Opinion
CASE NO. 2:03-CV-128
September 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Suzuki Motor Corporation ("SMC") has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Motion to Dismiss for Insufficiency of Service of Process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3); and, in the alternative, Motion to Transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and/or § 1406(a). (Docket # 2) Having considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the Court finds that there are no grounds to assert personal jurisdiction over SMC, and therefore GRANTS SMC's motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2001, Plaintiff Houston Biggins, Jr. ("Biggins") was driving Stanley Hunter ("Hunter") in a 2001 Suzuki Grand Vitara ("Vitara"). The Vitara rolled over and Hunter was killed. While the accident occurred in Luna County, New Mexico, all Plaintiffs reside in Fort Worth, Texas. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Vitara was "designed, manufactured, marketed, assembled, and tested" by Suzuki and was "unreasonably dangerous."
Defendant SMC is a Japanese company that manufactures the Vitara. SMC designs and manufactures its products in Japan and sells them to a subsidiary company, the American Suzuki Motor Corporation ("ASMC"), located in California. ASMC then distributes and markets the SMC products throughout the United States. ASMC is not a party to this suit.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Texas, a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if it has "minimum contacts" with the forum and if exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994). State law jurisdictional issues do not constrain the Court because the Texas long-arm statute is coextensive with the United States Constitution. Alpine View Co. Ltd v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000). Contacts sufficient to assert specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction constitute sufficient "minimum contacts." Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003). "When a nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities," the defendant's contacts are sufficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over that defendant." Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). "General jurisdiction maybe asserted when a defendant's contacts with the forum state are substantial and `continuous and systematic' but unrelated to the instant cause of action." Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, n. 8 (1984)). Additionally, to establish general jurisdiction, the continuous and systematic activities must be substantial enough "in toto" to justify asserting jurisdiction over a defendant for causes of action unrelated to those activities. See Central Freight Lines, Inc., 322 F.3d at 381. Specific Jurisdiction
The Court finds no contacts between SMC, Texas, and the present litigation that support specific jurisdiction. As noted above, specific jurisdiction is only available when litigation arises from a defendant's contacts with the forum. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472. In the present case, the accident in question occurred in New Mexico. Furthermore, any defective design or manufacture would have occurred in Japan. Plaintiffs do not allege that SMC directly markets its products in Texas, but admit that ASMC, not SMC, distributes and markets the Vitara in the United States. Plaintiffs do not even allege that the Vitara was purchased in Texas. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to establish specific jurisdiction because they have given the Court no indication how any Texas contacts gave rise to this litigation.
General Jurisdiction
In contrast, Plaintiffs allege that three different activities, unrelated to the present cause of action, make SMC generally present in Texas. Plaintiffs do not dispute SMC's claim that it does not have an office or place of business, a certificate to do business, or employees in Texas. Plaintiffs also do not argue that SMC pays taxes to any Texas governmental entity, regularly conducts business in Texas, regularly contracts with Texas residents, owns real property in Texas, or maintains a mailing address or telephone listing. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that SMC is generally present in Texas because: SMC benefits from trademarks marketed in the United States under the Suzuki name, SMC designed and manufactured vehicles sold and used in the United States, and SMC used a Texas court to enforce a subpoena.
Plaintiffs' argument that marketing products in the United States subjects SMC to personal jurisdiction in Texas fails because SMC does not market in the United States. Plaintiffs have admitted that ASMC, not SMC, markets products in the United States. Although ASMC is SMC's subsidiary, the Court cannot impute ASMC's conduct to SMC. Applewhite v. Metro Aviation, Inc., 875 F.2d 491, 498-99 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding "it is well settled that a foreign corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court merely because of any contacts which its subsidiary may have with the forum state"). Moreover, Plaintiffs have presented no reasons why this court should pierce the corporate veil and hold SMC responsible for ASMC's conduct. Therefore, even if marketing alone was an activity sufficient to create general jurisdiction, this Court must find that SMC has not marketed in Texas.
Plaintiffs' argument that SMC has minimum contacts with Texas because it manufactured products that were eventually sold here is an improper attempt to apply the "stream of commerce" theory to a general jurisdiction case. Simply because SMC puts products into the stream of commerce that reach Texas, does not mean that SMC should expect to be sued in Texas courts for any purpose. The stream of commerce theory cannot establish general jurisdiction in a forum. Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 216 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, mere manufacture and design cannot subject SMC to general jurisdiction in Texas courts.
Using a Texas court to enforce a subpoena likewise does not support general jurisdiction. According to the evidence before the Court, SMC once applied to the Texas courts to enforce a subpoena. General jurisdiction only exists where a party's contacts are continuous and systematic. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 466 U.S. at n. 8. Applying to enforce a subpoena one time is neither "continuous" nor "systematic" and thus cannot be the basis for general jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the court finds no "minimum contacts" with Texas that would support asserting jurisdiction over SMC. Specific jurisdiction does not exist because there is no connection between the forum, Texas, and the litigation. General jurisdiction also does not exist because there is no evidence that SMC has any continuous and systematic contacts with Texas. The stream of commerce theory does not establish general jurisdiction and while ASMC markets SMC's products in Texas, SMC does not. Finding no minimum contacts, the Court need not address the fair play and substantial justice factors.
The Court GRANTS SMC's motion to dismiss and orders this case DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.