Opinion
No. CV 99-12811 GAF (AJWx)
April 13, 2001
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON HECK v. HUMPHREY AND ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff D'N. Hunter alleges that several Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") officers, including Raphael Perez, the officer at the center of the still-unfolding Rampart scandal, unlawfully arrested him for narcotics possession based on cocaine they planted on him. Fearing no one would believe his story, Hunter pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to five years in state prison.
Because his conviction has never been overturned, the Court previously ruled that Hunter may not proceed with his claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") based on the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). The Court now finds that his remaining claim under § 1983, for injunctive relief, must be also be dismissed under Heck. In addition, Hunter's claim for declaratory relief is dismissed since his action is for damages based on the defendants' past conduct.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Hunter originally filed this action on December 6, 1999. Since then, he has amended it twice, once as a matter of right on December 14, 1999, and again on August 7, 2000 in response to the Court's July 5, 2000 order dismissing his § 1983 damage claims under the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey. (July 5, 2000 Order at 6-8). Hunter's Second Amended Complaint contains four causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.; (2) injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ("RICO"); and (4) conspiracy to violate RICO. (Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") at ¶¶ 55-65).
Hunter also seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs with similar claims against the LAPD. (SAC at ¶¶ 45-54).
In support of these claims, Hunter alleges that on April 2, 1992 he was stopped, searched and seized without probable cause and "subjected to unreasonable force" by defendants Raphael Perez and other unknown LAPD officers. (Id. at ¶ 7). After stopping plaintiff, Perez allegedly "falsely and fraudulently constructed the appearance that Hunter was in possession of cocaine base. . . . by bending over near the spot where plaintiff was standing, and making believe he had picked up two foil-wrapped bundles of cocaine which were in Perez' hand all along." (Id. at ¶ 8). Perez then allegedly arrested plaintiff, filed a false police report and perjured himself at Hunter's preliminary hearing. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10).
For purposes of these motions, the Court accepts all of Hunter's allegations as true.
Hunter accepted a plea bargain under which he pleaded guilty to violating California Health and Safety Code § 11352 (prohibiting the transportation or sale of a controlled substance) and was sentenced to five years in state prison (SAC at ¶ 11; Mot. at Exh. 1). His conviction on this charge is undisputed and it has never been invalidated. (SAC at ¶ 11; Mot. at 3). The Court previously ruled that his still valid conviction bars his claims for damages under § 1983. (July 5, 2000 Order at 8, 12).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Hunter's Claim for Injunctive Relief Must be Dismissed Under Heck v. Humphrey.
As noted, the Court previously dismissed Hunter's § 1983 claims for damages based on the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). Hunter's Second Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief based on § 1983. (SAC at ¶ 56). This claim must be dismissed on the same grounds as Hunter's § 1983 damage claims.
Injunctive relief is available under § 1983 to enjoin state law enforcement authorities who have engaged in "a persistent pattern of police misconduct." Alee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815, 94 S.Ct. 2191 (1974) (upholding injunction prohibiting Texas law enforcement officials from violating Constitutional rights of union organizers); see also Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1993). "Ordinarily a prayer for such prospective relief will not `necessarily imply' the invalidity of a previous . . . [conviction] and so may properly be brought under § 1983." Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584 (1997). However, where the entitlement to such relief would require the Court to enter a judgment that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs state court conviction such relief cannot be sought. Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1999).
The Heck rule derives from the "principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. It also comports with the Supreme Court's general aversion to expanding methods to collaterally attack judgments. Heck, 512 U.S. at 485; 114 S.Ct. 2364. While these concerns for comity and finality may arise less often in actions for injunctive relief than in actions for damages, where they do arise there is no reason not to apply Heck. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[a] civil rights action is no more a proper method of collateral attack on a conviction when an injunction is sought than when damages are sought." Hoard, 175 F.3d at 533.
The Court has already determined that to be entitled to damages Hunter would be required to show that his state court conviction was invalid, something he may not do in a § 1983 action under Heck. Hunter would have to make the same showing to be entitled to injunctive relief. Thus, in this case, the Heck rule applies with equal force to plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief and must be dismissed without prejudice.
B. The Heck Rule Does Not Apply to Civil RICO Claims.
Defendants also claim Hunter's civil RICO claims are barred by the Heck rule. RICO imposes criminal and civil liability upon individuals who engage in "a pattern of racketeering activity" defined as "any act or threat involving" specified state-law crimes, acts indictable under various specified federal statutes, and other federal offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1). 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) allows a private party who has sustained damages from a RICO violation to bring a civil case to recover those damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c).
