Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-6267.
October 1, 2004
MEMORANDUM
State prisoner, Craig Alan Huskins ("Huskins"), brings this action alleging that he has received inadequate medical treatment regarding his mental health needs, and has been discriminated against based upon his mental health needs, during his incarceration with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). Huskins, claiming constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 12134, filed this action against thirteen defendants associated with the DOC. Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Responses and Replies thereto. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
The thirteen Defendants named in this action are the following: Jeffrey Beard, the DOC Secretary; Donald Vaughn ("Vaughn"), the ex-Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution ("SCI") at Graterford and current DOC Deputy Secretary for the Eastern Region; Joseph Chesney (retired) ("Chesney"), the ex-Superintendent of SCI Frackville; Ray Colleran ("Colleran"), the Superintendent of SCI Waymart; Martin Dragovich ("Dragovich"), the ex-Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill and current Superintendent of SCI Chester; Neal Mechling, the ex-Superintendent of SCI Pittsburgh and current Superintendent of SCI Fayette; Fred R. Maue, M.D. ("Dr. Maue"), the DOC Chief of Clinical Services; James Forr, the ex-Assistant to the Superintendent at SCI Frackville; Joseph Miller, the Major of the Guard at SCI Frackville; Bruce Smith (retired), the ex-Deputy for Centralized Services at SCI Frackville; John Kerestes, the ex-Deputy for Facilities Management and current Deputy for Centralized Services at SCI Frackville; David Searfoss, the Corrections Classification and Program Manager at SCI Frackville; and William Kepner, the School Principal at SCI Frackville (collectively, "Defendants").
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate in DOC custody who is currently incarcerated at SCI Pittsburgh. (Pl. Dep. at 4, 9). Plaintiff is twenty-six years old and has a long history of mental health issues dating back to the age of three years old. (Pl. Dep. at 7; Maue Dep. at 24). Due to his mental issues, Plaintiff has resided in various mental hospitals or other mental health centers for most of his life. (Pl. Dep. at 6-8; Maue Dep. at 24). Plaintiff resided at Norristown State Hospital preceding his current DOC incarceration. (Pl. Dep. at 7; Maue Dep. at 32). Plaintiff's initial DOC incarceration was a result of an assault against several people at Norristown State Hospital.
According to Dr. Maue, Plaintiff does not suffer from a major psychiatric disorder. (Maue Dep. at 34-36). Plaintiff's most current mental health diagnosis is as follows: he has a dysthymic disorder (chronic low level depression); impulse control disorder; pervasive developmental disorder; and antisocial disorder. (Id. at 24-30). Plaintiff's disorders are aggravated by situations he considers stressful, such as restrictions on his freedom. (Id. at 30-31).
A. Criminal Proceedings and Sentences
In May 2000, Plaintiff first entered DOC custody. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18). In the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff pled guilty to six counts of Aggravated Assault and one count of Simple Assault. (Def. Ex. 5, Attach. (a)). Regarding one of the Aggravated Assault convictions, Plaintiff was sentenced to be incarcerated for four years to eight years. (Id.). As for the remainder of the Aggravated Assault convictions, Plaintiff was sentenced to probation for a period of time totaling forty-four years to run consecutively to the incarceration sentence. (Id.). Regarding the Simple Assault conviction, Plaintiff was sentenced to probation for a time period of two years to run consecutively to the other sentences. (Id.).
Plaintiff has been charged, convicted, and sentenced regarding various new crimes since his initial reception into DOC custody. On April 12, 2001, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to three counts of Simple Assault in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, regarding his assault of another inmate and staff members at SCI Waymart. (Id.). For one of the counts, Plaintiff was sentenced to one to two years' incarceration to run consecutively to the prior sentences. (Id.). For another count, Plaintiff was sentenced to one to two years' incarceration to run consecutively to the previous count. (Id.). As for the last count, Plaintiff was sentenced to incarceration for one to two years to run consecutively to the prior two counts. (Id.).
