Opinion
C.A. No. PC-2016-3957
09-09-2019
H.V. COLLINS PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and J.H. LYNCH & SONS, INC., Defendants.
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff: Robert G. Flanders, Jr., Esq. Christopher Nicholas Dawson, Esq. For Defendant: Lawrence P. McCarthy, III, Esq. Renee M. Bevilacqua, Esq.
DECISION SILVERSTEIN , J. (Ret.) Before the Court is Plaintiff H.V. Collins Properties, Inc.'s (Collins Properties or Plaintiff) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Collins Properties seeks a determination from this Court that the State of Rhode Island's (State) construction of a bicycle path (the Bike Path) across Collins Properties' land, without notice to or consent from Collins Properties, constitutes a taking of Plaintiff's land and riparian rights. As such, Plaintiff asks the Court to find the State liable to Plaintiff for just compensation, in an amount to be determined in future proceedings. The State objects, arguing that it owned the land in issue prior to the Bike Path's construction. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14 and Article I, Section 16 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
I
Facts and Travel
Collins Properties is a construction business organized as a Rhode Island corporation. Since 1950, Collins Properties, along with its affiliates and predecessors-in-interest, has owned real property located at 99 Gano Street, Providence, Rhode Island (99 Gano Street or the Property). The Property has served as the headquarters of Plaintiff's business since 1950. Plaintiff utilizes the land for storage of construction materials, landscapes the Property, and excludes the public by the use of permanent fencing around the Property's perimeter.
Collins Properties acquired 99 Gano Street by deed in 1950. The Providence City Tax Assessor's map identifies the Property as three consecutive pieces of land, including Plat 17, Lot 416 (Lot 416), which abuts Gano Street on the Property's western boundary; Plat 17, Lot 611 (Lot 611), which borders the Seekonk River on the Property's eastern boundary; and Beach Avenue (Beach Ave. or the Contested Land), a "paper street" comprised of a strip of land between Lot 416 and Lot 611. Before the construction of the Bike Path, there were no physical boundaries between these three parcels of property. Instead, they appeared to be one continuous piece of land.
The Property also included a seawall at the bank of the Seekonk River, prior to the events giving rise to this matter. The seawall existed when Plaintiff purchased the Property, and Plaintiff maintained it until 2016. From 1950 until at least 1978, Plaintiff also maintained a boat dock that extended into the Seekonk River from the seawall. In 2004, the City of Providence (Providence or the City) constructed a boat ramp next to 99 Gano Street. At that time, Plaintiff and the City executed an Agreement dated January 3, 2004 requiring the City to reinstall the fencing that prevented public access onto 99 Gano Street, including the Contested Land.
The paper street at Beach Ave. was first recorded in 1847 on a plat entitled, "Plot of What Cheer Estate belonging to the heirs of the late Gov. Jas. Fenner, Surveyed and Plotted July 14, 1847, By Atwater & Schubarth" (the What Cheer Plat). The paper street was fully submerged under the Seekonk River at the time of the recording of that plat. It remained so until as late as the 1940s, at which time the shoreline of the Seekonk River had begun to recede, and nearby property owners began to fill in their lands at the shoreline. By 1950, when Plaintiff purchased the Property, the paper street was still partially—if not completely—submerged under water, while Lot 611 was fully submerged. After purchasing 99 Gano Street, Collins Properties filled in Beach Ave. and Lot 611, a process which was completed in 1972. There is no dispute that Collins Properties is the owner of Lot 416. The parties disagree as to the legal owner of Beach Ave. and Lot 611.
In August 2016, a construction crew entered 99 Gano Street, without notice or consent from Plaintiff, and began to build the Bike Path. The project was known as the Blackstone River Bikeway and was executed by contractor J.H. Lynch & Sons, Inc. (J.H. Lynch) pursuant to a contract with the State. The entire project consisted of approximately 0.7 miles of bike path, beginning at the intersection of Gano Street and Trenton Street, following along the Seekonk River, and ending at Waterman Street in Providence. Upon entry, the construction crew proceeded to lay a foundation for the Bike Path, to remove the fencing that existed around the perimeter of the Property, and to demolish the seawall. The crew dumped stones, fill, and rip-rap over and between the location of the seawall and the Seekonk River. Both the State and J.H. Lynch ignored Plaintiff's requests to consider an alternate route for the Bike Path.