Several district courts, including one in the Ninth Circuit, have held that the Heck rule applies to civil RICO claims. Garcia v. Scribner, 1998 WL 397895, *3 (N.D.Cal. 1998); Dominguez v. Winters, 1996 WL 191725, *1 (E.D. La. 1996). To support their rulings, both courts cited to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994). The District Court's reliance on Stephenson appears to be misplaced. Stephenson held only that the rule of Heck v. Humphrey applies to Bivens civil rights actions against federal actors in the same way it applies in 1983 cases brought against state actors. See also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens."). The only mention of RICO claims in Stephenson comes when the court notes that the pro se complaint includes a two word allegation that the defendants "violate[d] RICO." Stephenson, 28 F.3d at 27. The court in Garcia v. Scribner, 1998 WL 397895 offered no additional analysis; rather it simply cited Stephenson for the proposition that Heck applies to RICO claims with the same force as to Section 1983 claims.
Counsel for defendant City of Los Angeles also alluded to the Stephenson decision at oral argument.
Reading Stephenson as ruling on Heck's applicability to RICO claims on this basis is more than a stretch — the issue was simply not addressed in the Fifth Circuit opinion. Defendants offer no persuasive reason why the Fifth Circuit would rule that Heck applies to all civil RICO actions without offering any discussion of the interaction between RICO and Heck. The better reading of Stephenson is that it only addressed Heck's applicability to Bivans actions, not to civil RICO claims.
While there may be policy reasons that would persuade the Supreme Court to extend the Heck rule to RICO cases where the RICO claim collaterally attacks a criminal judgment, there are other reasons why that Court might choose to limit its application to Section 1983 cases. Heck itself only addresses the accrual of actions brought under § 1983, and focuses on the interplay of two specific statutes: § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the habeas corpus statute). Nowhere in the majority's opinion did the Court suggest that the rule applies more generally to the accrual of all civil actions that might be filed by individuals with outstanding criminal convictions. The Supreme Court has continued to confine its own application of this rule to § 1983 actions in its later decisions interpreting Heck. See Edwards, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584. Given these limitations this Court does not find such an extension warrant.
C. Hunter Has Not Stated a Viable Claim for Declaratory Relief.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 2202, provides a means by which rights and obligations may be adjudicated in cases involving an actual controversy that have not reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy, or in which a party entitled to a coercive remedy fails to sue. See, generally, 12 Moore's Federal Practice, § 57.04[3] (3d ed. 2000). "The remedy is intended to minimize the danger of avoidable loss and the unnecessary accrual of damages, and to afford one threatened with liability an early adjudication without waiting until an adversary should see fit to begin an action after the damage has accrued." Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1394 (D. Cob. 1996). As with all cases filed in federal court, actions for declaratory relief must present a justiciable controversy involving an actual case or controversy brought by a plaintiff with proper standing to sue.
Where a plaintiff seeks damages or relief for an alleged constitutional injury that has already occurred declaratory relief generally is inappropriate. See Saum, 912 F. Supp. at 1394; Hoagy Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 776 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (D. Ind. 1991) (Act unavailable to tow truck operator asserting equal protection claim against city in connection with award of contract to other operators; purpose of Act was to prevent the accrual of avoidable damages, and these had already occurred); Gruntal Co., Inc. v. Steinberg, 837 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.N.J. 1993) (declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct); Boston v. Lafayette County, 744 F. SUPP. 746, 755-56 (N.D. Miss. 1990), aff'd 933 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1991) (declaratory relief unavailable in civil rights action arising from death of detainee where defendants immune from damages and no threat of future injury). Furthermore, to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional practice which has been enforced against a plaintiff, the plaintiff must allege that there are continuing or current adverse effects from the past enforcement or that there is an immediate threat of repeated injury from subsequent enforcement. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983) (plaintiff who claimed he was subjected to excessive force by defendant police officers' use of choke hold could not maintain claim for injunctive relief against City's continued use of procedure); Del Percio v. Thornsley, 877 F.2d 785, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1989).
The cases cited above confirm that where, as here, a plaintiff seeks no prospective relief, the Declaratory Judgment Act is an inappropriate vehicle for asserting constitutional claims. In this case, a declaration of the parties' rights will not prevent the accrual of avoidable damages and therefore, will not serve the purposes of the Act. Indeed, a declaration that a policy or practice exists would provide Hunter no relief whatsoever. Nor is there an immediate threat of repeated injury to Hunter that would confer standing on him. Cf. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660. For these reasons, Hunter's claim for declaratory relief is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs first claim for relief (entitled "Count One") is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs second claim for relief, (entitled "Count Two") is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.