Opinion
Cause No.: 3:01cv0556.
March 12, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court because the Plaintiff, Randy W. Hunter, appeals the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), who denied his application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i), 423. This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals of the final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In accordance with Local Rule 7.3, this matter is deemed to be before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
I. Procedural History
Hunter applied for DIB in April of 1997, claiming he became unable to work in June of 1996, due to osteoporosis. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Hunter had a hearing on December 12, 1998 before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Hunter was represented by counsel at this hearing, and the ALJ heard testimony from Hunter and a vocational expert. On September 1, 1999, the ALJ determined that Hunter was not entitled to social security benefits. Hunter appealed the ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council, which upheld the decision of the ALJ. Therefore, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
II. Relevant Facts
Hunter was 54 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. He graduated from high school and completed three years of college. Hunter claimed he could not work because of pain in his neck, shoulders, and arms. Hunter also claimed he has knee pain, which he has not sought treatment for, and that he suffers from depression on some days.
Hunter has a history of hemorrhoids, swollen fingers, high blood pressure, and obesity. In February of 1992, Dr. David Sands diagnosed the plaintiff with degenerative changes and high blood pressure. In June of 1993, Hunter reported pain in his back and neck. An exam revealed a decreased range of motion, and the plaintiff stopped working at this time.
In February of 1995, Hunter saw Dr. Thomas Mertins, complaining only of a skin irritation. The next time Hunter saw Dr. Mertins was in July of 1995, this time for blood in his urine. The only treatment notes from this exam stated the plaintiff had a history of kidney stones. Hunter also saw Dr. Mertins twice in 1996, although the record does not list any substantive treatment notes, except for a check on Hunter's blood pressure.
Dr. Mertins did submit a letter in May 1997, in which he stated that the plaintiff was limited by severe osteoporosis, hypertension, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). He also stated Hunter could not perform any work activity that would require heavy lifting or straining and the only work the plaintiff would be qualified for was sedentary. The ALJ did not accord Dr. Mertins' letter much weight, as Hunter only saw Dr. Mertins for routine check-ups and for high blood pressure. Hunter did not seek any treatment from Dr. Mertins after March 24, 1997, for any of the physical impairments he alleges in his disability request.
Hunter saw Dr. Michael Holton on June of 1997. At this time, Hunter reported a history of osteoporosis and COPD, and, because of a work injury, numbness in his right upper arm to his elbow. Dr. Holton found Hunter exhibited a shuffling gait and moderate instability walking on his heels and toes, but was able to perform these tasks without assistance. Dr. Holton also noted a stiffness in Hunter's cervical spine. A neurological exams found normal muscle tone in all four extremities, no evidence of atrophy or muscle spasms, diminished deep tendon reflexes, and no gross sensory deficits.
Dr. Holton also reported Hunter had decreased breath sounds but a spirometry indicated only a mild restriction in the lungs. Hunter was also found to have mild or moderate degenerative changes and stiffness. The grip strength in his right hand was 68 pounds and his left hand was 28 pounds. Dr. Holton also felt Hunter would experience difficulty performing fine finger manipulation, handling, or reaching, except on an occasional, non-repetitive basis.
In April of 1999, a functional capacity evaluation was performed by Thomas Ross. Mr. Ross stated that Hunter demonstrated very low functional capacity and the results were below sedentary work level. However, the validity of the results were not determined because Hunter did not complete many of the tests to allow for such a determination. Because of this, the ALJ did not accord much weight to these results.
In April of 1997, Hunter saw Dr. Bryan Ciula for ways to deal with stress, which Hunter felt was contributing to his physical problems. Hunter was given the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which reveled a profile of some who appears to have difficulty dealing and coping with distress and difficulty. In June of 1997, Hunter was diagnosed with psychological factors affecting a physical condition and dysthymia. Hunter's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) was 63, suggesting Hunter has some difficulty with social, occupational, or school functioning, but he generally is functioning well and is capable of maintaining meaningful relationships.
In September, 1997, Hunter saw Dr. William Yee. Dr. Yee stated Hunter's concentration and memory were unimpaired and Hunter did not seem to be in any physical distress but was upset about attending the evaluation. Hunter denied being depressed or anxious but reported being angry, irritated, and annoyed by the disability process. Dr. Yee diagnosed Hunter as having an adjustment disorder with depression due to difficulties with his disability application and psychological factors affecting his physical complaints. Dr. Yee also gave Hunter a GAF of 63. Dr. Yee stated that Hunter was unable to work at this time. However, the ALJ stated this finding was inconsistent with the results of this exams and with the findings of Dr. Ciula. The ALJ found a GAF of 63 not to be indicative of a disabling mental condition.
III. Standard of Review
The Social Security Act itself provides the appropriate standard of review, stating that, "the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ's finding that Hunter is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). A federal court in reviewing the Commissioner's decision is not free to decide facts anew, re-weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner to decide whether a claimant is disabled under the statute. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2000).
IV. Description of the ALJ's Findings
Hunter must establish that he is "disabled" in order to qualify for the benefits he requests. The Act defines "disabled" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(D). In determining disability status, the Secretary used a five-step inquiry set forth in the Social Security guides. Allen v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1992). The Secretary must consider the applicant's claim in the following sequence: 1) whether the claimant is currently employed; 2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; 3) whether this impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary; 4) whether the claimant can perform his past work; and 5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy. Id.The claimant has the burden of proving a disability under steps one through four. Once the claimant has satisfied Steps One and Two, he will automatically be found disabled if he suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform his past work, the burden shifts to the Agency to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Roderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). To meet this burden, the agency will have to establish that the claimant has the "residual functional capacity" to perform other work available in the national economy. Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640(7th Cir. 1987).
