Opinion
1:22-CV-00078-SPB
12-16-2022
RON ALLEN HUNTER JR., Plaintiff v. DR. BARRETT, PHYSICIAN; DR. KANG, PHYSICIAN; AND Z. WAGGONER, CO.; Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS BESSETTI-BARRETT AND KANG LI'S MOTION TO DISMISS
IN RE ECF NO.20
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants Colleen Bessetti-Barrett and Kang Li (collectively, "Medical Defendants") have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. See ECF No. 20. The motion has been referred to the undersigned for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). It is respectfully recommended that the motion be GRANTED and that Hunter's Complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice, as to the Medical Defendants.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At the time of the events alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff Ron Allen Hunter Jr. ("Hunter") was a pre-trial detainee housed at the Erie County Prison. His pro se civil rights Complaint was docketed on April 1, 2022. ECF No. 8. He identifies the following individuals as defendants: "Dr. Barrett, Physician," "Dr. Kang, Physician," "Z. Waggoner, CO." Id., pp. 2-3.
According to the docket of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Hunter was found guilty of the underlying state court criminal charges on November 10, 2022. See Common Pleas Court Docket No. CP-25-CR-000437-2022 (available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-25-CR-0000437 2022&dnh=eV2YlhMzSwTPkCn4qFh%2F0w%3D%3D) (last accessed 11/14/2022).
Defendant Waggoner has also moved to dismiss the claims against him. See ECF No. 22). His motion will be addressed by separate Report and Recommendation.
Hunter's Complaint alleges that during intake on January 11, 2022, he told prison officials that "the emergency room said no lifting" because he had hernias and fractured ribs. Id. p. 4. Hunter alleges prison officials laughed at him despite his hernias and forced him to lift himself into a top bunk bed. Id. He further alleges that prison officials gave him ibuprofen in response to his medical complaints but did not change his assignment from a top bunk to a bottom bunk. Id. See also Id. at p. 5. He faults prison officials generally for ignoring his health concerns.
Hunter also alleges that Defendant Waggoner "knew about my health problems at the time yet he still mased (sic) me knowing I got heart problems, breathing problems, and 2 hurnias (sic)." Id. at p. 13. Hunter relates that he "even has liver problems" and that he does not "feel safe here." Id. He says that on February 16, 2022, "I found 2 new hurnias (sic) and now have 4 hurnias because the jail dr. will not do her job." Id. Approximately five days after he filed his Complaint, Hunter submitted a document he labeled "affidavit." See ECF No. 10. This document, Hunter contended, was drafted "in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5." See, e.g. ECF No. 5, p. 1. This document is unsworn and therefore not an affidavit. Because it was filed before the motions to dismiss, the Court will instead consider the filing as a supplement to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. See also Korb v. Hay stings, 260 Fed.Appx. 222, 226 (3d Cir. June 8, 2021) (pre-motion-to-dismiss filings should be treated as supplements to the complaint). This supplement adds the following additional factual background:
On 1-11-22,1 came to Erie County Prison after being at Saint Vincent Hospital because my ribbs (sic) were fractured because a state trooper Christopher Weber. It even shows in my affidavit of probable cause that I was at the hospital and I have hospital records of two hurnias (sic) from Saint Vincent. So CO. Waggoner knew I was not allowed to lift anything.
Dr. Kang and Dr. Barrett stated that there is no record of my ribbs (sic) being fractured. But my affidavit shows me being at Saint Vincent Hospital for my ribbs (sic) and records of my hurnias (sic).ECF No. 10. p. 1.