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Plaintiff also was charged with three counts of Aggravated Harassment by a Prisoner and one count of Summary Harassment in connection with two separate incidents while incarcerated at SCI Pittsburgh. (Id.). Plaintiff pled guilty to the three counts of Aggravated Harassment by a Prisoner and was sentenced to probation for two to four years for each count. (Id.). It was ordered that these three sentences run concurrently to each other and to all of the other sentences Plaintiff was serving. (Id.).
Apparently the Summary Harassment charge was dismissed. (Def. Ex. 5, Attach. (a)).
Aggravating Plaintiff's sentences, and accounting for time served, Plaintiff's minimum release date is June 10, 2006 and his maximum release date is April 24, 2012. (Def. Ex. 5, Attach. (b)).
B. Plaintiff's Incarceration
Plaintiff has resided at SCI Graterford, SCI Camp Hill, SCI Waymart, SCI Frackville and SCI Pittsburgh since he first entered DOC custody in May 2000. (Pl. Dep. at 8-9). Plaintiff has been placed in a variety of settings within each of these institutions to address his mental health needs while maintaining the safety of Plaintiff, staff and other inmates. (Maue Dep. at 47-48). While at SCI Graterford, SCI Frackville and SCI Pittsburgh, Plaintiff spent time in Mental Health Units ("MHUs"). (Pl. Dep. at 10, 18, 29; Maue Dep. at 19, 37). Plaintiff was also assigned to SCI Waymart. (Pl. Dep. at 23-24). SCI Waymart contains the DOC's mental health hospital which is dedicated to the long-term care for mentally ill inmates. (Maue Dep. at 38, 42).
The DOC has an extensive mental health care system. (Maue Dep. at 42-43). The DOC mental health care system is a comprehensive and layered system treating approximately 7,000 inmates who currently have varied mental health issues. (Id.). According to Dr. Maue, the DOC's mental health care system is "a much more comprehensive and layered system of mental heath care than the Department of Public Welfare has within the State system." (Id. at 43).
MHU's are facilities located within certain institutions that are designed to provide short-term inpatient mental health care to inmates. (Maue Dep. at 16-17). MHUs are operated by a private mental health provider, Mental Health Management Company, and are licensed by the Pennsylvania Office of Mental Health. (Id. at 17-18, 77).
Since May 2000, Plaintiff's DOC disciplinary record reveals 65 misconducts primarily for assaults and refusing to obey orders. (Def. Ex. 5, Attach. (d)). Plaintiff's DOC disciplinary record indicates assaults against staff members, other inmates and himself. (Id.). Plaintiff admits to threatening, spitting on and biting prison staff members. (Pl. Dep. at 36). As mentioned earlier, some of the assaults conducted by Plaintiff during his incarceration have resulted in criminal charges being filed against Plaintiff which resulted in convictions.
Plaintiff's assaultive behavior was viewed as a threat to his safety, as well as the safety of others. (Maue Dep. at 19). Plaintiff was assigned to high security areas of the institutions known as Restricted Housing Units ("RHUs"). (Maue Dep. at 49-50; Pl. Dep. at 11, 18, 35). In addition to acting as a misconduct sanction, an inmate may be assigned to the RHU for non-disciplinary reasons in a status referred to as Administrative Custody ("AC"). (Maue Dep. at 72). AC allows an inmate to be housed in his own cell in the RHU with certain privileges, such as possession of a radio, television and other items in the cell, that are not granted to inmates in Disciplinary Custody ("DC"). (Id. at 72). Plaintiff initially started in the RHU in DC for certain misconducts, but advanced to AC in the RHU. (Id. at 66-67, 70-71). While in the RHU, Plaintiff has often been permitted special exceptions in which he has been allowed to have a television and radio in his cell. (Id. at 67).
As a reward to Plaintiff for following the prison rules for a certain time period, Plaintiff has been given credit for time served for much of his DC time, which has accumulated to as many as six to eight years. (Maue Dep. at 39-40, 67-68; Pl. Dep. at 35).
