Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, Inc.

42 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Metzger

    119 Ga. App. 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 7 times

    See Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F.2d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 1942). Under the Civil Practice Act, general allegations are sufficient to support a plaintiff's claim for relief. Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619, as amended ( Code Ann. § 81A-108); Vaughn v. McDaniel, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 163 S.E.2d 844); Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246), cert. denied 118 Ga. App. 866. In most cases the same liberal rule will apply to the defendant's pleadings.

  2. Landmark c. Services Inc. v. Tarpley

    224 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 7 times

    HALL, Justice, dissenting to Division 4. "The CPA abolished `issue pleading,' substituted in lieu thereof `notice pleading,' and directs that `all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.' Code Ann. § 81A-108; Brown v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67, 70 ( 166 S.E.2d 89) (1969); A-1 Bonding Service, Inc. v. Hunter, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246) (1968); Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333 ( 163 S.E.2d 327) (1968). `Under the CPA, a pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Cochran v. McCollum, 233 Ga. 104 ( 210 S.E.2d 13) (1974).

  3. Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, P. A.

    236 Ga. 302 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 53 times
    Characterizing a loss of consortium claim as "sounding in tort"

    The CPA abolished "issue pleading," substituted in lieu thereof "notice pleading," and directs that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Code Ann. § 81A-108; Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67, 70 ( 166 S.E.2d 89) (1969); A-1 Bonding Service v. Hunter, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246) (1968); Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333 ( 163 S.E.2d 327) (1968). "Under the CPA, a pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."

  4. Summer-Minter v. Giordano

    231 Ga. 601 (Ga. 1973)   Cited 165 times
    Holding that summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits because each party has a duty to present his or her case in full once the motion is made and "a party against whom summary judgment has been granted is in the same position as if he suffered a verdict against him"

    Under the concept of notice pleading, now used in Georgia practice, a complaint will be sustained against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim so long as the complaint admits of any conceivable set of facts which would support a recovery. Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) ( 166 S.E.2d 89); Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, 118 Ga. App. 498 (2) ( 164 S.E.2d 246). However, once the issues are narrowed for trial, the complaint stands only upon those facts adduced at trial by the plaintiff, and once a verdict is returned or a motion for directed verdict is sustained, it is too late to amend even pending remittitur.

  5. Gill v. Myrick

    228 Ga. 253 (Ga. 1971)   Cited 12 times

    It seems to me that our courts sometimes take too quick and unanalytical glances at complaints which should be dismissed because of allegations which foreclose relief sought When the complaint contains such allegations it has to be judged in the appellate court where no amendment has been filed eliminating the allegations which would prevent the relief sought. The case of Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246) and what happened after this court denied certiorari, should put in bold relief what can happen when the principle above stated is not strictly applied. After this court denied certiorari, the plaintiff in that case amended his complaint by striking the allegation which the dissenting judges thought precluded recovery.

  6. Clear Vision CATV Services, Inc. v. Mayor of Jesup

    171 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. 1969)   Cited 5 times

    There is nothing in the petition which shows that the appellant is not entitled to a mandamus absolute as to the rights of appellant to a contract which does not preclude it from submitting a proposal and requiring a contract which as to details is not significantly different from the proposals of the appellant. See Code Ann. § 81A-112 (b) (6) and dissenting opinion in Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246). "[A] motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the allegations in the complaint disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim." Residential Development, Inc. v. Mann, 225 Ga. 393, 397 ( 169 S.E.2d 305).

  7. Harrison v. Tuggle

    167 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. 1969)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that although appellate court had previously ruled that petition was not subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, even if it was established as the law of the case that if the plaintiffs proved their case as laid a finding for them would be authorized, it did not follow that the mere proving of the facts alleged in the petition demanded a finding of the ultimate conclusion, so as to authorize the grant of a summary judgment; grant of plaintiffs' summary judgment, reversed

    When this case was previously before this court it was held that the petition was not subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Under such a holding even if it is established as the law of the case that if the plaintiffs prove their case as laid a finding for them would be authorized, (but see Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, 118 Ga. App. 498 ( 164 S.E.2d 246), certiorari denied), it does not follow that the mere proving of the facts alleged in the petition would demand a finding of the ultimate conclusion that the property is only suitable for purposes permitted in a "local commercial district C-1," so as to authorize the grant of a summary judgment, and the issuance of a mandamus absolute requiring the issuance of a building permit, etc. See also Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192.

  8. City of Chickamauga v. Hentz

    300 Ga. App. 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    It is thus immaterial that there was no renewal of the motion after the amendment. See Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Sue, 118 Ga. App. 498, 499 (1) ( 164 SE2d 246) (1968); compare Pitman v. Pitman, 215 Ga. 585, 589 (1) ( 111 SE2d 721) (1959). The purpose of the RPA is to encourage landowners to make their land available for public recreational use by limiting landowners' liability toward persons entering the land for recreational purposes.

  9. Artlip v. Queler

    470 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    To say otherwise, ignores the basic rule that, under the Civil Practice Act, all pleadings must be construed most favorably toward the plaintiff. Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Svc., 118 Ga. App. 498, 499(2) ( 164 S.E.2d 246). During the early evening on August 2, 1992, Margaret Artlip was attacked by a bee while she and a friend socialized on a outdoor deck in a recreational area at her landlord's apartment complex.

  10. Sanders v. Brown

    178 Ga. App. 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 24 times
    In Sanders v. Brown, 178 Ga. App. 447 (343 S.E.2d 722) (1986), this court held at 449 et seq., that "in those cases where recovery has been authorized for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant's actions were so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff."

    [Cit.]" Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Svc., 118 Ga. App. 498, 501 ( 164 S.E.2d 246) (1968). It was not error to deny SFS's motion for directed verdict.