Opinion
Civil 3:20-CV-464
06-27-2023
HAROLD HUNT, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW SMITH, Defendant.
Mariani Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
Pending before the court is another opportunity to consider the claims of Plaintiff Harold Hunt (“Hunt”) in his case against Defendant Officer Matthew Smith (“Officer Smith”). We are asked to consider the sufficiency of these claims in the context of Officer Smith's motion for summary judgment on Hunt's second amended complaint. (Doc. 51). In this second amended complaint Hunt alleges Officer Smith, a patrolman with the City of Wilkes Barre Police Department, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to false arrest and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 32, at 1). Officer Smith contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact which would allow Hunt to succeed on his Fourth Amendment claims because Officer Smith had probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hunt. (Docs. 51, 52).
After review of the record, we conclude that Hunt has not presented any evidence that Officer Smith arrested and prosecuted him without probable cause. Moreover, in any event we conclude that Officer Smith would be entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, we recommend that Smith's motion for summary judgment be granted.
II. Background
This case arises out of what is alleged to have been a tempestuous relationship between Hunt and his spouse. In the second amended complaint, Hunt alleges that he shared an apartment with his wife where a series of events took place in early 2018. (Doc. 39, at 2). On or about March 21, 2018, Hunt and his wife had a disagreement and began arguing. (Doc. 50, ¶ 1). Hunt alleges he and his wife argued over whether he would commit immigration fraud for her. (Doc. 32, ¶ 6). The complaint asserts that both Hunt and his wife had been drinking and were intoxicated which led to a physical fight. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 3). Hunt alleges his wife wanted him to say he was abusive to her to stop her from being deported, and that she attacked him and threatened to kill him after he refused. (Id., ¶ 7). Hunt claims there were pools of blood on the floor of the apartment and that he had sustained several injuries to his head, eye, nose, and neck. (Id., ¶ 7). Hunt's wife sprayed Hunt in the face with mace. (Doc. 50, ¶ 5). The affidavit of probable cause filed in Hunt's criminal case states that Hunt's wife then locked herself in the bedroom, called 9-1-1, and reported that Hunt was attacking her. (Id., ¶ 6). The police were called to the apartment, and Hunt asserts that Officer Smith questioned him about the incident. (Id. ¶ 8).
Officer Smith and other officers responded to the 9-1-1 call at the apartment Plaintiff shared with his wife. (Id., ¶ 7). Upon entering the apartment, Officer Smith could detect the smell of mace and he observed blood on the floor. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 12). Hunt contends he met the officers outside of his apartment, and that he informed Hunt that his wife attacked him and stated that she wanted to kill him. Officer Smith recalls Hunt informing him that his wife attacked him, and he put his hands on her only to pull her hands away from him. (Id., ¶ 8). After being sprayed in the face with mace, Hunt's left eye appeared to be swollen and red. Hunt contends his eye was not swollen because of the mace rather his eye swelled due to being hit in the eye with his wife's fist. (Doc. 50, ¶ 10).
While inside the apartment, Hunt's wife informed Officer Smith that Hunt pushed her on the couch and started to choke her with both hands wrapped around her neck. (Id., ¶ 13). Hunt's wife informed Officer Smith and wrote in her victim statement that she put her fingers in Hunt's nose to stop him from choking her. (Id.) Hunt's wife further provided that she was able to successfully push Hunt off and get away. (Id., ¶ 19). She also informed Officer Smith that she returned to where Hunt was, sprayed him with pepper spray/mace, and then ran back to the bedroom where she alleges that she locked the door, called 9-1-1, and awaited their arrival. (Id., ¶ 20). Hunt's wife told Officer Smith that she thought she was going to take her last breath. (Id., ¶ 14). Officer Smith recalled that Hunt's wife appeared to be visibly shaken up. (Id., ¶ 15).
Thus, the undisputed information confronting Officer Smith on March 21, 2018 at a minimum described the offense of assault by mutual affray under Pennsylvania law. Further, it is uncontested that the police officer was confronted by evidence of recent violence within the Hunt household, and faced a scenario fraught with future mutual hostility. Given these essentially undisputed facts Officer Smith had a duty to act.