1. Plaintiff's DOC Mental Health Treatment
Plaintiff has been treated for his mental health issues by numerous mental health professionals while in DOC custody. Recently, while incarcerated at SCI Pittsburgh, Plaintiff has been housed at the Long Term Structured Treatment Unit ("LTSTU"). (Maue Dep. at 64). Located at SCI Pittsburgh, the LTSTU is a behavioral unit specifically designed to handle aggressive inmates who do not have a major psychiatric disorder. (Id. at 35, 46). Since Plaintiff's November 2002 transfer to SCI Pittsburgh, he has been treated by a psychologist every day and a psychiatrist from every two weeks to once a month. (Pl. Dep. at 11-13). While incarcerated at the other institutions prior to SCI Pittsburgh, Plaintiff had varying degrees of contact with psychiatrists and psychologists. (Id. at 17-18, 24-25, 27-30). Throughout Plaintiff's DOC custody, several comprehensive evaluations and assessments of Plaintiff's mental condition have been conducted. (Def. Ex. 4, Attach. (a), (b)). Additionally, numerous Individual Treatment Plans regarding Plaintiff have been created and updated. (Maue Dep. at 76-79; Def. Ex. 4, Attach. (b)). Throughout his time in DOC custody, Plaintiff has also been consistently prescribed medications for his mental issues. (Pl. Dep. at 4-5, 14, 19, 30; Def. Ex. 4, Attach. (a), (b)). Currently, Plaintiff is being prescribed low doses of Clozaril, as well as Lithium, Remeron and Prozac. (Pl. Dep. at 5; Maue Dep. at 65).
Individual Treatment Plans are created and adjusted by a panel of numerous individuals involved in caring for Plaintiff. (Maue Dep. at 79).
C. Procedural History of this Action
On July 31, 2002, Plaintiff originally filed the pro se Complaint in this action. Plaintiff's Complaint named the DOC as the sole defendant. On May 30, 2003, this Court appointed current counsel to represent Plaintiff. On August 7, 2003, a conference was held in chambers regarding this action attended by Plaintiff's counsel, Plaintiff's parents and defense counsel. On September 8, 2003, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming the current thirteen Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and also moved to have the action transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On December 30, 2003, the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Transfer. The Court decided Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on January 12, 2004. The Court ruled that Plaintiff's ADA claims against Chesney, Colleran, Dragovich and Vaughn were dismissed as moot. The remainder of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied. After Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was decided, the case moved forward into its discovery phase. Upon the completion of discovery, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Complaint was filed by Plaintiff's father, Raymond Huskins, on Plaintiff's behalf. (See Compl.). Plaintiff has been adjudicated to be incompetent and his parents, Raymond and Barbara Huskins, are Plaintiff's court appointed legal guardians. (See Pl. Ex. 2) Plaintiff's parents filed several different actions in this Court on behalf of their son. After the appointment of counsel to represent Plaintiff, the other actions have been dismissed.
II. STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. A factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.Id. at 248.
To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but rather that party must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Similarly, the non-moving party cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (1986)). Further, the non-moving party has the burden of producing evidence to establish prima facie each element of its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the court, in viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then summary judgment is proper. Id. at 322; Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
III. DISCUSSION
As mentioned earlier, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and discrimination under the ADA. (See Am. Compl.). Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, entitled § 1983 Count, alleges that Defendants have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights to the due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 58-63; Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.). Plaintiff's claims stem from his mental health treatment while incarcerated, as well as his convictions resulting from his pleas of guilty. As for Count II, entitled ADA Count, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate his needs due to his mental disabilities and, as a result, he was excluded from engaging in programs and activities available to most prisoners. (Id. ¶¶ 64-69).
A. Count I (Section 1983 Claim)
Plaintiff's Count I can be separated into two separate claims. Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim against Colleran, the Superintendent of SCI Waymart, alleging that he violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law by forcing Plaintiff to stand trial even though Plaintiff has been adjudicated incompetent. (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 11-13). Plaintiff's next Section 1983 claim is asserted against all of the Defendants and contends that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated because he has not received proper mental health care and his time in RHU has both aggravated his mental health difficulties and has prevented him from receiving proper treatment. (Id. at 7-11).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims allege that Defendants violated his constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law. (Am. Comp. ¶ 61).
1. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff's first Section 1983 claim is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that a state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Thus, "a liberty interest of constitutional dimension may not be abrogated by governmental action without certain procedural safeguards." McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp.2d 499, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 35 Fed. Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim alleges that Colleran denied Plaintiff procedural due process. (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 11). Plaintiff claims that "Colleran denied due process . . . when he forced Plaintiff, who is incompetent to handle his own affairs, to stand trial on criminal charges of assault without the benefit of any help from his legal guardians." (Id.). Plaintiff argues that he has a valid cause of action under Section 1983 for a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law because Colleran "forc[ed] Plaintiff, an incompetent, to undergo an unfair criminal trial." (Id. at 13).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Plaintiff pled guilty to these charges and was sentenced to serve two to four years in prison. (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 11).
"Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004). "[I]f a prisoner challenges `the fact or length of confinement,' then his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255, but if the prisoner is challenging only `the conditions of his confinement,' the claim may be pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). In some instances a Section 1983 plaintiff may seek damages for harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would necessarily render the fact or length of confinement invalid; however, the plaintiff must first be able to satisfy the "favorable termination rule." Under the "favorable termination rule," a Section 1983 plaintiff "cannot seek damages for harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would necessarily render the fact or length of his confinement invalid, unless he can prove that the conviction, sentence or prison disciplinary sanction that resulted from those actions has been reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief (in other words, terminated favorably to the plaintiff)." Torres, 292 F.3d at 143 (citingHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997)).
"The favorable termination rule does not apply when a prisoner's § 1983 claims can implicate only the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of his confinement." Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff's claim against Colleran does not challenge the conditions of his confinement, but challenges the fact of his conviction and confinement. Plaintiff's claim is based upon the premise that he received an unfair trial because he was incompetent. A finding of an unfair trial based upon Plaintiff's incompetency would necessarily render the trial, as well as the fact of his confinement, invalid. Since the nature of Plaintiff's claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction and continuing confinement, Plaintiff's avenue to relief is either through filing a habeas petition, Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484 (stating that "the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody"), or, in relation to the instant Section 1983 claim, satisfying the "favorable termination rule." Torres, 292 F.3d at 143. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims fails because he has not satisfied the "favorable termination rule." Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence that his conviction, and subsequent confinement, has been terminated favorably to him by being reversed, invalidated, or called into question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, viewing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law. Consequently, summary judgment is granted in Colleran's favor regarding Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff's second Section 1983 claim is based upon the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution which prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. An Eighth Amendment violation occurs in the case where state actors act with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). There is "no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart." Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
a. Non-Medical Defendants
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim is against all of the Defendants in their individual capacities. (Am. Compl. ¶ 59). With the exception of Dr. Maue, all of the Defendants were in supervisory, security, or educational positions with the DOC, and were not involved in the physical or mental health treatment of any inmates. (Defs.' Mem. Law Support Mot. Summ. J. at 14) (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-14). "[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference." Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). In order to charge a non-medical prison official with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff "bears the burden of proving . . . facts supporting the defendants' mental states." Id. (citing Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Maue, the only medical Defendant, will be addressed in the following section of this Memorandum Opinion. See Part III.A.2.b.
The Defendants contend that the record is lacking any evidence to support Plaintiff's claim against the non-medical Defendants and Plaintiff does not dispute that contention. In fact, Plaintiff does not address Defendants' argument that he has failed to state a claim against any of the non-medical Defendants. Reviewing the record, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff does not proffer any evidence regarding the mental states of the non-medical Defendants. There is evidence of letters sent by Raymond Huskins to some non-medical Defendants regarding Plaintiff's treatment; however, the letters were generally responded to with an explanation that Plaintiff's mental health needs were being addressed through the DOC's mental health treatment system. "If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands." Id. Although the letters may have informed some of the non-medical Defendants about Plaintiff's allegations of inadequate treatment, there is no proof regarding the non-medical Defendants' states of mind concerning deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. The responses to the letters reveal that the recipients relied upon the DOC's mental health system to treat Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not proven any facts relating to the non-medical Defendants' states of mind regarding Plaintiff's mental health treatment. Since Plaintiff has made no showing regarding the non-medical Defendants' states of mind concerning deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, summary judgment is granted in favor of all of the non-medical Defendants pertaining to Plaintiff's Section 1983 action.