More than a year later, Hunter filed a number of documents he labeled as requests for an unspecified "writ." See ECF Nos. 43, 46, 47, and 48. These filing primarily concerned Hunter's requests for relief and events that occurred after the filing of the Complaint. Therefore, the Court construed them as further supplements to Hunter's Complaint and caused them to be re-docketed as such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Korb, 860 Fed.Appx. at 226. Hunter's supplements supplement his complaint as follows. At ECF No. 43, Hunter states that he wants "to be clear on the relief I am asking." He then specifies various types and amounts of damages he is seeking. At ECF No. 46, Hunter reports that he was seen by a doctor on August 9, 2022. ECF No, 46, p. 1. Hunter filed ECF No. 47 to "better describe (sic) my claim." ECF No. 47, p. 1. He alleges that cameras "will show staff laughing making fun of me while I'm asking to see the doctor and when I asked to be seen about my hurnias (sic) and ribbs (sic) I was ignored." Id. He further alleges that he "put in a grievance in then I was denied the grievance process and procedure." Id. Hunter acknowledges that he was seen by a doctor "two months later only for my hurnias (sic) not for my ribbs." Id. Although this supplement does not identity the medical providers, it does state that "Waggoner knew - there were witnesses I was in to[o] much pain to defend myself." Id. Hunter's last supplement alleges that he was seen "[by] the doctors about pain in my ribbs. Finally after putting a lawsuit in because they ignored me." ECF No. 48, p. 1. He additionally alleges that:
Doctors Kang - Dr. Barrett did not care about my health or see me and when Waggoner knew and even admitted to me - He carried my things because my ribbs (sic) are fractured yet CO. Waggoner still mased (sic) me assaulted me knowing I could barely move. I was [in] pain and even though he knew this he tried to force me to carry my stuff a few week[s] later to a top bunk up stairs knowing and aware I can barely carry anything."Id. Although these supplements elaborate somewhat regarding facts alleged in Hunter's Complaint, they do not materially alter the Court's analysis of the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss.
On June 21, 2022, the Medical Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 20. Hunter was ordered to file a response in opposition to the motion or an amended complaint. See ECF No. 24. Instead, on June 29, 2022, he filed a "notification" stating his desire to "proceed with legal action -1 do not want this case dismissed. I do want to continue my lawsuit and civil case." ECF No. 27. The Court notified Hunter that this filing, construed as his response to the motion to dismiss, lacked "any factual background, legal argument, and/or citation to proper legal authority" and afforded him an additional time to file a proper response to the motion or an amended complaint. ECF No. 28, p. 1, ¶ 2. Thereafter he filed two supplemental responses: ECF No. 30 on July 11, 2022; and ECF No. 37 on July 15, 2022. The Medical Defendants' motion is now ripe for disposition.
As reflected on the docket, Hunter also filed numerous Petitions for Writ of Quo Warranto. See ECF Nos. 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 38. The Court denied the petitions. Hunter v. Weber, 2022 WL 28119021, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2022) (citations omitted).
II. Standards of Decision
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twornbly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twornbly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must view the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twornbly, 550 U.S. at 555. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ld. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.5 Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.5Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.55 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to a review of Hunter's complaint, the supplements thereto, the claims raised therein, and a resolution of the pending motions to dismiss.
III. Discussion and Analysis
Hunter asserts claims against Medical Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. Section 1983 provides a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state actors and provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ...42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method for vindicating violations of federal law." Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States ... by a person acting under color of state law." Id. (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). See also Whitney v. Posika, 2022 WL 4104274, at *4-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022).
A. Claims Alleged In the Complaints and Supplemental Filings
Despite his use of the standard form complaint, Hunter's pleading and the supplements thereto are disorganized, confusing, at times repetitive, and often disjointed. However, upon review, the undersigned has identified several potential claims against the Medical Defendants, specifically, an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a retaliation claim, a defamation claim, and an assault and battery claim. As discussed below, each of these claims fails based on a complete lack of supporting factual allegations.
1. The Complaint violates the pleading requirements of Rule 8 and fails to allege facts to support "failure to protect," retaliation, defamation, and assault and battery claims against the Medical Defendants.
