Opinion
1:23-cv-282
04-17-2024
RON ALLEN HUNTER, JR., Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is hereby recommended that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Ron Allen Hunter, an inmate incarcerated at the Erie County Prison, initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. The Court granted his motion on April 15, 2024. ECF No. 20.
In his original pleading, Hunter alleged that a state trooper identified as Christopher Weber utilized excessive force while effectuating an unlawful arrest on January 11, 2022. ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Hunter maintained that Weber “attacked [him] and made a false statement and charges to cover up that [he] fractured my ribs.” Id. at 4. Hunter suffered “fractured ribs and a fractured chest plate for 8-9 month[s].” Id. at 5. After the arrest, Hunter was “found not guilty on all charges” and was “falsely imprisoned for a year.” Id. at 4.
Rather than sue Weber, Hunter elected to sue two unrelated entities: Erie County and the Governor of Pennsylvania. Id. at 3. It is unclear what connection, if any, Erie County has to this lawsuit. Weber, a Pennsylvania state trooper, does not have any apparent affiliation with the County, and there are no allegations pertaining to Erie County in Hunter's Complaint. As to the Governor, Hunter based his claim entirely on his supervisory position within the Commonwealth:
By the Governor of Pennsylvania allowing the state trooper Christopher Weber to keep his job when the trooper Weber should be fired for lie under oath and malicious prosecution forgery, excessive force and putting false charges and false arrest on me the governor of Pennsylvania is held responsible for his state trooper actions.Id. at 4.
On January 2, 2024, the Court issued an Order advising Hunter that, to prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, was personally involved in depriving him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ECF No. 5. The Court explained that “a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiff s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Id. (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)). Noting that Hunter's original pleading included no allegations of any sort against Erie County and only boilerplate allegations of supervisory liability against the Governor, the Court determined that Hunter had failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Rather than recommend dismissal at that time, however, the Court offered Hunter an opportunity to file an amended complaint and provided the following instructions:
Plaintiff must name and identify the individual officials responsible for the alleged violation and provide specific details as to how each was involved in the deprivation of his civil rights. Plaintiff should be as specific as possible about the particulars of his claim as it pertains to each defendant. This description should include references to relevant dates, times, and locations, and should explain to the Court how each defendant's behavior, action, or inaction contributed to the alleged violation. Plaintiff should attempt to cure the deficiencies outlined above by providing the necessary factual detail to support each of his claims.Id.
Hunter filed his Amended Complaint on January 8, 2024. ECF No. 6. Despite the Court's recommendation that he attempt to identify and name the individuals directly responsible for the alleged misconduct, Hunter's amended pleading again names only Erie County and the Governor of Pennsylvania as Defendants. Id. Doubling down on his supervisory liability claim against the Governor, Hunter explains that:
When the governor of Pennsylvania takes office, the governor also takes an oath to protect my right's and the governor take's an oath to protect the citizen's and the governor is held liable under oath. When the governor certifies a state trooper or a peace keeper with the same power's as the governor, the governor is then also takes responsibility for the trooper Christopher Weber attacking me and putting me in danger as a citizen. ... When the governor takes an oath to protect me as a citizen and he as the governor violates the constitution when the peacekeeper the governor put in office violates my right and life as a citizen.ECF No. 6 at 1-2. As with his previous pleading, there are no allegations at all concerning Erie County.
Since filing his Amended Complaint, Hunter has filed several motions seeking to further amend or supplement his pleading. See ECF Nos. 8, 12, 13, 14, and 17. Specifically, Hunter seeks leave to: 1) add the State of Pennsylvania as a Defendant based on the same factual allegations in his Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8]; 2) amend his pleading to include state law negligence and equal protection claims against the Governor [ECF Nos. 12 and 14]; and 3) amend his request for relief to include compensatory damages and a pardon from the Governor [ECF Nos. 13, 17], Additionally, Hunter has filed an unsupported motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 11] and two motions to “amend . . . caselaw” in support of his request. See ECF Nos. 18 and 19. Each of these motions will be dismissed by separate order for the same reasons set forth in this Report.
Despite Hunter's request, neither document includes any citation to caselaw.
B. Standard of review
Because he is seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
C. Analysis
As this Court has previously advised Hunter, a successful § 1983 plaintiff must ultimately support that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). When claims implicate multiple defendants, the plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personally] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 667 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Hunter's allegation - that the Governor of Pennsylvania had an affirmative obligation to prevent an individual state police officer from assaulting him based solely on his oath of office -falls short of this standard. There is nothing in his pleading to suggest that the Governor was aware of and disregarded any facts that put Hunter at risk of being assaulted by an officer or that he directed, participated in, or acquiesced to a course of conduct that that led to the alleged assault. Nor is there anything in Hunter's pleading to indicate that the Governor established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which led to the constitutional harm. Hunter's conclusory allegation that the Governor took an oath to protect the citizens of Pennsylvania is not enough to establish the Governor's direct personal involvement in a constitutional violation. Accordingly, each of his claims must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Moreover, while the Third Circuit has expressed a strong preference for permitting curative amendments, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002), the court “need not provide endless opportunities for amendment, especially where such opportunity already has been enjoyed.” Baker v. Moon Area Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 40571719, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2018) (quoting Taylor v. Pilewski, 2008 WL 4861446, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2008)). This is particularly true where amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Considering the many deficiencies identified in this order, and the many proposed amendments filed by Hunter, it is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).