We will not revisit this ruling in this appeal. Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 186, 384 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2016) (the law of the case doctrine generally "operates to foreclose re-examination of decided issues either on remand or on a subsequent appeal") .' (2) The Cost Order also provided:

Before reaching the Circuit Court's ruling with regard to the common-law principle, however, we are confronted with the question of whether application of the principle presents a political question, the resolution of which "threatens confrontation with the other branches of government." Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 188, 384 P.3d 1282, 1289 (2016) (quoting Trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 169, 737 P.2d 446, 455 (1987)). Kawananakoa recognizes that the Circuit Court's application of the common-law principle here "suggests [that] the court was somehow influenced by the 'political question' doctrine."

The Legislature maintains that this court may look no further than determining whether the Legislature followed its own procedural rules to ascertain whether the three readings requirement is satisfied without violating the separation of powers doctrine. See Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 188-89, 384 P.3d 1282, 1289-90 (2016) (holding that whether a legislator is qualified to hold office is nonjusticiable because section 12 grants the Legislature the exclusive authority to judge the qualifications of its members). The Legislature insists that there is no judicially discoverable or manageable standard, aside from the Legislature's own rules of procedure, for this court to decide whether the three readings requirement was satisfied and therefore the question is nonjusticiable.

The Legislature maintains that this court may look no further than determining whether the Legislature followed its own procedural rules to ascertain whether the three readings requirement is satisfied without violating the separation of powers doctrine. See Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai‘i 181, 188-89, 384 P.3d 1282, 1289-90 (2016) (holding that whether a legislator is qualified to hold office is nonjusticiable because section 12 grants the Legislature the exclusive authority to judge the qualifications of its members). The Legislature insists that there is no judicially discoverable or manageable standard, aside from the Legislature's own rules of procedure, for this court to decide whether the three readings requirement was satisfied and therefore the question is nonjusticiable.

The Legislature maintains that this court may look no further than determining whether the Legislature followed its own procedural rules to ascertain whether the three readings requirement is satisfied without violating the separation of powers doctrine. See Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 188-89, 384 P.3d 1282, 1289-90 (2016) (holding that whether a legislator is qualified to hold office is nonjusticiable because section 12 grants the Legislature the exclusive authority to judge the qualifications of its members). The Legislature insists that there is no judicially discoverable or manageable standard, aside from the Legislature's own rules of procedure, for this court to decide whether the three readings requirement was satisfied and therefore the question is nonjusticiable.

We have held that the Department is permitted to "exercise all such power as the public interests may from time to time require[,]" unless expressly restricted by statute. Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai‘i 181, 190, 384 P.3d 1282, 1291 (2016) (quoting Chun, 87 Hawai‘i at 173, 952 P.2d at 1236 ). Thus, in the absence of a common law or statutory restriction, the Department may exercise powers not expressly granted by statute, including in its representation of the legislature, or a component part thereof.

Appellate courts apply the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a lower court's denial of a motion for disqualification. Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court may not be reversed by an appellate court unless the trial court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant."

Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016).

Stender v. Vincent, 92 Hawai‘i 355, 361, 992 P.2d 50, 56 (2000). Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai‘i 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016). The construction of the terms of restrictive covenants, like the terms of a contract, are questions of law.

Stender v. Vincent, 92 Hawai'i 355, 361, 992 P.2d 50, 56 (2000) . Hussey v. Say, 139 Hawai'i 181, 185, 384 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2016). In State v. Thompson, this court rejected the defendant's argument that the law of the case doctrine precluded the circuit court from imposing consecutive sentences upon resentencing, where the "original judge had imposed concurrent, not consecutive, sentences."