Hunter invokes the terms "failure to protect," "defamation of character," "assault and battery," and "retaliation" in his Complaint and supplements. See ECF No. 8, pp. 3, 12 ("failure to protect" and "retaliation"); ECF No. 43, p. 1 ("defamation of character" and "assault and battery"). Construing this language as Hunter's attempts to raise such claims, the Court should dismiss them as violative of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Rule 8 requires that "each averment [of a pleading] must be simple, concise and direct" and that the pleading demonstrate that the plaintiff "is entitled to relief." Travaline v. U.S. Supreme Court, 424 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1)). A complaint that is "so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8." Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019). Dismissals under Rule 8 are "'reserved for those cases in which the complaint so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'" Id., at 94 (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Even the most generous reading of Hunter's complaint does not bring it within the requirements of Rule 8. Indeed, his allegations regarding "failure to protect," "defamation of character," "assault and battery," and "retaliation" are nothing more than a recitation of random legal terms. Hunter fails to identify a defendant against whom he asserts any of these claims or to allege facts to support any of them. See, e.g., Scotto v. Credit Suisse, 2022 WL 1320391, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2022). Accordingly, it is recommended that Hunter's "failure to protect," "defamation of character," "assault and battery," and "retaliation" claims be dismissed because they are devoid of supporting factual allegations and fail to comply with Rule 8.
2. Hunter's Complaint Fails to Allege Facts to Support a Fourteenth Amendment
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need Claim Against Any of the Medical Defendants.
Hunter's complaint and supplemental filings raise a claim against the Medical Defendants based on alleged inadequate medical care during his detention in the Erie County Prison. Hunter alleges that he or his medical records placed the Medical Defendants on notice that he had hernias, fractured ribs, and a restriction on lifting but he was nevertheless assigned to a top bunk. See, e.g., ECF No. 8, p. 3. Because Hunter was a detainee, and not a convicted prisoner, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, is the source of his constitutional rights in this action. Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Fac, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003). As a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment protects Hunter from "any and all punishment." Montgomery v. Aparatis Dist. Co., 607 Fed.Appx. 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2015). And "due process rights of [detainees] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). As this Court recently explained,
While the due process rights of a [pre-trial detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner, the proper standard for examining such claims is the standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, *•£-, whether the conditions of confinement (or here inadequate medical treatment) amounted to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt.Young v. Kubrin, 2022 WL 16637729, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2022) (citations omitted).
Where, as here, however, the parties do not seek to apply a different standard to a detainee's claim for inadequate medical care, courts apply the same standard utilized for such Eighth Amendment claims. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 581-82 & n. 5; Estate of Thomas v. Fayette Cty., 194 F.Supp.3d 358, 369 n. 9 (W.D. Pa. 2016). Based on this standard, the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim should be granted.
Prison officials may not act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a cognizable deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to show (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle, at 104. Additionally, "there is a critical distinction between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment." Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "Because mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support a claim of an eighth amendment violation, when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care." Id. See also Buxton v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 3357880, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2022). Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. As explained below, Hunter's claim fails because he has not alleged facts to support a plausible inference that any Medical Defendant assigned him to a top bunk or personally engaged in any other conduct that could be considered deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Hunter's claim relates to two medical conditions: hernias and broken ribs which he sustained prior to his incarceration. These alleged conditions are sufficient to support the serious medical need element of the claim, at least at the pleading stage of the case. See, e.g., Greenland v. United States, 2018 WL 4346776, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2018), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2018 WL 4344981 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2018) (hernia); Sherman v. Quest, 2020 WL 6791100 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2019) (broken ribs). See also ECF No. 10. p. 