Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:99-CV-2232-R.
October 4, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before this Court is Defendants Western Extrusions ("Western"), Patrick MeEvoy and Mark Aldredge Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Factual Background
In June 1997, Plaintiff Ronald Hunt was hired by Aldredge and Mark Brewner to be Western's Maintenance Supervisor. In his position, Hunt supervised fourteen maintenance employees. Brewner supervised Hunt, while Aldredge was responsible for overall plant management as yell as hiring and firing.
In December 1997, two of Hunt's workers, Hipolto Alcala and Fernando Posada, complained to him that another of Hunt's workers, Robert Mayfield, had made racially derogatory comments about Hispanics. At that time, Hunt told Mayfield to stop making such statements, reported the incident to his direct supervisor, Brewner, and believed the matter to be resolved.
In February 1998, Hunt decided to promote Mayfield to the position of "lead man" in his department. On March 2, 1998, five Hispanic employees complained to Rosemary Contreras, Western's personnel Manager, that Mayfield and Hunt had made racially offensive statements at work. That same day, Contreras reported these complaints to Aldredge, who immediately began an investigation. Within three days, Aldredge determined that the complaints against Hunt were fabricated by the complainants because they were angry about his decision to promote Mayfield. All five complainants were terminated by March 5, 1998. Mayfield was also terminated as a result of this incident.
These emloyees were Hipolito Alcala, John Paul Ramirez, Fernando Posada, Gonzalo Posada, Jr., and David Castillo.
Two weeks after these firings, Hunt arranged a meeting with McEvoy, Western's President, and Aldredge. Hunt alleges that during this meeting he explained that ". . . those men did not deserve to be fired; that the discharges were unfair and unjust; that they were fired because they that they were fired because they were Mexicans; . . . [and he] did not agree with the decision. . . ." (Hunt Decl. ¶ 8.)
Defendant's deny the occurrence of this meeting.
Several weeks later, Hunt began to feel that he was being "shut out" by management at Western. Further, he had seen Aldredge touring the plant with an unknown man and one of Hunt's co-worker's told him that this man was Hunt's replacement. When Hunt expressed concern over this to Aldredge, Aldredge told him he was going to be fired. Hunt then requested severance pay and Western agreed to give him one month's pay for his resignation. It is important to note that Defendants deny that Hunt was ever told he was going to be fired. Rather, they allege that they told Hunt that he would be demoted and would report to the new Maintenance Supervisor, whom they had hired to replace him.
in Plaintiff's Response and Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Hunt explains that he was excluded from meetings and Brewner began communicating directly with his workers, rather than going through Hunt.
In addition, Defendants allege that they had been negotiating Hunt's replacement as Maintenance Supervisor for several months. They claim that soon after Hunt was hired as Maintenance Supervisor, Aldredge and Brewner had begun questioning Hunt's ability to effectively supervise employees. They allege that in January 1998, Aldredge began discussions with Raymond Blake, an employee for another company, about the possibility that Blake might be interested in Hunt's position at Western. According to the Defendants, these negotiations carried on for several months and culminated in Blake's acceptance of the position in May 1998.
On October 1, 1999, Hunt filed his complaint alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Subsequently, Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment on July 2, 2000.
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, `there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Wilson Industries. Inc., v. Aviva America. Inc., 185 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotingAmburgey v. Corhart Refactories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir. 1991)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, all reasonable doubts and inferences must be decided in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633. 640 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, as long as there appears to be some evidentiary support for the disputed allegations, the motion must be denied.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986);Coke v. General Adjustments Bureau, 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party may then oppose the motion by going "beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designat[ing] `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment will be granted against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. § 1981 — Retaliation
The elements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim are identical to the elements of a Title VII claim. Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court will apply Title VII analysis to Hunt's claims. Under the Title VII analysis, once Hunt establishes a prima facie case of retaliation the burden shifts to Defendants to show a non-retaliatory motive for Hunt's dismissal. Byers v. Dallas Morning News. Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing, e.g., Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996)). Once Defendants meet this burden, Hunt must show that Defendants' explanation is a "pretext for unlawful discrimination." Id.
1. Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie retaliation case, Hunt must produce evidence that (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) Defendants took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Hunt engaged in protected activity when he protested Western's decision to fire the five Hispanic men who complained about the racially offensive language being used by Western employees. A plaintiff has engaged in protected activity if he has (1) "`opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice' by Title VII or (2) `made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing' under Title VII." Long, 88 F.3d at 304 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Hunt's statements at his meeting with McEvoy and Aldredge indicated that he believed that Western made the decision to fire the employees because of their race, that Western was unjustified in terminating them, and that he did not agree with the decision. Although Defendants deny that this meeting took place, the fact that Hunt alleges that it occurred raises an issue of material fact.
Hunt also satisfies the second element of his prima facie case because he alleges that he resigned in the face of being terminated by Western, which raises an issue of material fact on the discharge elemert of his prima facie case. See Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997). Further, this element would be satisfied even if Defendants' version of events were taken as true, that is that Hunt was told he would be demoted and not fired. This is so because demotion is also classified as an adverse employment action. See Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that adverse employment actions include demotions).
in Defendants' Reply Brief in Suport of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that no adverse employment action was taken against Hunt. Specifically, they point to Hunt's declaration in which he states that when he asked Aldredge whether he was going to be fired, Aldredge said, "Yes, that's true. Your mission with Western Extrusions is over." (Hunt Decl. ¶ 10) Hunt asked when it would be official and Aldredge replied that he was sure about when. (Id.) Hunt then requested and was given severance for leaving that same day.
