Hussey v. Railroad

16 Citing cases

  1. Morris v. Railroad

    160 A. 52 (N.H. 1931)   Cited 23 times
    In Morris v. Boston Maine R.R., 85 N.H. 265, 160 A. 52, the question was whether plaintiff had, as he testified, stopped his car on the railroad track; if so, he was negligent.

    It is not perceived how the evidence excepted to could have confused or unduly prejudiced the jury. Where the evidence is admissible for one or more purposes and it is capable of use for an incompetent purpose it was the right and duty of the party aggrieved to request that its use be limited. Lord v. Railway, 74 N.H. 295, 298; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 245. No request was made. The defendant takes nothing by his exception.

  2. Rue v. Wendland

    226 Minn. 449 (Minn. 1948)   Cited 24 times
    In Rue v. Wendland, 226 Minn. 449, 33 N.W.2d 593, cited by defendant, a somewhat similar situation was involved and the court held that the evidence presented fact questions for the jury.

    Precautionary duty depends on reason to apprehend results. Hussey v. Boston Maine R. 82 N.H. 236, 245, 133 A. 9, 15. Duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion as they are or should be known to the actor. An act or omission from which no injury should be anticipated is not negligent. Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co. supra; The Nitroglycerine Case (Parrot v. Wells, Fargo Co.) 82 U.S. (Wall.) 524, 21 L. ed. 206; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 32. It follows, therefore, that the circumstances of which the actor has knowledge or notice are determinative of whether he was negligent. If this were not true, as said in Stedman v. O'Neil, 82 Conn. 199, 206, 72 A. 923, 926, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1229:

  3. Gates v. Railroad

    37 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1944)   Cited 8 times

    Failure to slacken his speed caused the witness who saw the train and the truck to exclaim, ". . . ain't that truck going to stop," perfect proof that Gates was either wholly inattentive or was going to try and get over the crossing ahead of the train. Whichever version is adopted we are confronted with the following: had Gates looked he would have seen. Not having slowed down or done anything for his own protection, the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that he did not look and consequently was negligent for not having done so. Collins v. Hustis, 79 N.H. 446, 447, 448; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 240; Bursiel v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 363, 369. Had he listened he would have heard. If he did not hear because the windows of his truck were closed, or because his truck made so much noise that he could not hear, or both, he was negligent for creating this perilous situation and for not taking precaution to protect himself against what should have been an expectable and anticipated danger. Archibald v. Railroad, 92 N.H. 184, 188. It is to be noted that the witnesses who testified to having heard the short blasts of the whistle were in the old depot then converted into a home located on the south side of the road east of the crossing, and that the windows in the building were closed. And again if Gates "observed the train and attempted to cross in front of it and the collision resulted from his miscalculation of the speed of the train and the probable operation of his machine, as is quite probable, he voluntarily put himself in a place of danger of his own motion and cannot recover for the r

  4. Isabelle v. Company

    37 A.2d 367 (N.H. 1944)   Cited 1 times

    " R. L., c. 384, s. 13. Under this section, if the plaintiff's "conduct admits of any reasonable and nonculpable explanation, the question of his due care is for the jury." Doyle, Adm'r v. Company, ante, 61; Jones v. Railroad, 83 N.H. 73, 78; e.g. Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 240. "The plaintiff was not required to take every precaution she could to prevent the accident. Weeks v. Company, 78 N.H. 26, 29. Her duty was to act as the average person might have acted.

  5. Doyle v. Company

    35 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    Under the statute (R. L., c. 384, s. 13), which places the burden of proving contributory negligence upon the defendant, if the conduct of a plaintiff "admits of any reasonable and nonculpable explanation, the question of his due care is for the jury." Jones v. Railroad, 83 N.H. 73, 78; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 240. Both the issue of the defendant's fault and that of the decedent's contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury.

  6. Hackett v. Railroad

    6 A.2d 139 (N.H. 1938)   Cited 16 times

    Its materiality does not seem to be in doubt. Haskell v. Railway, 73 N.H. 587; Spilene v. Company, 79 N.H. 326, 330; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 242. The record does not contain the evidence upon the issues of liability, and it is not clear whether there were grounds for finding that the offered proof would be prejudicial upon other issues than the one to which the offer was directed (Bunten v. Davis, 82 N.H. 304, 312), but the defendant aptly suggests that it might properly have been excluded as cumulative in the discretion of the court, since the jury might rely upon common knowledge that the cost of flagmen would have been trifling.

  7. Buffum v. Buffum

    195 A. 679 (N.H. 1937)   Cited 2 times

    In this situation, the court could not properly direct a verdict on the issue of liability. Williams v. Duston, 79 N.H. 490; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 240; Webster v. Seavey, 83 N.H. 60, 62; Exeter Banking Co. v. Taylor, 85 N.H. 458, 460. There is no express finding that the defendant abandoned his defence on that issue and, in view of his motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, a finding to that effect would be unwarranted. New trial.

  8. Palmer v. Edgerly

    181 A. 125 (N.H. 1935)   Cited 9 times

    No similar warning was given to the jury in the instant case and that distinguishes it from the Brito case. See also Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 242; Brock v. Company, 83 N.H. 290, 292. Moreover, the Brito case is subject to the criticism that it was left for the jury to say whether the evidence was conjectural or not. This permitted them to give it probative value if they thought it had such value, and, in analysis, submitted to them an issue which was one of law.

  9. Ghilain v. Couture

    164 A. 213 (N.H. 1933)   Cited 9 times

    On the issue of contributory negligence the defendants had the burden of proof. P. L., c. 328, s. 13. It was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendants' knowledge of the danger was superior to Ghilain's, for the defendants were not entitled to invoke the doctrine of assumed risk in their defence. Vandell v. Sanders, 85 N.H. 143, 144; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 241; Kambour v. Railroad, 77 N.H. 33. Judgment on the verdict.

  10. Piateck v. Swindell

    84 N.H. 402 (N.H. 1930)   Cited 28 times
    In Piateck v. Swindell, 84 N.H. 402, 151 A. 262 (1930), this court considered the possible negligence of a truck passenger who was injured in an accident while sitting on the floor of the truck's cab with his right leg hanging out of the cab and his foot resting on the running board.

    And incurrence of a known danger is not the legal equivalent of negligence. Prichard v. Boscawen, 78 N.H. 131, 133, and cases cited; Hussey v. Railroad, 82 N.H. 236, 241, 242; Owen v. Elliot Hospital, 82 N.H. 497, 499. II.