The State, through the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT), claims to have acquired title to Beach Ave. through eminent domain against Providence. RIDOT filed for condemnation of Plat No. 2845 on August 28, 2015 in the Providence Land Evidence Records, pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 37-6-1 et seq. and §§ 24-10-1 et seq. As a result, the State contends that it acquired title to the Contested Land. However, it is Plaintiff's position that the City never had ownership of Beach Ave., thereby rendering this condemnation invalid.
In the wake of the construction of the Bike Path, Plaintiff claims numerous injuries to its rights in 99 Gano Street. The Bike Path now bisects the Property, thereby preventing Plaintiff's direct access to the Seekonk River and to Lot 611. Additionally, the State's removal of Plaintiff's fencing around the perimeter of the Property now allows public access onto 99 Gano Street. At the site of the Bike Path itself, J.H. Lynch raised the grade of the Contested Land, further obstructing Plaintiff's access to the Seekonk River. Moreover, the project resulted in the evisceration of the seawall, leaving in its place a mound of rip-rap at the shore of the Seekonk River. In the wake of these changes, the State has not compensated Plaintiff and denies liability.
In August 2016, shortly after the commencement of the Bike Path's construction, Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that the State's actions constituted a taking of Plaintiff's property and riparian rights. Plaintiff seeks just compensation for the State's action. The amount of such compensation, if any, is to be determined in future proceedings.
II
Standard of Review
It is well-settled that '"[s]ummary judgment is 'a drastic remedy,' and a motion for summary judgment should be dealt with cautiously."' Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 390 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Ardente v. Horan, 117 R.I. 254, 256-57, 366 A.2d 162, 164 (1976)). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the [C]ourt determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Quest Diagnostics, LLC v. Pinnacle Consortium of Higher Educ., 93 A.3d 949, 951 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). Pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment "may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."
'"[T]he moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact."' McGovern v. Bank of Am., N.A., 91 A.3d 853, 858 (R.I. 2014) (quoting 1 Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 56:5 (2018-19 ed.)). Once this burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to prove by competent evidence the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Id. The nonmoving party may not rely on '"mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions'" to satisfy its burden. D'Allesandro v. Tarro, 842 A.2d 1063, 1065 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Santucci v. Citizens Bank of Rhode Island, 799 A.2d 254, 257 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam)).
III
Analysis
The central question in this dispute is which party held the fee title in the Contested Land at the time of the Bike Path's construction. Although the State filed a condemnation notice against the City in 2015 with respect to the Contested Land, Plaintiff argues that it—rather than the City—held the fee title in the Property at that time, rendering the condemnation notice moot. In response, the State submits that the chain of title indicates that the City held the fee title in the Contested Land in 2015, making the State's condemnation of the Contested Land from the City effective. Accordingly, the State argues that its actions were lawful and do not require the State to compensate Plaintiff, whereas Plaintiff argues that the State's construction of the Bike Path on the Contested Land constitutes a taking for which Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation.
A
Ownership of the Contested Land
In support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Collins Properties first argues that it holds the fee title in the Contested Land as well as the riparian rights associated with both the Contested Land and Lot 611. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that—pursuant to the requirements of Rhode Island law—the City never accepted the offer to dedicate the "paper street" that appeared on the 1847 deed of the What Cheer Plat in order to obtain ownership of Beach Ave. Plaintiff submits that even if the City may have originally held rights in Beach Ave., such rights were extinguished by (1) the City's failure to accept the paper street within a reasonable time, (2) Plaintiff's filling in of Lot 611, and (3) adverse possession.
In response, the State argues that it properly condemned Beach Ave. from the City. Accordingly, the State argues that Plaintiff has no claim to the Contested Land and is not entitled to just compensation. The State submits that the chain of title indicates that the City was the proper owner of the Contested Land in 2015 at the time of condemnation, and that—notwithstanding the chain of title—the Public Trust Doctrine holds that the Contested Land and Lot 611 must be property of the State, as both were previously submerged below the Seekonk River. With respect to Plaintiff's arguments, the State maintains that the City and State's claims to the Contested Land cannot be extinguished by the City's failure to act within a certain amount of time, by Plaintiff's filling in of the Contested Land, or through adverse possession. Accordingly, the State argues that its construction of the Bike Path did not constitute a taking, and that it has no obligation to compensate Collins Properties.