Applying this standard, the ALJ decided this case at step five by determining that:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on June 25, 1996, the date the claimant stated he became unable to work, and continued to meet them through December 31, 1998.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 25, 1996.
3. The medical evidence established that the claimant has "severe" impairments consisting of: osteoporosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), but that he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The Administrative Law Judge finds the testimony regarding his subjective complaints as not substantially credible to the extent it is maintained he was unable to perform sustained work-related activity.
5. As of June 25, 1996, through December 31, 1998, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform a broad range of light work activities that required lifting and carrying up to ten pounds frequently, twenty pound occasionally and a sit/stand option. However, the claimant was unable to perform work activity that required exposure to dust, chemical fumes, or smoke. He also was unable to perform work that required intense public contact and a closely regimented pace of production ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).
6. As of June 25, 1996, through December 31, 1998, the claimant was unable to perform his past relevant work as an electronics assembler and as an associate chemical engineer.
7. As of June 25, 1996, through December 31, 1998, the claimant's residual functional capacity for a full range of light work was reduced by the limitations identified in paragraph 5.
8. The claimant was 52 years old on his alleged onset date and was considered to be an individual closely approaching advanced age as defined by the Social Security Regulations. He was 54 years old on December 31, 1998, the last day he was insured for Disability Insurance Benefits, and was considered to be in the same age category ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563).
9. The claimant has a high school education and has completed three years of college level course work ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564).
10. The claimant has acquired work skills which are transferable to the skilled or semi-skilled work functions of other work within his residual functional capacity. These skills include: (1) the ability to read blue prints, wiring diagrams, and/or other work specifications, (2) the use of precision instruments, (3) inspection and maintenance of production records and (4) knowledge of production machine set-up and adjustment (20 C.F.R. § 404.1468)
11. Based on an exertional capacity for light work, and the claimant's age, education, and work experience, section 404.1569 and Rule 202.15, Table No. 2, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 would have directed a conclusion of "not disabled" on or before December 31, 1998.
12. Although the claimant's additional non-exertional limitations did not allow him to perform the full range of light work, using the above cited rule as a framework for decisionmaking, there was a significant number of jobs in the national economy which he could have performed on or before December 31, 1998.
13. The claimant was not under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, on or before December 31, 1998 ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)).
In so finding, the Agency (through its designate, the ALJ) renders Hunter ineligible to receive benefits under the Act.
IV. Issue Presented on Review
Hunter questions whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Hunter claims the ALJ erred by not articulating reasons for rejecting evidence of finger limitations, by rejecting evidence by Dr. Mertins, and by improperly evaluating Hunter's testimony.
V. Discussion
The Social Security Act limits the scope of review available to this Court. See 42 U.S.c. § 405(g). The Court will affirm the decision of the ALJ if there is substantial evidence which supports the ALJ's findings of facts and no error of law occurred. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. The question, therefore, is not whether Hunter is disabled, but rather if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995).
The Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred when he failed to articulate reasons for rejecting evidence on finger limitations. The Seventh Circuit has stated that an ALJ "is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony, but must provide a glimpse into [his] reasoning." Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1175. Much of the evidence of finger limitations were from a time period when the claimant was working. The fact that Hunter was working during a time when he had the finger limitations supports the ALJ's conclusion that Hunter was not disabled. The ALJ also mentioned the report of Dr. Holton who reported mild to moderate degenerative changes and stiffness. The record shows that Hunter never saw any other doctor for problems with his fingers and did not ever mention these problems to his treating physician. The ALJ also relied on Hunter's testimony that he attends to his own personal care, cleaning, cooking, shopping, and performing light housework, such as washing dishes and dusting. An ALJ is allowed to rely on medical and non-medical evidence to assess a claim. See Diaz v. Charter, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995). Although the ALJ could have explained himself more fully, there is substantial evidence in the record which supports that ALJ's reasoning in regards to Hunter's finger limitations.
The Plaintiff also claims the ALJ erred when he rejected the opinion of Dr. Mertins, the Plaintiff's treating physician. The Seventh Circuit has stated that a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight as long as it is consistent with other medical evidence and supported with medical findings. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1177. A claimant will not be entitled to disability solely because the treating physician stated the he is disabled. Id. Here, the ALJ did not accord Dr. Mertins' opinion much weight because it was not backed up with medical records. Hunter saw Dr. Mertins mainly for routine check-ups for blood pressure and there is no evidence of Hunter even being seen by Dr. Mertins after March of 1997 for any of the alleged physical impairments. Considering the medical evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ's explanation adequate and his decision supported by substantial evidence.
Hunter also claims the ALJ improperly evaluated his testimony. The Seventh Circuit has stated "an ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed unless it is patently wrong." Diaz, 55 F.3d at 308. The ALJ found Hunter's testimony that he is unable to perform sustained work-activity as not substantial credible. The ALJ discounted this testimony because Hunter performs certain household activities and is able to live on his own when his parents are in Florida. Hunter also sought little medical help for his problems and only takes over the counter medication. See Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that failure to seek medical attention was evidence of the claimant's exaggerated reports of pain); Caldarulo v. Brown, 857 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding the ALJ's decision where claimant could control pain with over the counter medication). The ALJ also did take Hunter's psychological evidence into account and provided work restriction based on his psychological assessment. The psychological evidence supports a finding that Hunter does not have a disabling psychological impairment. Again, the ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence and this Court finds that the ALJ provided a reasonable explanation of why Hunter was found not disabled. See Dixon, 270 F.3d 1176 (stating the ALJ must provide a glimpse into her reasoning and build a logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion).
VI. Conclusion
Bases on the foregoing review of the record, this Court finds substantial evidence to support the Agency's determination that Hunter was not disabled. Accordingly, the Agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.