it is sometimes put, the transaction amounts to an equitable mortgage." Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Hodges v. Verner, 100 Ala. 612, 13 So. 679; Dooly v. Pinson, 145 Ala. 659, 39 So. 664, Hughes v. Letcher, 168 Ala. 314, 52 So. 914; Hidden v. Jordan, 21 Cal. 92; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481 ; Walton v. Karnes, 67 Cal. 255, 7 P. 676; O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 435, 16 P. 237; Hellman v. Messmer, 75 Cal. 166, 16 P. 766; Brown v. Spencer, 163 Cal. 589, 126 P. 493; McPherrin v. Fair, 57 Colo. 333, 141 P. 472; Caruthers v. Williams, 21 Fla. 485; Smith v. Sackett, 10 Ill. 534; Coates v. Woodworth, 13 Ill. 654; Wright v. Gay, 101 Ill. 233; Furber v. Page, 143 Ill. 622, 32 N.E. 444, Towle v. Wadsworth, 147 Ill. 80, 30 N.E. 602; 35 N.E. 73; Henry v. Britt, 197 Ill. App. 167; Krebs v. Lauser, 133 Iowa, 241, 110 N.W. 443; Payne v. McClure Lodge, 115 S.W. 764; Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen 15; Jackson v. Stevens, 108 Mass. 94; McDonough v. O'Niel, 113 Mass. 92; Fickett v. Durham, 109 Mass. 419; Hutchings v. Clerk, 225 Mass. 483, 114 N.E. 746, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 979; Robinson v. Leflore, 59 Miss. 148; Thomas v. Thomas, 62 Miss. 531; Hebron v. Kelly, 75 Miss. 74, 21 So. 799; Wilson v. Hoffman, 104 Miss. 743, 61 So. 699; Comfort v. Winters, 108 Miss. 330, 66 So. 532; Marcellus v. Wright, 51 Mont. 559, 154 P. 714; Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424, 115 Am. St. Rep. 596, 98 N.W. 1085; Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582; Getman v. Getman, 1 Barb. Ch. 499; Safford v. Hynds, 39 Barb. 625; Modern Baking Co. v. Orringer, 271 Pa. 152, 114 A. 264; Brenner v. Brenner, 29 Pa. Dist. R. 23; Salter v. Gentry, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 526, 130 S.W. 627; Schutz v. Harris, 149 S.W. 242; Borrow v. Borrow, 34 Wn. 684, 76 P. 305; McSorley v. Bullock, 62 Wn. 140, 113 P. 279; Harvey v. Shipe, 78 W. Va. 246, 88 S.E. 830. The precise question is put at rest by this court in the case of Wilson v. Hoffman, 104 Miss. 743; Comfort v. Winters, 108 Miss. 330.

An equitable mortgage is created by assignment of a sheriff's [5, 6] deed or a certificate of sale to one advancing money for redemption of lands from judicial sale under an agreement to reconvey to the debtor on repayment. (Jones on Mortgages, 8th ed., sec. 228; Lounsburg v. Norton, 59 Conn. 170, 22 A. 153; Trogdon v. Trogdon, 164 Ill. 144, 45 N.E. 575; Byers v. Johnson, 89 Iowa, 278, 56 N.W. 449; Staughton v. Simpson, 69 Minn. 314, 72 N.W. 126; Sweetzer's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 264.) It is also sometimes said that under such a state of facts the person advancing the money to procure the assignment of a sheriff's certificate of sale or bidding in the property for the benefit of the mortgagor at foreclosure sale, holds the property as the trustee of a resulting trust. ( Marcellus v. Wright, 51 Mont. 559, 154 P. 714; Hutchings v. Clerk, 225 Mass. 483, 114 N.E. 746.) Defendant contends that there could be no resulting trust pursuant to the provisions of section 6785, Revised Codes 1921, since Evans did not pay the money to plaintiff until long after the transaction had occurred.

Southwick v. Bigelow, 237 Mass. 299, 305. Hutchings v. Clerk, 225 Mass. 483, 487. O'Brien v. Hovey, 239 Mass. 37, 43. Holian v. Holian, ante, 563.

In Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen, 15, where no money passed from the alleged buyer to his alleged agent, the court refused to establish a resulting trust in the absence of very clear proof of a present loan from the agent to the buyer. In Hutchings v. Clerk, 225 Mass. 483, where the same rule of law is recognized, the case rests upon a finding of fact that the consideration was furnished by the promisee. The fact that a consideration exists does not prevent the statute of frauds from rendering a promise unenforceable.