In reply, Plaintiff disputes the State's invocation of the Public Trust Doctrine. Plaintiff argues (i) that the State's attempted condemnation of the Contested Land from the City directly contradicts the State's claim that it owns Beach Ave. by reason of the Public Trust Doctrine, and (ii) that the State waived its right to raise the Public Trust Doctrine by failing to include it as an affirmative defense in its Answer.
1
Incipient Dedication of Beach Ave.
The law with respect to platted streets, or "paper streets," is well-settled in Rhode Island. "Where a plat is recorded with streets delineated thereon and lots are sold with reference to the plat, there is, so far as the public is concerned, an incipient dedication of such streets." Parrillo v. Riccitelli, 84 R.I. 276, 279, 123 A.2d 248, 249 (1956) (citing Brown v. Curran, 83 A. 515, 518 (1912)). "To complete such a dedication and establish as public highways the streets that appear on the recorded plat, there must be an acceptance on the part of the public," either by public user or through proper action on the part of public authorities. Id. (citing Marwell Construction Co. v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of City of Providence, 61 R.I. 314, 321, 200 A. 976, 979 (1938)).
The Contested Land first appeared as a paper street on the What Cheer Plat in 1847. This record constituted the incipient dedication of Beach Ave. Parrillo, 84 R.I. at 279, 123 A.2d at 249. At that time, Beach Ave. did not physically exist and was fully submerged beneath the Seekonk River. In order for Beach Ave. to become a public way, this initial dedication required an acceptance on the part of the public. Mill Realty Associates v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Coventry, 721 A.2d 887, 891 (R.I. 1998). Such dedication could have been accomplished either through public use or through the City's acceptance of Beach Ave.
There is no evidence before the Court of such acceptance of Beach Ave., either by public use or by City action. With respect to the public, the Contested Land was submerged beneath the Seekonk River when Plaintiff purchased the Property in 1950. After Plaintiff purchased 99 Gano Street, Plaintiff excluded the public from the Property through fencing around the perimeter. Therefore, the public has never used the Contested Land as a public way.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Providence accepted the dedication of the paper street. The index of public streets on file with the Department of Public Works for the City—which includes a list of all roadways that Providence considers to be public streets—does not include Beach Ave. Moreover, Collins Properties entered into an Agreement with the City regarding a boat ramp to the immediate north of 99 Gano Street in 2004, in which the City provided Plaintiff with assurances that it would not disturb Plaintiff's property. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 3; Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts 9, ¶ 33. Also, pursuant to this Agreement, the City replaced a fence that Plaintiff had previously installed across the northern boundary of 99 Gano Street that abutted Lot 416, Lot 611, and the Contested Land. Therefore, when the State condemned the Contested Land from the City in 2015, neither the City nor the public had accepted Beach Ave. as a public way. See Mill Realty Associates, 721 A.2d at 891.
The Court finally notes a recent Supreme Court decision holding that the incipient dedication of a paper street by a municipality must take place within a reasonable period of time. Ucci v. Town of Coventry, 186 A.3d 1068, 1073 (R.I. 2018). In Ucci, the Supreme Court held that the defendant town had forfeited its right to accept an incipient dedication by failing to do so within sixty-seven years of the dedication. Id. at 1074. Here, more than one hundred years had passed between the time the paper street was recorded on the What Cheer Plat (in 1847) and the time Plaintiff purchased the land (in 1950). When the City replaced Plaintiff's fence in 2004, more than one-hundred and fifty years had elapsed. Therefore, at the time the State attempted to condemn Beach Ave. in 2015, the Court finds the State failed to produce evidence of the acceptance by the City of the paper street and certainly no evidence of such acceptance within a reasonable time. See id. Accordingly, the State's attempted condemnation of Beach Ave. from the City was ineffective.