1. Hunter further alleges that his injuries prompted unnamed medical professionals at Saint Vincent's Hospital to restrict him from any lifting but that, upon his arrival at the Erie County Prison, he was assigned to a top bunk bed, which required him to "lift [him] self... to go to bed." See id.; ECF No. 8, pp. 4-5. This, according to Hunter, aggravated his medical conditions. Id. at p. 5 ("... because I'm forced to get to the top bunk to go to bed now I got 2 hurnias (sic) and sharp pain down my leg and my hurnias (sic) feel like a rock."). In an attachment to his Complaint, Hunter similarly alleges that "I got 4 hurnias (sic) now because the Dr's here and the CO's are forcing me against Saint Vincent Hospital Dr's order's, I not supposed to lift anything under any cercumstances (sic)." ECF No. 8, p. 13. He asserts that he developed new hernias because "the jail dr. will not do her job." Id. Thus, Hunter's principal claim is that his assignment to a top bunk was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
"Courts have found that it can be an Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate has a serious medical need requiring him to use the bottom bunk, but prison officials are deliberately indifferent to that need." Saunders v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 5558659, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2019) (quoting Whitehead v. Wetzel, 2016 WL 356809, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2016)). See also Guilfoil v. Pierce, 2009 WL 688957, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 16, 2009) ("Refusal of prison officials to assign an inmate with a herniated disc to a bottom bunk may constitute deliberate indifference if the inmate's condition is sufficiently serious."). That determination applies equally to pretrial detainees. See Id. To be liable for such a violation, however, "[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs." Rode v. Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Roth v. PrimeCare, 2019 WL 2745789, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2022). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence" and such allegations "must be made with appropriate particularity." Id. (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). That is to say, the Medical Defendants herein must have played an "affirmative part" in the complained of misconduct. See Chinello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986). Missing from Hunter's submissions is any averment that the Medical Defendants were responsible for or acquiesced in Hunter's bunk assignment. See, e.g., Cooper v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 2669167, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2022) (identifying defendant unit manager as being responsible for cell and bunk assignments). This omission is fatal to his claim.
The complaint and supplements thereto are devoid of any allegations that the Medical Defendants assigned him to a top bunk. Indeed, the complaint contains no averment regarding who made or participated in this decision. See, e.g., Zamichieli v. DelBalso, 2022 WL 821170, at *8 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (evidence on summary judgment showed that the DOC Defendants had no personal involvement in bunk assignment). Absent allegations of fact to support that one or more of the Medical Defendants participated in Hunter's bunk assignment at a point in time when he or she knew it violated a medical lifting restriction, the Complaint does not support a plausible inference of neglect or deliberate indifference on their part. See, e.g., Cameron v. Swartz, 2020 WL 7496317, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2020) (dismissing claim where plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant was responsible for making bunk assignments).
Furthermore, Hunter's claim is not saved by his allegation that the Medical Defendants were on notice of his medical condition by virtue of his medical records. Hunter argues that his medical records from Saint Vincent's emergency room demonstrated he had two hernias, was treated for a rib injury, and was put on a lifting restriction. See, e.g., ECF No. 10, p. 1; see also ECF No, 46, 48. But he does not allege that the Medical Defendants were in possession of these hospital records at the time he was assigned a top bunk or that any of them participated or acquiesced in this assignment. Instead, he alleges only that he "told them the emergency room said no lifting." ECF No. 8, p. 4. He also pleads that he wrote to the medical department and that he continued to tell "them my medical issue." Id. But Hunter does not identify "them" as being the Medical Defendants. Indeed, he does not allege that any Medical Defendant participated in his prison intake. Moreover, Hunter alleges that he "finally" got to see Defendant Kang on August 9, 2022. See ECF No. 46, p. 1. This allegation clearly contradicts any inference that Kang had seen Hunter prior to that date. In one of his supplements, Hunter alleges that "when I came in the jail the trooper's (sic) informed the jail of my ribbs (sic) being fractured." ECF No. 47, p. 1. He fails to identify this "trooper" or who the trooper talked to about Hunter's fractured ribs. Pointedly, Hunter does not allege that this unnamed trooper told any Medical Defendant about Hunter's medical conditions. Such allegations are insufficient to support an inference that any Medical Defendant had actual knowledge or notice of any medical condition and/or restrictions applicable to Hunter and ignored or disregarded the information by assigning him to a top bunk.