b. Medical Defendant
Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Maue alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated as a result of a vicious cycle whereby Defendants "aggravated [Plaintiff's] problems with impulse control and aggressive behavior by putting him in that hole [RHU] and thereby caused more aggressive behavior, for which they punished Plaintiff by putting him in the hole [RHU] for a longer period of time." (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 9-10). Defendants deny Plaintiff's contention by arguing that the record confirms that, throughout his DOC custody, Plaintiff has received an abundance of treatment for his medical difficulties. (Defs.' Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 12). While in the custody of the DOC, Defendants state that Plaintiff has received the following medical treatment: routinely being treated by numerous psychiatrists and psychologists; being provided with Individual Treatment Plans; prescribed medications; and "[f]or the past two years, Plaintiff's mental health has been personally monitored by the Chief of Clinical Services for the entire DOC, Defendant Maue, who has extensive experience in mental health treatment." (Id. at 12-13).
1.) Eighth Amendment Constitutional Violation
As mentioned earlier, "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (internal citation omitted). "Only `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or `deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs' of prisoners are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235 (quotingWhite v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation." Id. (citations omitted). A mere disagreement with the proper form of treatment does not rise to a constitutional violation. Id. at 236 (citations omitted). Moreover, "medical malpractice does not become a constitutional claim merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp.2d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Negligent malpractice, standing alone, is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment."). "When a prisoner has received medical attention and merely questions its adequacy, courts hesitate to second-guess professional judgments under the guise of the Eighth Amendment." Wolfe, 130 F. Supp.2d at 652 (citations omitted).
"In order to establish a violation of [a prisoner's] constitutional right to adequate medical care, evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need."Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). "`Deliberate indifference,' . . . requires `obduracy and wantonness,' which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk." Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal citation omitted). "It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute `deliberate indifference.'" Id. Essentially, "deliberate indifference" is "a subjective standard: `the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Wolfe, 130 F. Supp.2d at 652 n. 6 (quotingFarmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Although essentially a subjective standard, "objective factors may inform the viability of a `deliberate indifference' claim." Id. 2.) Analysis of Plaintiff's Claim
Assuming that Plaintiff suffers from a serious medical condition sufficient for purposes of a deliberate indifference claim, the summary judgment record lacks any evidence tending to show that Dr. Maue was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. As mentioned earlier, Dr. Maue is Chief of Clinical Services, or Medical Director, for the DOC. (Maue Dep. at 12). For the past couple of years, Dr. Maue has personally monitored Plaintiff's mental health. (Id. at 18-24). In response to Plaintiff's issues, Dr. Maue personally conducted a full evaluation of Plaintiff's mental health in 2002. (Id. at 18-33). Dr. Maue states that he reviewed all of Plaintiff's records and conducted an interview with Plaintiff. (Id. at 31-34). Dr. Maue also conducted a mental status exam of Plaintiff. (Id. at 33-34). In addition to the aforementioned, Dr. Maue interviewed various staff members at SCI Frackville (the institution Plaintiff was assigned to at the time), including the Superintendent, other administrative staff and the MHU staff. (Id. at 32). After collecting all of the pertinent information regarding Plaintiff, Dr. Maue held additional conferences involving the DOC's Chiefs of Psychology, the administrative staff at SCI Frackville and SCI Pittsburgh's administrative staff. (Id. at 39-40).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). A medical need is considered serious where the denial or delay of treatment results in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. at 347 (citation omitted). A medical injury is also considered serious where the denial or delay of treatment "causes an inmate to suffer a life-long handicap or permanent loss." Id. (citations omitted).
Dr. Maue received his M.D. from Temple Medical School in 1980, specializing in Psychiatry, and is Board Certified in Psychiatry, Neurology and geriatric Psychiatry. (Maue Dep. at 9). Dr. Maue has held the position of Chief of Clinical Services, which is the Medical Director of the DOC, since January 1999. (Id. at 12, 15). Prior to his current position, Dr. Maue was the DOC's Chief of Psychiatry from 1996 to 1999. (Id. at 11). From 1980 until 1996, Dr. Maue was a Staff Psychiatrist at numerous hospitals and SCIs throughout Pennsylvania. (Id. at 9-11).