2
Public Trust Doctrine
The State additionally submits that the State—rather than the City—owns all of Plaintiff's property that was previously submerged under the Seekonk River, including Lot 611 and the Contested Land, pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine. Plaintiff responds that the State waived its right to raise this argument through its failure to include it as an affirmative defense in its answer. Notwithstanding the State's alleged waiver, Plaintiff argues that the State does not own the Property by way of exceptions to the Public Trust Doctrine. Plaintiff lastly notes that the State's claim of ownership of Beach Ave. and Lot 611 directly contradicts its attempted condemnation of Beach Ave. from the City.
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's assertion that the State waived its right to present arguments pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine is of no moment. Indeed, Super. R. Civ. P. 12(h) states that "[a] party waives all defenses and objections which the party does not present . . . in the party's answer." See also Catelli v. Fleetwood, 842 A.2d 1078, 1081 (R.I. 2004) ('"[i]t is well settled that 'failure to plead an affirmative defense results in its waiver"') (quoting Duquette v. Godbout, 416 A.2d 669, 670 (R.I. 1980)). Affirmative defenses are enumerated in Rule 8, and include "accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver," although this list is not exhaustive. Super. R. Civ. P. 8(c); 1 Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 8:6 (2018-19 ed.). However, affirmative defenses "need not 'be explicitly labeled as such, and the defense may be pleaded in general terms so long as it gives the [plaintiff] fair notice of the defense."' West Davisville Realty Co., LLC v. Alpha Nutrition, Inc., 182 A.3d 46, 51 (R.I. 2018).
Here, the State neglected to include the Public Trust Doctrine, either explicitly or generally, in its Answer. However, the Public Trust Doctrine is not enumerated as an affirmative defense in Super. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Moreover, Plaintiff received fair notice of the State's argument—along with an opportunity to respond—in the State's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See West Davisville Realty Co., LLC, 182 A.3d at 51. The State is therefore not barred from presenting arguments regarding the Public Trust Doctrine.
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, "the state holds title to all land below the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public." Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995) (citing Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 91 R.I. 145, 152, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (1960)). However, the Supreme Court has established a two-part test that enables littoral owners to acquire the land submerged beneath his or her shoreline, harbor line, or otherwise. First, the landowner must fill in the land with the express or implied approval and acquiescence of the state. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044. Second, the landowner must improve "the land in justifiable reliance on the approval." Id. These requirements allow the landowner "to establish title to that land that is free and clear," and once so acquired, "the state cannot reacquire it on the strength of the public-trust doctrine alone." Id.
Here, Plaintiff has acquired the Contested Land and Lot 611 through the exception to the Public Trust Doctrine set forth in Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce. Id. at 1044. First, Plaintiff filled in both plots of land that were originally submerged, beginning in 1950 and ending in 1972. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 6. The State acquiesced to Plaintiff's filling in of the Property through its failure to act in response to this process of filling in the land—not only with respect to Plaintiff but also with respect to the adjacent landowners who were also filling in the land below the shoreline—which took place beginning more than fifty years ago. Collins Properties satisfies the second prong of the two-part test through its improvements to the Contested Land and Lot 611, in justifiable reliance on the State's approval, including its landscaping, installation of fences, and general maintenance for business use. Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Pine, 729 A.2d 202, 206 (R.I. 1999); see also Hilley v. Simmler, 463 A.2d 1302 (R.I. 1983) (stating that fences, landfill, retaining walls, and walkways are improvements to real property). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the legal owner of Lot 611 and Beach Ave.
3
Adverse Possession
In the event this Court finds that Plaintiff does not own the Property under the rules of incipient dedication or the exception to the Public Trust Doctrine in Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, Plaintiff argues that it owns the Contested Land and Lot 611 by way of adverse possession. The State responds that, notwithstanding Plaintiff's continuous and exclusive use of the Property since 1950, Plaintiff cannot adversely possess land that belonged to the State.
The law of adverse possession regarding public lands is well-settled. The United States Supreme Court holds that private parties are prohibited from adversely possessing all lands, including shoreline property. Marine Railway & Coal Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 47, 64-66 (1921). Rhode Island law echoes this prohibition. See Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991) (holding that "a private party cannot adversely possess public property"). Rhode Island's Marketable Record Title Act further bars private parties from acquiring public land through adverse possession. G.L. 1956 § 34-13.1-7; see also § 34-7-8 (statutorily precluding private individuals from adversely possessing shoreline or waterfront property within Rhode Island).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is barred from adversely possessing Beach Ave. and Lot 611 under both state and federal law. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has legally acquired title to the land, through both the law of incipient dedication and the Public Trust Doctrine. Therefore, while the State is correct that Plaintiff's claim to the Property by reason of adverse possession fails, Plaintiff has established its ownership of the Property (a) through its position that the City never acquired title by reason of incipient dedication and (b) by reason of exceptions to the Public Trust Doctrine.