Hunter argues that "I can prove on my affidavit of probable cause I was at the hospital." ECF No. 46, p. 1. By this, Hunter likely is referring to the affidavit of probable cause relating to this criminal case, which is neither a hospital record nor a record that would be part of his prison medical file.
Finally, any claim against the Medical Defendants related to their treatment of his medical conditions should also be dismissed. Hunter alleges, for example, that "they ignored my health problems now they are wors (sic)." ECF No. 8, p. 13. He claims that he was given only ibuprofen for his complaints of pain (ECF No. 8, p. 5). This claim suffers from the same deficiencies noted above. Hunter does not identify any Medical Defendant who allegedly neglected his care. Instead, he asserts broad, conclusory allegation of inadequate care against the Medical Defendants as a group. Such allegations that generally allege conduct against groups of defendants are improper. See, e.g., Caristo v. Blairsville-Saltsburg School District, 370 F.Supp.3d 554, 569 n.21 (W.D. Pa. 2019); Dillard v. Morris Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 2020 WL 4932527, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2020) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)). "Mere 'conclusory allegations against defendants as a group' which 'fail to allege the personal involvement of any defendant' are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Bass v. Howard, 2020 WL 1332007, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2020) (quoting Galicki v. N.J., 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015)). In other words, a complaint that "fails to separate out the liability for each defendant" should be dismissed. Sheer an v. Blyth Shipholding S.A., 2015 WL 9048979, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015); see also Krebs v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 6820402, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2016).
Furthermore, Hunter acknowledges that he received some medical attention and treatment for his injuries and conditions (ibuprofen for pain), but he apparently asserts that this treatment was inadequate. Generally, an inmate's disagreement concerning the medical treatment prescribed by medical personnel will not support a claim of deliberate indifference. See Preacher v. Correct Care Svrs., 2022 WL 2135260, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2022) (citing Allah v. Thomas, 679 Fed.Appx. 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2017) (allegations that medical providers should have prescribed medications stronger than Motrin for inmate's back and leg pain amounted to mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment and were thus insufficient to state a plausible constitutional violation). Compare Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 Fed.Appx. 681, 686 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curium) (refusal to increase the strength of pain medication in the face of repeated complaints of severe, persistent pain may under extreme circumstances constitute deliberate indifference). "[T]here are circumstances in which some care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements." Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978). "For instance, prison officials may not, with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, opt for "an easier and less efficacious treatment" of the inmate's condition." West, 571 F.2d at 162 (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974)). Here, however, Hunter has not alleged facts to support that any Medical Defendant denied medication or other treatment in response to repeated complaints of severe, persistent pain or otherwise failed to respond appropriately to his hernias, at least some of which he apparently self-diagnosed, or his alleged lifting restriction. His bald assertions of inadequate care are not enough to support a claim of deliberate indifference against any Medical Defendant. Bass, 2020 WL 1332007, at *4. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
IV. Further Amendment
Hunter's complaint fails due to its lack of specific allegations relating to the conduct of the Medical Defendants. Cognizant of Hunter's pro se status, the Court should permit him an opportunity to amend his pleading within thirty days to "flesh out" his allegations regarding inadequate medical care and to give him an opportunity to explain "the who, what, where, when, and why of his claim." See Scotto, 2022 WL 1320391, at *3 (citing Gambrell v. S. Brunswick Bd. of Educ, 2019 WL 5212964, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2019)). Hunter should be instructed to draft his amended complaint to allege the conduct of each Medical Defendant upon which he bases his inadequate medical care claim against him or her and to avoid conclusory allegations against multiple Defendants. Leave to amend should be denied, however, as to his failure to protect, defamation of character, assault and battery, and retaliation claims. The facts alleged and Hunter's repeated supplements to his Complaint demonstrate the complete implausibility of each of these claims and that further amendment as to these clams would be futile.
V. Notice to the Parties Concerning Objections
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the Parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of their appellate rights.