Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-6711.
September 23, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2004, upon consideration of defendant's motion to stay (docket entry #25) and plaintiff's response thereto, and the Court finding that:
(a) We ordered defendant to resume paying disability benefits to plaintiff on August 1, 2004, see Order of July 15, 2004, at ¶ 3 (docket entry # 20), and we entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $46,078.97, less applicable taxes, see Judgment of August 2, 2004 (docket entry # 24);
(b) Defendant filed a notice of appeal on September 1, 2004, and it now requests that we stay our Order and Judgment pending resolution of its appeal, if it posts an $120,000.00 supersedeas bond;
(c) Plaintiff does not oppose stay of the August 2, 2004 Judgment, provided that defendant gives an $85,000.00 supersedeas bond;
(d) Still, she opposes staying our July 15, 2004 Order because defendant has been complying with that Order and paying the benefits due in August and September of 2004;
(e) According to plaintiff, defendant's decision to comply with our Order precludes it from obtaining a stay of that Order because, once benefits payments resume, they may only be discontinued after defendant has complied with the terms of the Plan and ERISA;
(f) This argument proves too much because it suggests that, even if the Court of Appeals vacated our decision, defendant would have to continue paying benefits until it proceeded through a termination procedure that complied with the Plan and ERISA;
(g) Clearly, a benefits administrator who resumes paying benefits pursuant to a court order may stop paying benefits if that order is vacated or stayed;
(h) Plaintiff also calls our attention to the hardship that she will face if her benefits are once again discontinued, but she will be in no worse a position than if we had never ordered the resumption of benefits payments;
(i) Moreover, the supersedeas bond provides adequate security that her claims will be fully liquidated if she prevails on appeal;
We do not by this statement belittle the importance of the monthly payments to Ms. Hunter, but we are mindful that, if a judgment is fully secured on appeal, a stay should issue "as a matter of right." See 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2905, at 520 (2d ed. 1995).
(j) We shall, therefore, grant defendant's motion to stay, but the stay shall not take effect until after defendant has posted an $120,000.00 supersedeas bond, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d) (permitting stay only after defendant gives a supersedeas bond); and
(k) Unless and until defendant posts this bond, our July 15, 2004 Order remains in full effect, and defendant shall continue paying disability benefits to plaintiff;
It is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion to stay is GRANTED; and
2. Immediately upon the posting with the Clerk of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $120,000.00, our Order of July 15, 2004 shall be STAYED; and
3. Plaintiff shall NOT ATTEMPT TO COLLECT on our Judgment of August 2, 2004 until after the Court of Appeals has rendered its decision.