Opinion
Nos. 16-97-06018; CA A103273
Argued and submitted October 27, 1999.
Filed: December 22, 1999.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lane County, George J. Woodrich, Judge.
Daniel W. Goff argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
William H. Sherlock argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jessica L. Wood, Stephen A. Hutchinson, and Hutchinson, Anderson, Cox, Coons DuPriest, P. C.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Armstrong and Kistler, Judges.
PER CURIAM
Reversed and remanded.
Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff on its action to recover on a promissory note executed by defendant. The trial court entered the judgment after it granted a directed verdict for plaintiff under ORCP 60 at the close of plaintiff's case. In his amended answer, defendant alleges several affirmative defenses, including real party in interest, waiver, laches, partial failure of consideration and complete failure of consideration. Those defenses could present factual issues, including whether the note was intended to secure payment for future legal services. See Thompson v. Dockstader, 131 Or. App. 254, 884 P.2d 586 (1994) (reasoning that whether a note is given as security for an antecedent debt is a question for the factfinder). As a result of the trial court's ruling, defendant was precluded from attempting to prove his affirmative defenses. ORCP 60 authorizes a motion for a directed verdict "at the close of all the evidence," or "at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent." Neither situation occurred here, and, consequently, the trial court erred. Because of our disposition, we do not reach defendant's other arguments.
ORCP 60 provides, in part:
"Any party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent or at the close of all the evidence."
We do not decide what evidence is admissible in support of defendant's defenses.
Reversed and remanded.