B
Just Compensation for the Taking of the Property and Accompanying Riparian Rights
Having determined that Beach Ave. and Lot 611 are property of Plaintiff, the Court turns to the question of whether Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation from the State. Plaintiff argues that the State has taken its property in three ways: (1) by physically taking Collins Properties' land and eviscerating its seawall; (2) through an inverse condemnation of Lot 611 by way of bisecting Plaintiff's property with the Bike Path, inviting the public onto Plaintiff's land, and obstructing Plaintiff's access to Lot 611; and (3) taking Collins Properties' riparian rights in both the Contested Land and Lot 611 by restricting access to the Seekonk River and destroying Plaintiff's seawall.
The State has refused to provide Plaintiff with any compensation. According to the State, it justly compensated the City when it attempted to take Beach Ave. through eminent domain, and Plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation from the State. Moreover, the State argues that Plaintiff's claim of inverse condemnation with respect to Lot 611 fails for lack of factual support, and the Bike Path in no way impedes Plaintiff's riparian rights.
1
Physical Taking of the Contested Land and Destruction of the Seawall
The Court has determined that Plaintiff is the owner of the Contested Land and Lot 611, and the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the owner of the seawall. As such, the Court turns to the question of whether the construction of the Bike Path constituted a taking by the State for which Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation. The sole question with respect to the alleged taking is the State's liability to Plaintiff; the amount of compensation is not before the Court.
It is axiomatic that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use[] without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public uses, without just compensation"). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional requirement to apply to invasions of property both large and small. See Woodland Manor III Assocs. v. Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 811 (R.I. 1998). The United States Supreme Court has additionally determined that "no de minimis exception could apply to the constitutional takings doctrine, and that a small physical occupation [is] nevertheless a physical occupation." Tuthill Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431-32 (1982). Whether a public entity's actions constitute a taking is a question of law. Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1995).
The Court finds that the State's construction of the Bike Path constituted a taking of Plaintiff's property, entitling Plaintiff to just compensation in an amount to be determined in a future proceeding. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16. In building the Bike Path, the State's construction crew entered the Contested Land, destroyed Plaintiff's fencing, and raised the grade of Beach Ave. See Harris, 668 A.2d at 327 ("[a] plaintiff need not prove actual deprivation of possession but merely serious impairment of the use and enjoyment of property"). These actions provided the public with unobstructed use of Beach Ave., while depriving the Plaintiff of its use of this portion of 99 Gano Street. Contrary to the State's assertion, the City did not own Beach Ave. at the time of the State's attempted condemnation pursuant to the Public Trust Doctrine and the law of incipient dedication. Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044; see also Parrillo, 84 R.I. at 279, 123 A.2d at 249. Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation from the State, in an amount to be determined in a future proceeding. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2
Inverse Condemnation of Lot 611
Plaintiff further argues that the construction of the Bike Path, which bisected the Property and obstructed Plaintiff's access to Lot 611, constituted an "inverse condemnation" of Lot 611 requiring just compensation. The State argues that its actions with respect to Lot 611 are not substantial enough to constitute an inverse condemnation, and that Plaintiff has failed to support this allegation with sufficient evidence.
Under Rhode Island law, when state action impairs or diminishes '"the right of access to land . . . such act is not [a] confiscatory taking requiring compensation unless the impairment or diminution is so substantial as to leave the property owner without reasonable access to his [or her] property."' Bruzzese v. Wood, 674 A.2d 390, 394 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Narciso v. State, 114 R.I. 53, 59, 328 A.2d 107, 110 (1974)). "The determination of whether a 'substantial impairment' has been established is a question of law, while the extent of such impairment is a question of fact." Narciso, 114 R.I. at 60, 328 A.2d at 110 (citing State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 10 (1970)). "Prior to an assessment and award of damages, there must be a finding that a substantial impairment" has taken place. Bruzzese, 674 A.2d at 394.