During his deposition, Dr. Maue, unsure of the date of the evaluations, stated that the evaluation occurred in 2001. (Maue Dep. at 20). However, Defendants state that they reviewed documentation pertaining to the evaluation and such documentation reveals that it occurred in 2002. (Defs.' Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 8 n. 6; Def. Ex. 4, Attach. (a)).
Dr. Maue's ultimate diagnosis of Plaintiff's mental health status is as follows: Plaintiff had a dysthymic disorder (chronic low level of depression); an impulse control disorder; a pervasive developmental disorder; and an antisocial personality disorder. (Id. at 24-30). Dr. Maue concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression, or autism. (Id. at 24-34). In light of Dr. Maue's diagnosis and Plaintiff's history of violence, Dr. Maue determined that an eventual transfer to SCI Pittsburgh's LTSTU would best suit Plaintiff's mental health needs while maintaining the safety of Plaintiff, staff and other inmates. (Id. at 40, 48). In conjunction with Dr. Maue's diagnosis, Plaintiff was eventually transferred to the LTSTU at SCI Pittsburgh. (Id. at 64). Dr. Maue continues to monitor Plaintiff's progress through intermittent personal visits with Plaintiff and conferences with Plaintiff's caregivers at SCI Pittsburgh. (Id. at 66-68, 75-76). Since early 2003, Dr. Maue has noted Plaintiff's progress. (Id.). Plaintiff has not incurred any new major misconducts since July 9, 2003. (Id. at 66; Def. Ex. 5, Attach. (d)). Plaintiff reports that his current incarceration at SCI Pittsburgh is "the least worst time" he has experienced since being placed in DOC custody. (Pl. Dep. at 39).
The details of Dr. Maue's findings and future plan for Plaintiff are memorialized in his August 20, 2002 report. (Def. Ex. 4, Attach. (a)).
Plaintiff has proffered no evidence showing acts or omissions by Dr. Maue that indicate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Focusing upon his confinement in the RHU, Plaintiff generally argues that all of the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs. Plaintiff fails to proffer any argument, or evidence, concerning Dr. Maue's state of mind regarding deliberate indifference, recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk to Plaintiff. When asserting an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, "the prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Johnson v. Hill, 910 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). In order to make the requisite showing of "deliberate indifference," "[t]here must be proof that the conduct alleged was deliberate and intentional." Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 815 (M.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 101 F.3d 691 (3d Cir. 1996). Without any argument, or evidence, pertaining to Dr. Maue's state of mind in relation to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, there is no showing of the culpability required to establish "deliberate indifference." Moreover, the evidence presented, even when making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, shows that Dr. Maue was not indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, but actively pursued treatment for Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff fails to establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, summary judgment is granted in Dr. Maue's favor regarding Plaintiff's Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. B. Count II (ADA Claim)
Since all of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims have been dismissed, Defendants' arguments regarding the defense of qualified immunity will not be addressed.
Plaintiff bases his disability claim on Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131- 12134 ("Title II"). According to Title II, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "The regulations to Title II of the ADA state that the statute `applies to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by public entities.'" Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 243 F. Supp.2d 232, 235 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching, in their official capacities, failed to reasonably accommodate his needs due to his mental disabilities and, as a result, he was excluded from engaging in programs and activities available to most prisoners. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64-69).
"[T]he ADA appl[ies] to state and locally-operated correctional facilities." Yeskey v. Com. of PA Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff has never specifically set forth what programs and activities he alleges to have been been excluded from due to his mental health issues.
