CPLR 503 (subd [a]) provides in pertinent part that "the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced" (emphasis supplied). As to plaintiff's renting of the room and her statements at the hearing regarding her intent to remain, we find these factors insufficient to support a finding that she was a resident of Nassau County. Although a person may have more than one residence for venue purposes ( Hurley v. Union Trust Co. of Rochester, 244 App. Div. 590, 593), "to consider a place as such, he must stay there for some time and have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency" ( Katz v. Siroty, 62 A.D.2d 1011, 1012). In the instant case there was no evidence adduced at the residency hearing or submitted in the affidavits to indicate that prior to the commencement of this action plaintiff had continuously, or even on a steady basis, remained in Nassau County since she agreed to rent the room on June 11. Accordingly, since plaintiff was not a resident of Nassau County, defendant's motion is granted to the extent of changing the venue to Westchester County, the county in which defendant undisputedly resides.

; Hurley v. Union Tr. Co. of Rochester, 244 A.D. 590, 594 (3d Dep't 1935) (reversing trial court's order granting “defendant's motion to change the place of trial from Albany county to Monroe county”); Labissiere v. Roland, 231 A.D.2d 687, 687 (2d Dep't 1996) (holding plaintiff's submissions “will not suffice to establish residency for purposes of defeating a properly brought motion to change venue” and directing venue of action to be changed from Kings County to Nassau County); (Pl.'s Mem. at 21-22; Pl.'s Reply at 9).

We thus hold that "resident" as used in CPLR 202 does not have the same meaning as "domiciliary". Rather, the determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for purposes of CPLR 202, turns on whether he has a significant connection with some locality in the State as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year ( Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238; Hurley v Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590; see Reese and Green, op. cit., 6 Vand L Rev, at p 563). Cases defining "resident" for purposes of venue under CPLR 503 are useful precedents (see, e.g., Siegfried v Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916; Hammerman v Louis Watch Co., 7 A.D.2d 817) because if an individual can show that he is a resident of a particular county in the State for venue purposes, he will also be a resident of the State itself for purposes of CPLR 202.

A corporation may acquire a residence in a state other than that of its creation. Internation Mill Co. v. Columbia Trans. Co., 290 U.S. 622, 54 S.Ct. 797, 78 L.Ed. 1396; Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 A.D. 590, 280 N.Y.S. 474; Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 Kan. 370, 128 P. 367; 43 L.R.A., N.S., 272; Knight v. Penn. R. Co., 264 Ky. 412, 94 S.W.2d 1013; Tucker v. Ingram, 187 S.C. 525, 198 S.E. 25, 126 A.L.R. 1499; Shelton v. So. Kraft Co., 195 S.C. 81, 10 S.E.2d 341, 129 A.L.R. 1280; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 56 S.Ct. 773, 80 L.Ed. 1143; State v. So. Nat. Gas. Co., 233 Ala. 81, 170 So. 178. Thos. S. Lawson, Atty. Gen., and John W. Lapsley and J. Edw. Thornton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

In making its motion, defendant assumed the burden of disproving plaintiffs Bronx County residence ( see e.g. Clarke v Ahern Prod. Servs., 181 AD2d 514). Counsel's affidavit by which he cites unspecified "investigative efforts" that revealed that someone other than plaintiff occupied the apartment amounts to mere hearsay and is insufficient to carry defendant's initial burden ( see Hurley v Union Trust Co. of Rochester, 244 App Div 590). Even if accepted, defendant's proof would fall far short of establishing that plaintiff did not live anywhere in Bronx County when this action was commenced.

The New York courts have determined that the issue of whether one is considered a resident for purposes of its borrowing statute "turns on whether [the individual] has a significant connection with some locality in the state as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year." Antone v. General Motors Corp., 484 N.Y.S.2d 514, 518 (N.Y. 1984) (citing, Matter of Newcomb, 84 N.E. 950 (N Y 1908); and Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 280 N.Y.S. 474 (N.Y.App.Div. 193 5); see also Reese and Green, op. cit., 6 Vand.L.Rev., at p. 563). This Court adopts the New York test as the baseline for determining Delaware residency in regards to the Delaware Borrowing Statute.

