Hutton v. Consolidated Grain Barge Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Bowman v. American River Transp. Co.

    217 Ill. 2d 75 (Ill. 2005)   Cited 37 times
    Stating the doctrine for statutes

    However, as mentioned, the appellate court affirmed the remainder of the trial court's findings, specifically the "pain and suffering" award and the striking of defendants' jury demand. The panel rejected defendants' reliance on an opinion recently filed in the Fourth District, Hutton v. Consolidated Grain Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401 (2003), which directly conflicts with Allen and holds that both parties in a Jones Act case are entitled to demand trial by jury. Thus, the appeal before us raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in striking defendants' jury demand in this state court Jones Act case; and (2) whether the $325,000 judgment for pain, suffering, disability and disfigurement is supported by the evidence.

  2. Lyons v. Lyons (In re Estate of Lyons)

    2014 Ill. App. 4th 130902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    ¶ 16 In her reply brief, respondent argues we can consider this appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Specifically, respondent contends "[the trial court's] Order could also be considered as requesting an appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308," citing Hutton v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401, 795 N.E.2d 303 (2003). We disagree.

  3. State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc.

    2013 IL 113836 (Ill. 2013)   Cited 82 times
    Explaining that if the federal courts are split on how they construe a federal statute, then the importance of uniformity recedes and this court will follow the line of cases it believes to be properly decided

    Bowman, 217 Ill.2d at 91–92, 298 Ill.Dec. 56, 838 N.E.2d 949. Instead, we agreed with our appellate court case Hutton v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 341 Ill.App.3d 401, 276 Ill.Dec. 950, 795 N.E.2d 303 (2003), and cited with approval to a law review article that also rejected the federal circuit court decisions. In justifying our departure from federal circuit precedent, we noted that, since Sprietsma, federal circuit and district court decisions were “merely * * * persuasive.”

  4. Endicott v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.

    167 Wn. 2d 873 (Wash. 2010)   Cited 13 times

    Another explored the historical meaning of the Jones Act and adopted a jurisdictional interpretation. Hutton v. Consol. Grain Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401, 795 N.E.2d 303, 306-09, 276 Ill. Dec. 950 (2003). In a thorough opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court disapproved of Allen and adopted Hutton as the proper statement of the law.

  5. Samaha v. Burnside

    2024 Ill. App. 4th 230166 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    An order for bench trial is nonfinal, as it "does not terminate the litigation between the parties on the entire controversy or a separate part thereof." Hutton v. Consolidated Grain &Barge Co., 341 Ill.App.3d 401, 403-04 (2003) (stating the same for an order denying a motion for jury trial). Furthermore, defendant has not argued that any of the Illinois Supreme Court rules permitting an interlocutory appeal apply in this case.

  6. Underwood v. City of Chicago

    2020 Ill. App. 182180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    Where it is clear that a circuit court intended to permit a party to take an appeal, not from a judgment disposing of one or more specific claims, but from a ruling on a discreet issue—and where, in our discretion, we have concluded that interlocutory appellate review of that question is proper—we have treated an appeal purportedly brought under Rule 304(a) as one more properly brought under Rule 308. See Hutton v. Consolidated Grain and Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401, 404 (2003). We find it appropriate to do so here.

  7. Whitledge v. Klein

    348 Ill. App. 3d 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    "Because our decision today involves the construction of a statute, the question before us is one of law, and our review is de novo." Hutton v. Consolidated Grain Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401, 406, 795 N.E.2d 303, 307 (2003). We adhere to the familiar and well-settled rule of statutory construction that requires this court to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, which is best found in the plain language of the statute.