Here, the Court is solely presented with a question of liability and must determine whether a substantial impairment has occurred, a question of law. Randall v. State, 609 A.2d 949, 950 (R.I. 1992) ("[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only when there is no issue of material fact, only a question of law"). In making such a determination, the Court notes that the construction of the Bike Path bisected Plaintiff's property, separating Lot 416 from Lot 611. Prior to the construction of the Bike Path, Plaintiff had unobstructed use of 99 Gano Street, including Lot 416, the Contested Land, and Lot 611, allowing Plaintiff to utilize the entire property for its business activities. In the wake of the State's actions, Plaintiff no longer has unobstructed beneficial use of Lot 611, as this portion of 99 Gano Street is separated from the rest of the Property with both a fence and the Bike Path. See generally Bruzzese, 674 A.2d at 395 (affirming the trial court's determination that the DOT's actions blocking access of tractor-trailer trucks into the plaintiff's property constituted a taking entitling the plaintiff to damages). Accordingly, the Court finds that the State's actions resulted in a substantial impairment in Plaintiff's property as a matter of law. Id. at 394 ('"in an exercise of police power, the right of access to land . . . is [substantially impaired as a matter of law when the] diminution is so substantial as to leave the property owner without reasonable access to his [or her] property"') (quoting Narciso, 114 R.I. at 59, 328 A.2d at 110).
3
Taking of Riparian Rights in the Contested Land and Lot 611
Finally, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to just compensation for the State's taking of its riparian rights, as both Lot 611 and the Contested Land border the Seekonk River. The State responds that Plaintiff cannot own riparian rights in Lot 611 and the Contested Land because Plaintiff does not own these properties. Having determined that Plaintiff is the legal owner of both the Contested Land and Lot 611, the Court turns to the question of whether Plaintiff is the owner of the riparian rights thereto and entitled to just compensation for the State's actions.
A riparian proprietor is defined as a person "in possession of riparian land or who owns an estate in it; a landowner whose property borders on a stream or river." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Under Rhode Island law, status as a riparian proprietor entitles such an owner "to an action for any injury from which he suffered in the use of [his or her riparian] right[s]." Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200, 210 (1881) ("[r]iparian owners have a right to construct wharves, buildings, and other improvements in front of their lands, and in and over the public navigable waters"). Id. at 202. To successfully plead a claim with respect to the ownership of their riparian rights, plaintiffs must demonstrate "that they, through their predecessors, were entitled to littoral rights to the tidelands that were filled. Such littoral rights could only be claimed if plaintiffs' predecessors had acquired title." Hall, 594 A.2d at 876.
Here, Plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that no material fact exists with respect to its ownership of the Contested Land and Lot 611. Accordingly, they are riparian proprietors under Rhode Island law. Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. at 202. As such, they are entitled to make use of the water, and to construct improvements at the water's edge, including the seawall that the State destroyed. Id.; see also 1 Byron K. Elliott & William F. Elliott, A Treatise on The Law of Roads and Streets § 227 (4th ed. 1926 revised) (noting that the destructing of right to wharfage is a taking). By obstructing Plaintiff's access to Lot 611, coupled with the construction of the Bike Path across the Contested Land, the State has obstructed Plaintiff's use of the shoreline bordering the Property, thereby obstructing Plaintiff's riparian rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation for the State's taking of its riparian rights; the specific amount shall be determined in a future proceeding.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, this Court declares that Collins Properties is the legal owner of the Contested Land in issue, Lot 611, and the riparian rights appurtenant to both properties. As such, the State's construction of the Bike Path, without notice or consent from Collins Properties, constituted a taking of Plaintiff's land and its riparian rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation from the State, in an amount to be determined in a future proceeding. Specifically, compensation must be decided for (1) the State's taking of the Contested Land through its construction of the Bike Path, (2) the State's inverse condemnation of Lot 611, and (3) the State's impairment of Plaintiff's riparian rights with respect to Lot 611 and the Contested Land.
Prevailing counsel shall present an appropriate order consistent herewith which shall be settled after due notice to counsel of record.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Robert G. Flanders, Jr., Esq.
Christopher Nicholas Dawson, Esq. For Defendant: Lawrence P. McCarthy, III, Esq.
Renee M. Bevilacqua, Esq.