Huntington v. Fishman

15 Citing cases

  1. Duncan v. Klein

    313 Ga. App. 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that it was unforeseeable to an attorney and his law firm that, as a result of giving incorrect advice to the plaintiff about the merits of his discrimination claims against his then-current employer, the plaintiff "would elect to enroll in a law school in a faraway place, leave his family behind, and refinance his home to cover the costs of law school and the expenses of his family in the meantime" and therefore, the bad legal advice was not the proximate cause of those costs and expenses as a matter of law

    Id. at 45, 653 S.E.2d 344. With respect to constructive discharge, Duncan contends that he would have sued NGK in a Georgia court if Klein had given good advice, but because Klein did not, Duncan had to sue NGK in Maryland, where a claim for constructive discharge, he says, is not viable. Put another way, Duncan contends that the erroneous advice he received from Klein caused him to lose an otherwise viable claim against NGK for constructive discharge. See Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga.App. 27, 30, 441 S.E.2d 444 (1994). Duncan asserts separate claims for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, but all these claims are based on the alleged failure of Klein to properly research and advise Duncan about the treaty between the United States and Japan and its implications for his claims against NGK. The court below characterized these claims as claims of legal malpractice, and the parties do not attempt on appeal to differentiate the claims.

  2. Lalonde v. Taylor English Duma, LLP

    349 Ga. App. 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    (Emphasis supplied.) Huntington v. Fishman , 212 Ga.App. 27, 30, n.2, 441 S.E.2d 444 (1994). Other than mooting the issue based upon its holdings in Divisions 1 and 2, the majority opinion does not address Lalonde's argument that the trial court erred by concluding that he could not create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether he would have been better off with no deal.

  3. Beamon v. Mahadevan

    329 Ga. App. 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 10 times

    ” Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.Judgment affirmed. See generally Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga.App. 27, 28 n. 1, 441 S.E.2d 444 (1994) (noting that a loss of consortium claim is derivative of liability to a spouse, but the fact that the statute of limitation has run on the underlying claim is of no consequence to the viability of the derivative loss of consortium claim), citing Parrotte v. Christian, 208 Ga.App. 823, 824(2), 432 S.E.2d 255 (1993).Perry v. Atlanta Hospital & Med. Center, Inc., 255 Ga. 431, 432, 339 S.E.2d 264 (1986), citing Hamby v. Neurological Assoc., P. C., 243 Ga. 698, 256 S.E.2d 378 (1979).

  4. Graivier v. Dreger

    633 S.E.2d 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    Dreger and his firm argued on summary judgment, however, that he acted with ordinary care and that his actions did not proximately cause any damage. See Huntington i. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29 ( 441 SE2d 444) (1994). (i) Ordinary care.

  5. Dyer v. Honea

    252 Ga. App. 735 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 33 times
    Explaining that "the law expects citizens to exercise at least a minimum of due care to protect themselves from fraud"

    (Citations omitted.) Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994). In denying summary judgment to Bailey, the trial court ruled that genuine issues of fact remained as to the reasonableness of Dyer's belief that an attorney-client relationship existed between Dyer and Bailey. This ruling is enumerated as error. Notwithstanding Bailey's protests to the contrary, Dyer's deposition testimony creates an issue of fact as to whether he reasonably believed that he had hired Bailey to represent him at the closing.

  6. Chaney v. Blackstone

    547 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    Therefore, a jury issue exists as to whether Blackstone's pursuit of an all or nothing strategy against Quinn and Georgia Farm Bureau constituted a deviation from the standard of ordinary care under the circumstances. See generally Freeman v. Pittman, 220 Ga. App. 672 ( 469 S.E.2d 543) (1996); Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994); Little v. Middleton, 198 Ga. App. 393 ( 401 S.E.2d 751) (1991). Judgment reversed. Miller and Mikell, JJ., concur.

  7. Mountain Bound, Inc. v. Alliant Foodservice, Inc.

    242 Ga. App. 557 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 20 times

    Because Mountain Bound's evidence raised a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the goods for which Alliant billed were actually delivered, we reverse. See Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 30 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994) (summary judgment foreclosed when material factual issue in dispute). Mountain Bound was organized for the sole purpose of operating the River Walk Grill, a restaurant.

  8. Redwine v. Windham

    513 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 7 times

    Here, to recover the attorney fees at issue, Redwine had to prove both the amount of damages and that the filing error proximately caused those damages. Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994). This he failed to do.

  9. Lane v. Tift County Hospital Authority

    492 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    The movant has that burden even as to issues upon which the opposing party would have the trial burden." Ham v. Ham, 230 Ga. 43, 45 ( 195 S.E.2d 429) (1973); see also Sawgrass Builders v. Key, 212 Ga. App. 138 ( 441 S.E.2d 99) (1994); Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29-31 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994). The appellant pled that the x-rays showed no fracture, and appellee admitted that the x-rays were inconclusive. Appellee could neither admit nor deny that Lane had a fracture of the neck at either time he was x-rayed.

  10. Nat. Am. Ins. Co. v. Thornton

    225 Ga. App. 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 2 times
    In Nat. American Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 225 Ga. App. 883 (485 S.E.2d 530) (1997), we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Michael Thornton in this legal malpractice action.

    (Cits.)' [Cits.]" Huntington v. Fishman, 212 Ga. App. 27, 29 ( 441 S.E.2d 444) (1994). A motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, which must be filed within 30 days of the judgment, OCGA § 5-6-38 (a); Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 775, 776 (1) ( 285 S.E.2d 542) (1982).