Summary
In Hurst v. Starr, 226 Ga. 42 (172 S.E.2d 604), it is held that where the notice of appeal is as to the sustaining of a motion for directed verdict without appealing from the subsequent judgment, the motion to dismiss must be sustained.
Summary of this case from Johnson v. DanielOpinion
25573.
ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 1969.
DECIDED JANUARY 8, 1970.
Appellate procedure. Douglas Superior Court. Before Judge Emeritus Foster.
Noland Coney, John L. Coney, E. W. Hurst, for appellant.
Hansell, Post, Brandon Dorsey, Jefferson D. Kirby, III, for appellees.
The notice of appeal in this ejectment case recites that it is from the order of the court sustaining the appellees' motion for a directed verdict against the appellant and the verdict thereafter, on the same date, rendered at the direction of the court. The subsequent judgment, based upon such verdict and awarding the property to the appellees, was not appealed.
The appellant has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which alleges, insofar as material here, that appellant's notice of appeal fails to set forth a judgment, ruling or order entitling appellant to take an appeal.
This motion is meritorious.
This court has held that the verdict of a jury is not an appealable judgment under the Appellate Practice Act of 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; Code Ann. § 6-701). Gibson v. Hodges, 221 Ga. 779 ( 147 S.E.2d 329); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. Keebler, 222 Ga. 437 ( 150 S.E.2d 674). Whether the verdict resulted from direction, as here, or was by deliberation is of no decisive consequence.
Neither is the sustaining of a motion for directed verdict an appealable judgment under any of the provisions of said Act. The decisions just cited as to nonappealability of the verdict itself apply here also.
Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.