While this is evidence of some general burden, it is not necessarily evidence of an unreasonable burden, nor is it the type of "particular and specific demonstration of fact" required to justify a protective order. Serrano, 699 F.3d at 901 (quoting Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and additional citation omitted)); see also Hutchison v. Parent, 3:12CV00320, 2012 WL 6029141, *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Serrano and citing Moore's Federal Practice ยง 26.104[1] for the proposition that "[g]ood cause is not established via inconvenience and expense"); but cf. Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App'x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding district court's issuance of protective order where the deponent submitted an affidavit stating that it would be difficult for him to schedule a deposition because of his legislative duties, and specifically stating the areas in which he had no personal knowledge or connection to the activities alleged). The factual evidence of "unreasonable burden" is especially insufficient here where Defendant has provided no affidavit or other evidence demonstrating that he lacks personal knowledge, and where Mr. Duncan argues that he intends to ask Defendant Husted questions about the application and interpretation of certain election laws.