"[A]s a general rule, a premature 'complaint cannot be cured through amendment, but instead, plaintiff must file a new suit.'" Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sparrow v. USPS, 825 F.Supp. 252, 254-55 (E.D.Cal.1993)); see also Boege v. Gallagher, No. 10-00565 LEK-KSC, 2011 WL 2746324, at * 1 (D. Hawaii July 11, 2011); Hurt v. Smith, No. 1:09-cv-00698-MJS (PC), 2011 WL 43474, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2011); Johnson v. Sullivan, 748 F.Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010). This is because "[a]llowing claimants generally to bring suit under the FTCA before exhausting their administrative remedies and to cure the jurisdictional defect by filing an amended complaint would render the exhaustion requirement meaningless and impose an unnecessary burden on the judicial system."
See Duplan v. Harper, 188 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir.1999) (“as a general rule, a premature complaint cannot be cured through amendment, but instead, plaintiff must file a new suit”) (citation omitted); Boege v. Gallagher, No. CIV. 10–00565, 2011 WL 2746324, at *1 (D.Hawai'i, July 11, 2011) (“Insofar as the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the FTCA is a jurisdictional requirement, a plaintiff cannot cure the premature filing of an FTCA complaint simply by filing an amended complaint”); see, e.g., Waters v. Anonymous Hosp. A, No. 10–cv–00983, 2011 WL 1458161, at *3–*4 (S.D.Ind. Apr. 14, 2011) (denying leave to amend prematurely-filed FTCA complaint). To rule otherwise “would be inconsistent with case law and the rationale behind the jurisdictional prerequisite mandated by the FTCA.” Hurt v. Smith, No. 09–cv–00698, 2011 WL 43474, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 06, 2011). CONCLUSION