Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:99CV-130-B-B
August 28, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the court on the defendant's second motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Upon due consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the court is ready to rule.
FACTS
The plaintiffs are adult resident citizens of the State of Mississippi. The defendant is an adult resident of the State of Tennessee and practices medicine exclusively within Tennessee. On or about February 17, 1998, the defendant, who specializes in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology, began to treat Barbara Huss. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant did not adhere to the standard of care imposed upon qualified practitioners in the same or similar practice, breached duties required by this standard of care, and that damages resulted from the alleged negligence of the defendant. The court initially dismissed this cause upon motion by the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute and failure to show adequate minimum contacts by the defendant with the forum state. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to rescind dismissal of the cause based on the plaintiffs' failure to receive full disclosure from the defendant. The defendant brings this second motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
LAW
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction over the nonresident when a nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930, 115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994). When the district court rules on the motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff may bear this burden by presenting a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction is proper. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). "Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists." Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). In a federal diversity suit, the court decides whether in personam jurisdiction is lacking by determining (1) whether the nonresident defendant can be sued in the forum state under its applicable long-arm statute, and (2) if the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to state law satisfies due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 743 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1984).
Mississippi's long-arm statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1996). Therefore, to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiffs have the burden of showing that they qualify under the "contract," "tort," or "doing business" provision of Mississippi's long-arm statute. Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 1989).
The defendant concedes the fact that the plaintiff fulfills the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Therefore, the court will concentrate on whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court must find that the nonresident defendant has (1) purposefully established "minimum contacts" with the forum state and, if so, (2) that entertainment of the suit against the nonresident would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
Under the minimum contacts requirement, a defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with a state's forum when "it purposely avails itself to the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958). Minimum contacts with the forum state may arise incident to the federal court's "general" or "specific" jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. General jurisdiction can be asserted only over nonresident defendants who have "continuous and systematic contacts" with the forum state regardless of whether the cause arises from the nonresident's contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 (1984). Specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state "arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 1872. Even a single purposeful contact may in a proper case be sufficient to meet the requirement of minimum contacts when the cause of action arises from the contact. Micromedia v. Automated Broad. Controls, 799 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1986).
In addition to the requirement of a nonresident defendant having minimum contacts with the forum state, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if it offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. When determining the fundamental fairness issue this court will normally examine (1) the defendant's burden; (2) the forum state's interests; (3) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033-34 (1987).
It is evident from the memoranda and exhibits presented that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden sufficient to fulfill the restrictions of minimum contacts under the personal jurisdiction requirements of due process. The defendant is a resident of Tennessee, and her medical office is located in Tennessee. All of the defendant's examinations, studies, and diagnoses of Barbara Huss were made in Tennessee. Barbara Huss' prescriptions were filled in Mississippi pursuant to diagnoses in Tennessee. The fact that Barbara Huss chose the defendant through her employer's HMO, does not dictate that the defendant is susceptible to minimum contacts with Mississippi solely through the defendant's relationship with the HMO. These contacts of the defendant with Mississippi are not the type of contacts which would be construed as the defendant purposely directing its activities toward the forum state or purposely availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities therein.
Further, the court must determine whether jurisdiction over the defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. After duly weighing the above listed factors in determining the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction, the court finds that the exercise of jurisdiction in this cause would be both unfair and unreasonable. If personal jurisdiction in Mississippi over the defendant was allowed in this cause, every time a Mississippi resident went out of state for medical attention, those doctors who provided the medical care could automatically be subject to personal jurisdiction upon any injury that might be sustained by the Mississippi resident. Even if the defendant is receptive to service of process under the Mississippi long-arm statute, the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does not comport with the dictates of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.