Defendants correctly point out that, under Mattern, the fact that a plaintiff may be in jeopardy of discharge at some future date does not amount to an adverse employment action. However, this cafe is distinguishable from Mattern. In that case, one of the plaintiffs supervisor threatened to fire her. Further, the plaintiff had received a negative performance evaluation in which her employer stated that the evaluation was to serve as a final warning. That is, the plaintiff had no more chances and another negative evaluation would mean that she would be terminated. When the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor's threat and the evaluation were adverse employment actions, the court held that a threat that the plaintiff might be fired in the future was not the type of action that Title VII was designed to protect against. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708.
In the present case, Hunt has not alleged that he was told he might be fired, but rather that he would in fact be fired, and only the exact date of his termination was in question. Since the facts of Mattern can be distinguished on this point, Hunt has sufficiently alleged that an adverse employment action was taken against him.
Finally, Hunt has established that there is a causal link between his opposition to the Defendants' firing of the five Hispanic employees and his ultimate termination. Roughly one month after Hunt opposed the Defendants' decision to fire the five employees, he was told he would be replaced by Blake. Further, during the time between his opposition and his termination, Hunt has alleged that Western management began shutting him out of the channels of communication at Western. Thus, Hunt has alleged facts that show a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
2. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason
Since Hunt has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to Defendants to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him. Long. at 308. Defendants can meet this burden by setting forth "reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (citation omitted).
Defendants contend that they began considering the need to replace Hunt as early as December 1997, approximately four months before Hunt objected to the discharge of the five Hispanic employees who complained. Defendants claim that within Hunt's first six months as Maintenance Supervisor, Aldredge and Brewner received numerous complaints from Hunt's workers regarding his poor supervisory skills. (Aldredge Aff. ¶ 4.) Aldredge further alleges that his decision to demote Hunt was further confirmed by the fact that the five Hispanic employees who complained about Mayfield also alleged that Hunt had made racially offensive statements. Although he determined that the complaints against Hunt were manufactured in an attempt to sabotage Hunt, he felt that this further demonstrated that Hunt was not a suitable supervisor. (Aldredge Aff. ¶ 2.) Further confirmation of Aldredge's feelings came in March 1998, when Hunt told him he was having problems working with Brewner, Hunt's immediate supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Finally, Aldredge claims that one of Western's best employees quit in March due to Hunt's poor manigerial skills. (Id.)
Due to his doubts about Hunt's abilities, in January 1998, Aldredge began discussing the possibility with Raymond Blake that Blake would take over as Maintenance Supervisor at Western. (Id. at 5-8.) In February 1998, after reviewing Blake's resume, Aldredge arranged for Blake to come to Western during the second week of March to tour the plant and discuss the specifics of the position. (Id. at ¶ 8.) By the end of February, Aldredge alleges that he had decided to hire Blake, and made him an offer. (Id.) Ultimately, in April 1998, Blake accepted the offer and began working for Western as the new Maintenance Supervisor on May 18, 1998. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
Defendants' have presented sufficient evidence to show that they had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their decision to terminate Hunt. Specifically, Defendants had doubts about Hunt's ability to perform his job beginning in December 1997 and they began negotiating for his replacement roughly two months before Hunt opposed the allegedly discriminatory events that occurred at Western in March 1998. Thus, the presumption of discrimination raised by Hunt's prima facie case is rebutted.
3. Pretext
Once a defendant produces a legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-05 (1973)). Specifically, "a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if the evidence, taken as a whole: (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was not what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that discrimination was a determinative factor in the actions of which the plaintiff complains." LaPierre v. Benson Nissan. Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, Hunt has failed to produce evidence that rebuts Defendants' non-discriminatory reason for firing him. Although the Court feels that Defendants have come forth with very little proof of their dissatisfaction with Hunt, it is clear that Hunt has failed to rebut even this. Indeed, Hunt has pointed out that he took courses at the community college level to prepare himself for management level work. However, he has produced no factual evidence that rebuts the Defendants' claim that he was simply not a good manager and that they had doubts about his abilities soon after he was promoted. Most importantly, Hunt has failed to rebut Defendants' claim that Blake was being considered as Hunt's replacement as early as January, two months before Hunt opposed the allegedly discriminatory acts of Defendants. If Blake was, in fact, being considered for Hunt's job before he opposed Western's allegedly discriminatory conduct, then Defendants have produced believable evidence that Hunt was not being retaliated against when he was terminated. Without some evidence that Western was not actually courting Blake as early as January to replace Hunt, Hunt cannot show that Defendants' non-discriminatory explanation for his termination is false or that discrimination was a determinative factor in his termination. Therefore, this Court concludes that Hunt has failed to carry his burden of showing that Defendants' explanation is a pretext for discrimination.
The only evidence Defendants have produced regarding this matter is the testimony of Aldredge.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
It is so ORDERED.