Hunt v. Temco, Inc.

5 Citing cases

  1. Roach v. Moss Motor Co.

    No. M2021-00511-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 6, 2022)   Cited 1 times
    Applying to ruling upon a motion to alter or amend

    In other words, the amendment did not implicate additional evidence of which the [defendant] had been unaware and did not change the relief sought." 2007 WL 394644, at *6 (citing Hunt v. Temco, Inc., 61 Tenn.App. 35, 55-56, 452 S.W.2d 879, 888 (1969) (citations omitted) (holding that a late-filed amendment asserting recovery upon a quantum meruit basis did not constitute a new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations because (1) the same evidence could have been used to support either a quantum meruit or contract claim and (2) the measure of damages was the same under both claims)); see also Guarantor Partners v. Huff, 830 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Garthright v. First Tennessee Bank, 728 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)) (explaining, in a case where the defendant should have been allowed to amend his answer to implead third-party defendants, that "defendants should be freely permitted to amend their answers when a case has not been set for trial, when discovery ha[s] not been completed, and when the plaintiff will suffer no prejudice except insofar as the defense itself might prevail.").

  2. Daniels v. Wray

    No. M2008-01781-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May. 21, 2009)   Cited 6 times
    In Wray, we allowed an amendment even where depositions had already been taken, whereas here, they had not been taken at the time Kerr filed the motion to amend.

    In other words, the amendment did not implicate additional evidence of which the church had been unaware and did not change the relief sought. See Hunt v. Temco, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 879, 888 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1969)(late-filed amendment asserting quantum meruit theory of recovery for first time permitted because (1) same evidence could have been used to support either quantum meruit or contract pleadings and (2) the measure of damages was the same for each theory). Consequently, we can find no prejudice to the church's ability to defend the lawsuit due to the amendment of the complaint.

  3. Weston v. Community Baptist CH

    No. M2004-02688-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2007)   Cited 3 times

    In other words, the amendment did not implicate additional evidence of which the church had been unaware and did not change the relief sought. See Hunt v. Temco, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 879, 888 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1969)(late-filed amendment asserting quantum meruit theory of recovery for first time permitted because (1) same evidence could have been used to support either quantum meruit or contract pleadings and (2) the measure of damages was the same for each theory). Consequently, we can find no prejudice to the church's ability to defend the lawsuit due to the amendment of the complaint.

  4. Peters v. Michael Const. Co., Inc.

    688 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    Its application in this case may best be explained by contrasting the facts at hand with those in a quasi contract case cited and relied upon by the chancellor below. As the chancellor noted, Hunt v. Temco, 61 Tenn. App. 35, 452 S.W.2d 879 (1969) is similar to the case at bar because it is a suit by a terminated employee to recover the value of services rendered during the employment relation. The complainant in Hunt was a former sales manager for a heater manufacturer, who had received a commission of from ten to twenty percent on certain heaters.

  5. Perritt v. Perritt

    528 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    This Court has no authority to review a concurrent finding of fact by the Clerk and Master and the Chancellor where there is any material evidence to support such finding. Gibson's Suits in Chancery, Vol. 1, Section 663, 5th Edition; Hunt v. Temco, Inc. (1969), 61 Tenn. App. 35, 452 S.W.2d 879; Ferrell v. Elrod (1971), 63 Tenn. App. 129, 469 S.W.2d 678. The testimony of plaintiff and his father constitute material evidence as to the father's ownership of the equipment. Therefore, assignments of error II and III are respectfully overruled; however, for reasons hereinafter set out, the Chancellor's decree must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.