred by "allowing bifurcation of the punitive damages phase of the trial after the liability phase had already concluded." (Original italics.) In so doing, she asserts Hwang did not timely move for bifurcation under Code of Civil Procedure section 598 and "therefore waived her right to bifurcate punitive damages" as well as "her right to present evidence to support an award of punitive damages."
Baik's argument is unavailing because it misinterprets Code of Civil Procedure section 598 (section 598). Although not entirely clear, she appears to argue that, under section 598, trial courts may only require damages to be tried separately from liability when a party has made a pretrial bifurcation motion. The statute, however, does not confer upon trial courts such limited authority. In general, it states that "when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby," courts may "make an order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case," subject to special defenses not applicable here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.) Although section 598 specifies the deadlines by which a bifurcation order must be filed when sought by way of a pretrial motion, it also states: "The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time." (Ibid.) In light of this statutory language, we reject Baik's contention that the trial court could not issue a bifurcation order unless Hwang filed a pretrial motion asking it to do so. We also note that, besides section 598, the trial court also had "ample authority" to bifurcate the trial into separate phases for liability and damages under Evidence Code section 320 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b). (Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 504; Evid. Code, § 320 ["Except as otherwise provided by law, the court in its discretion shall regulate the order of proof"]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1048, subd. (b) ["The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial . . . of any separate issue or of any number of . . . issues"].)
2. Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Baik's Financial Condition
Next, Baik asserts the punitive damages award must be reversed because "[t]he evidence in the record is insufficient to demonstrate Baik's overall ability to pay the $50,000 punitive damages award." Specifically, she argues that "[t]he evidence presented in this case constitutes an incomplete picture of [her] financial condition as of the time of trial," as it "presented, at best, only a limited picture of [her] assets, and revealed nothing about her liabilities."
"Our Supreme Court has summarized the fundamental principles of punitive damages under California law. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the defendant and deter the commission of similar acts. [Citations.] Three primary considerations govern the amount of punitive damages: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the injury suffered by the victims; and (3) the wealth of the defendant. [Citation.] As to the wealth of the defendant, the function of deterrence 'will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort'; conversely, 'the function of punitive damages is not served by an award which, in light of the defendant's wealth and the gravity of the particular act, exceeds the level necessary to properly punish and deter." (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 619-620.)
"In order for [a reviewing court] to ascertain whether a punitive damages award is properly calibrated so as to inflict economic pain without financially ruining the defendant, it needs some evidence about the defendant's financial condition and ability to pay the award. [Citation.] Thus, our Supreme Court [has] held . . . 'that an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial [court] record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant's financial condition.' [Citations.] It is the plaintiff's obligation to ensure that this requirement is satisfied [citation] ...." (Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165, 192 (Soto).) Accordingly, "[e]vidence of a defendant's financial condition is a legal precondition to the award of punitive damages. [Citation.] We examine the record to determine whether the challenged award rests upon substantial evidence. [Citations.] If it does not, and if the plaintiff[ ] had a full and fair opportunity to make the requisite showing, the proper remedy is to reverse the award." (Id. at p. 195.)
Having reviewed the record, we agree with Hwang that it contains adequate evidence of Baik's financial condition to support the punitive damages award. Specifically, as discussed below, we conclude Hwang presented sufficient evidence shedding light on Baik's assets and liabilities to support the trial court's finding that her "net worth is considerable and well in excess of $2 million."
With respect to her assets, the evidence demonstrates Baik owns a detached, two-story home located in Buena Park, as well as a condominium located in Ladera Ranch. Since April 2019, Baik has rented the condominium to her eldest daughter for $1,500 per month.
Certified real estate appraiser Randy Sonns appraised both of Baik's properties. Because Sonns was not permitted to enter either property, he conducted a "drive-by appraisal" of each one, in which he photographed the properties from the street and examined sales of comparable properties to ascertain their value. Based on the information he reviewed, Sonns opined the Buena Park home was worth $1.24 million and the Ladera Ranch condominium was worth $850,000.
In addition to receiving rental income from her daughter, Baik is employed and earns a salary of $144,000. Further, at the time of trial, Baik owned the following accounts: (1) an individual Chase Bank account worth $1,527.88; (2) a Bank of America consolidated checking and money market savings account held jointly with her husband worth $15,383.70; (3) an individual Equitable annuity account worth $613,645.04; (4) a Charles Schwab securities account held jointly with her husband worth $247,599.46; and (5) a Charles Schwab investment account held jointly with her husband, which earned $3,307.90 in dividends in 2021.
With respect to Baik's liabilities, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates: (1) the Buena Park property is encumbered by a mortgage with a remaining principal balance of $44,398.99; (2) she has borrowed $167,078.09 on a home equity line of credit secured by the Buena Park property; (3) the Ladera Ranch property is encumbered by a mortgage with a remaining principal balance of $384,366.78; (4) Baik borrowed $200,000 from her older sister, which she has promised to pay back when able to do so; and (5) she did not pay income tax on the money deposited into her Equitable account but will need to pay "about 50 percent" in taxes when she withdraws those funds.
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence above to establish her financial condition, Baik asserts we should discredit Sonn's appraisal of her real property based on shortcomings in his appraisal methods. She also suggests that we should accord significant weight to the evidence relating to her debt to her sister and the tax-related consequences she will face when she chooses to withdraw funds from her Equitable account. Again, Baik's contention is meritless because, in reviewing the punitive damages award, we are bound by the principles of substantial evidence review, which prohibit us from reevaluating witness credibility and reweighing the evidence. (DeNike, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Instead, guided by those principles, we conclude Hwang presented "'meaningful evidence'" of Baik's financial condition through her assets and liabilities (Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 192; see also id. at pp. 194-195), and that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that a $50,000 punitive damages award was appropriate, as Baik's "net worth is considerable and well in excess of $2 million."
For these reasons, we also reject Baik's contention that the punitive damages award is "impermissibly excessive as a matter of law" because "Hwang failed to present evidence to establish Baik's net worth ...."
3. Sufficiency of Evidence for Purposes of Section 15657.5, Subdivision (b)
Finally, Baik contends punitive damages were improper because Hwang failed to "prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that [Baik] has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of the abuse" of Mr. Tak, as required under section 15657.5, subdivision (b). In support of this position, Baik reiterates that the record lacks sufficient evidence demonstrating she committed financial elder abuse. We concluded this argument is meritless in section II.B above and, for the reasons stated there, are not persuaded to reverse the punitive damages award.
V. Hwang's Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal
Having concluded the judgment must be affirmed, we agree with Hwang that she is statutorily entitled to her attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. (§ 15657.5, subd. (a) [mandating an award of "reasonable attorney's fees and costs" to a plaintiff who "prove[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30"]; Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927 ["settled case law . . . has established the general principle that statutes authorizing attorney fee awards in lower tribunals include attorney fees incurred on appeals of decisions from those lower tribunals"].) Per her suggestion, we remand the matter to the trial court to determine the amount recoverable. (Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1610 ["Although we have the power to appraise and fix attorney fees on appeal, we deem it the better practice to remand the cause to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of such fees"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Hwang is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to determine the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded.
We concur: COLLINS, J. ZUKIN, J.