See Ex parte Pettway, 594 So.2d 1196, 1201 n.5 (Ala. 1991); Brooks v. State, 471 So.2d 511, 515 (Ala.Crim.App.1985); Hutto v. State, 53 Ala.App. 685, 689-690, 304 So.2d 29 (Ala.Crim.App.1974); Reed v. State, 48 Ala.App. 120, 122, 262 So.2d 321 (Ala.Crim.App.1972). Thus, police officers making an arrest within the county, but outside the city police jurisdiction, are acting within the scope of their discretionary authority.

See also Brooks v. State, 471 So.2d 511 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). Furthermore, in Ringstaff v. State, 480 So.2d 50 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the fact that a police officer was "off-duty" did not affect the legality of the arrest, citing Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 689-90, 304 So.2d 29, 32-33, cert. denied, 293 Ala. 758, 304 So.2d 33 (1974). In summary, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment regarding the requested jury instructions on self-defense, but we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it holds that the evidence presented did not show that the petitioner was entitled to an instruction on the law relating to the use of force in effecting an arrest.

Perry sued Greyhound for assault and battery, claiming that the arresting officers, acting as security guards for Greyhound and not as police officers for the City of Mobile, had no authority to use physical force in effecting the arrest and apprehension of Perry. Because the offense for which Perry was arrested was committed in the officers' presence, we affirm the summary judgment, based on the principles enunciated in Driskill v. State, 376 So.2d 678 (Ala. 1979); Hood v. City of Bessemer, 404 So.2d 710 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 304 So.2d 29 (1974), cert. denied, 293 Ala. 758, 304 So.2d 33 (1974). See, also, Code 1975, §§ 15-10-3 and 13A-3-27.

While the officer was in the employ of the Huntsville Board of Education at the time of the incident, he was in uniform and received his orders from his police chief. For the purposes of this statute, he was engaged in the active discharge of his duties. Cf. Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 304 So.2d 29 (1974), (wherein it was held that a police officer employed by a high school to work security at a football game was acting within the line of duty in attempting to make an arrest for possession of beer in a dry county). Code 1975, § 15-10-3, gives an officer the authority to make arrests without a warrant when a public offense has been committed in his presence.

Therefore, because Jones was not engaged in the active discharge of his lawful duties as a peace officer at the time of the assault, the conviction must be reversed. See generally, Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 304 So.2d 29, cert. denied, 293 Ala. 758, 304 So.2d 33 (1974); Curlin, supra; and Williams v. State, 45 Wis.2d 44, 172 N.W.2d 31 (1969). The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded.

COLEMAN, Justice. Petition of Jerry Hutto for Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that Court in Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 304 So.2d 29. Writ denied.

It is also permissible for a witness who has observed wounds to testify that they seemed to have been made with a sharp or blunt instrument."). But see Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 689, 304 So. 2d 29, 32 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974) ("A witness may not testify as to the cause of a wound unless it is shown that he is an expert or possesses greater knowledge of the cause of wounds than the average person."). "[C]ounsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise a baseless objection."

"Officer Hunt, in whose presence the alleged misdemeanor was committed, had the legal right to arrest defendant anywhere in Jefferson County. In making a valid arrest a police officer is not limited to the territory within the corporate limits of the municipality of which he is a police officer; he may legally arrest in any part of the county in which the municipality is situated, Code of Alabama 1940, Tit. 15, Sec. 152; Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41 [(1870)]; Hutto v. State, 53 Ala.App. 685, 304 So.2d 29 [(1974)]; Reed v. State, 48 Ala.App. 120, 262 So.2d 321 [(1972)]."

nd noticed three plants that appeared to be marijuana "stepped out of his exterminator role and became a government agent" when he examined the plants and took a leaf for verification); Perry v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 491 So.2d 926 (Ala. 1986) (holding that status of off-duty police officers "moonlighting" as security guards was changed to that of police officers after witnessing a crime); Driskill v. State, 376 So.2d 678, 679 (Ala. 1979) (holding that an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard for a high school football game was acting in his capacity as a police officer, not in his capacity as a security guard, when he attempted to remove a student from the stadium and that student physically resisted); Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d 1113, 1114 (Ala. 1978) (holding that an off-duty police officer "moonlighting" as a security guard was not transformed from a security guard to a police officer when he received a report of a fight, because he had not witnessed any crime); and Hutto v. State, 53 Ala. App. 685, 689, 304 So.2d 29, 33 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 293 Ala. 758, 304 So.2d 33 (Ala. 1974) (holding that an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard for a high school football game was acting in his capacity as a police officer, not in his capacity as a security guard, when he was assaulted after he had witnessed the appellant, a minor, in possession of beer). The clear import of these cases is that when an off-duty police officer witnesses a criminal offense or suspects criminal activity, the officer's status changes and, from that point on, he is considered to be acting in his capacity as a police officer and not in his capacity as a private citizen, i.e., he is considered to be "on duty."

The majority holds that police officers retain their official status as a policeman when employed privately during off-duty hours, because a police officer's duties are continual. See Hutto v. Alabama, 304 So.2d 29 (Ala.Crim.App. 1974); Carr v. State, 335 S.E.2d 622 (Ga. App. 1985); Monroe v. State, 465 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971). Public policy considerations, including the notion that authority placed in security guards furthers the objective of deterring unlawful acts, is also a deciding factor for many courts.