In contending the contrariety of this conclusion, the bare hearsay affidavit of one of the petitioner-respondent's attorneys, is not acceptable. ( Hitner v. Boutilier, 67 Hun 203; Leefe v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 14 A.D.2d 951; Hurley v. Union Trust Co., 244 App. Div. 590; Farragut Gardens No. 5 v. Milrot, 23 A.D.2d 889.) Although it is questionable whether or not the petitioner-respondent has complied procedurally with the requirements of CPLR 7503 (subd. [c]), under the circumstances here prevailing, we do not reach this question.

Plaintiff had no other address in Kings County. Both before and after his stay at the Home (which ended on June 11, 1965), he lived in and paid rent for an apartment in Orange County. Residence within the meaning of the statute must be characterized by some element of permanency, a place where one abides with the intention of remaining ( Bradley v. Plaisted, 277 App. Div. 620; Hurley v. Union Trust Co. of Rochester, 244 App. Div. 590). The facts in this case do not show an element of permanency in the residence at the Home or that the Home was in a place where plaintiff intended to remain. This court has held that a mere stopover at a hotel or a rooming house or a mountain resort is not sufficient to establish a residence within the meaning of the statute ( Oelkers v. Hulseberg, 200 Misc. 352, affd. 279 App. Div. 669). See, also, Hammerman v. Louis Watch Co. ( 7 A.D.2d 817) and Rosenthal v. Brethren of Israel ( 13 A.D.2d 735). The stopover at the Home for rehabilitation in the case a bar is in the same category.

Plaintiff attends courses in two institutions of higher learning in New York County. He therefore is regularly in the county at least two days and one night each week, shares the cost and occupancy of a friend's apartment, and keeps some of his personal belongings there. Section 182 of the Civil Practice Act was amended as far back as 1925 just to eliminate needless procedural battles over venue. This it did by removing the significance of domicile, always a concept of delicate shading, in the venue context and by entitling a plaintiff to sue in any county in which he has a residence ( Hurley v. Union Trust Co. of Rochester, 244 App. Div. 590). So long as plaintiff's residence in New York County was not utterly specious, or was not created for purposes of this action (and that is not contended by defendant), the statute mandates its recognition. It is an alternative residence, so long as it has regularity and plaintiff in fact abides at the place, with intention to remain ( Bradley v. Plaisted, 277 App. Div. 620; 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, p. 102 et seq.). It would be unfortunate to reintroduce, under another guise, the futile venue litigation of another day (see 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, p. 105, footnote 14).

In the opposing affidavit of Benjamin Hammerman it is stated that the plaintiffs actually reside at Kiamesha Lake where they maintain a residence although it is admitted that they also have a place of business and residence outside of Sullivan County. A supporting affidavit was filed by one Irving Cohen, stating that he let premises "upon an all year basis to the plaintiffs who reside therein, occupy the same and actually sleep therein, in connection with the operation of their business". Although it is true that a person may have more than one residence for venue purposes, to consider a place as such, he must stay there for some length of time and have the bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence with at least some degree of permanency ( Hurley v. Union Trust Co. of Rochester, 244 App. Div. 590; Bradley v. Plaisted, 277 App. Div. 620). The mere assertion by plaintiffs that they reside at Kiamesha Lake where they have a place of business is not sufficient. It is apparent from the affidavits that the plaintiffs only visit Kiamesha Lake occasionally on business. Residence requires more stability than occasional stopovers at a hotel ( Oelkers v. Hulseberg, 200 Misc. 352, affd. 279 App. Div. 669), and the mere fact that the plaintiffs rent premises on a year round basis where they sleep while there on business, in our view, does not establish a residence.