Plaintiff's ADA claim requests relief in the form of this Court issuing an injunction requiring Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching to: (1) have Plaintiff transferred to a state mental hospital to receive his mental health care treatment and (2) take appropriate steps to ensure that Plaintiff will remain in a state mental hospital until his prison term is concluded. (Id. ¶ 69). Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching argue that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff is not available through a Title II ADA claim. (Defs.' Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 17-18). They state that "[t]he DOC must accept and confine all persons committed to its custody." (Id. at 18) (citations omitted). Moreover, Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching argue that "[t]he DOC and its officials have no authority to unilaterally transfer an inmate in their custody serving a valid criminal sentence to the Department of Public Welfare, the operator of state mental hospitals." (Id.) (citation omitted). Plaintiff responds to the Defendants' argument by pointing to the fact that he seeks injunctive relief from this Court, not from the Defendants. (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 13). Relying upon this Court's ability to civilly commit Plaintiff to a state mental hospital, Plaintiff asserts that "Defendants do . . . have the ability to obey an injunction issued by this Court directing them to release Plaintiff." (Id.) (emphasis added).
This Court could not find any case law, in relation to the ADA, granting the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff in the form of release from DOC confinement and placement in a state mental hospital. Even after Defendants noted that the relief sought by Plaintiff was unavailable under the ADA, Plaintiff maintained that the sole relief sought pursuant to his ADA claim was release from the DOC and placement in a state mental health hospital. (See Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs.' Summ. J.). In support of his argument for his specific injunctive relief, Plaintiff cited to Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. 82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2000). Harris is inapposite to the instant action because it does not address the ADA nor the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff.
Just as Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment was previously dismissed on the basis that it impermissibly challenged the validity of his conviction and confinement, Plaintiff's ADA claim must also be dismissed. See Part III.A.1. "There is no reason to believe that ADA claims should be treated any differently than § 1983 claims when examining whether a prisoner's case should have been brought under habeas corpus." Bogovich v. Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999, 1002-04 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[o]ur habeas corpus precedent, arising from § 1983 claims, applies with equal force to claims brought by prisoners under the ADA"). "Regardless of the type of claims asserted, the traditional purposes of habeas corpus must be preserved." Id. "Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of [the ADA]." Id. at 1003 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, when an ADA claim raises the specter of a challenge to the validity or duration of confinement, the court must determine whether the petitioner's sole federal remedy lies in the writ of habeas corpus." Id.
Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief seeking release from DOC custody and a transfer to a state mental hospital necessarily would result in shortening the duration of his confinement. As pointed out by Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching, transferring Plaintiff to a state mental hospital would require Plaintiff, an inmate who is serving a presently valid criminal sentence, to be released from the DOC's custody and placed into the custody of the Department of Public Welfare. Such a release from DOC custody necessarily calls into question the duration of Plaintiff's criminal confinement. Plaintiff's argument that this Court has the authority to civilly commit Plaintiff to a state mental hospital fails to address the status of the underlying, and presently valid, criminal conviction. As it currently stands, Plaintiff's conviction and confinement are legally valid and there has been no showing regarding satisfaction of the "favorable termination rule" establishing that either the fact or length of his confinement has been reversed, invalidated or called into question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief. Because Plaintiff's requested relief would require the shortening of the duration of his DOC confinement, which necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction or continuing confinement, Plaintiff's federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. As a result, viewing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff's Title II ADA claim fails and summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching.
IV. CONCLUSION
Colleran is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed because it seeks damages for harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would necessarily render the fact or length of Plaintiff's confinement invalid. Summary judgment is granted in favor of all of the non-medical Defendants pertaining to Plaintiff's Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff has made no showing regarding the non-medical Defendants' states of mind concerning deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Summary judgment is granted in Dr. Maue's favor regarding Plaintiff's Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff fails to establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. As for Plaintiff's Title II ADA claim against Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching, summary judgment is proper because habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for Plaintiff's attack on the validity of his continuing confinement.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1 st day of October, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 33), and the Responses and Replies thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. summary judgment is GRANTED in Defendant Colleran's favor regarding Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment;
2. summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of all of the non-medical Defendants pertaining to Plaintiff's Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim;
3. summary judgment is GRANTED in Defendant Maue's favor regarding Plaintiff's Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim; and
4. summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Beard, Dr. Maue and Meaching regarding Plaintiff's Title II ADA.