Pennsylvania law defines simple assault by mutual affray as “a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent.” 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701 (b)(1). Simple assault by mutual affray is a third degree misdemeanor under the Pennsylvania crimes code. Id.
Hunt was then taken to the emergency room for treatment, where Hunt alleges Officer Smith informed him that he was going to arrest Hunt's wife as well in connection with the incident that occurred in the apartment. (Doc. 32, ¶ 12). After Hunt's wife wrote her victim statement, Officer Smith arrested Hunt and charged him with strangulation, simple assault, and harassment. (Doc 50, ¶ 21). After Hunt was arrested, he alleges that Officer Smith subsequently wrote a false affidavit and arrested him on false charges, even though he told Officer Smith his wife attacked him, that he did not fight back, and that he never struck his wife. (Doc. 32, ¶¶ 12, 14, 18).
According to Hunt, Officer Smith offered him a deal that if he did not say anything to the magistrate judge during the arraignment, he would arrest Hunt's wife for assault too. (Id., ¶ 15). Hunt agreed and did not provide any personal testimony to the magistrate judge. (Id.) Hunt further claims that Officer Smith was under the district attorney's instructions to arrest only Hunt, and not his wife. (Doc. 56-1, ¶ 14). However, Hunt's wife was not arrested after the arraignment, despite this alleged agreement. (Id., ¶ 16).
Hunt further alleges that Officer Smith “trashed” his apartment by moving blood evidence and turning over chairs and furniture, taking pictures after to use as support for the false arrest affidavit. (Doc. 32, ¶ 13). This allegation that the police officer staged the crime scene is advanced without any supporting facts in a wholly speculative fashion. Furthermore, Hunt alleges that at the preliminary hearing, a statement from a witness saying he saw Hunt's wife on top of him hitting him and saying she was going to kill him was read into evidence. (Id., ¶ 25). However, Hunt claims that Officer Smith began to threaten the witness with arrest, and stopped him from testifying, effectively denying Hunt's right to call a witness. (Id., ¶¶ 26-28). He also alleges that at the preliminary hearing, Officer Smith falsely testified and omitted exculpatory evidence. (Id., at ¶ 23). Finally, he alleges Officer Smith suborned perjury from the alleged victim and Plaintiff's wife at both the preliminary hearing and trial. (Id., ¶¶ 23, 33). At trial, Plaintiff was found not guilty of all charges. (Doc. 50, ¶ 22).
This lawsuit followed. (Doc. 1). Hunt filed the complaint in this case on March 20, 2020, and an amended complaint on April 29, 2020. (Doc. 7). In his amended complaint, Hunt named three individual defendants-Wilkes Barre Police Chief Joseph Coffay, Officer Matthew Smith, and Attorney Charles Ross-as well as the City of Wilkes Barre. The district court subsequently dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice against the City, the Police Chief, and Attorney Ross, as the complaint did not set forth any well-pleaded facts to support the supervisory and municipality claims against these defendants. (Doc. 9). Subsequently, Officer Smith filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him (Doc. 16), and the court dismissed the complaint as to Officer Smith without prejudice, granting Hunt a final opportunity to amend his complaint to address the pleading deficiencies we had identified. (Docs. 28, 31).
On July 9, 2021, Hunt filed a second amended complaint against Officer Smith, which is now the operative pleading in this case. (Doc. 32). Officer Smith filed this instant motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2022. (Doc. 51). This motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59). After consideration, and for the following reasons, we recommend that Officer Smith's motion be granted.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
The defendant, Officer Smith, has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. (Id., at 248-49).
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. (Id.) Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.
(Id.) In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Officer Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Be Granted.
In the present case, Hunt brings civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a state actor engaged in conduct that deprived him of “rights, privileges, or immunities” secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000).
Section 1983 offers private citizens a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.(Id.) “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988)).
When a plaintiff brings civil rights claims against a government actor, such as Officer Smith, the doctrine of qualified immunity may shield that government actor from civil liability. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that should be considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
We note that in proper cases, the court may consider the question of qualified immunity sua sponte. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 312 (3d. Cir. 2001).
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for civil damages brought pursuant to section 1983 “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The official seeking qualified immunity has the burden of establishing their entitlement to the affirmative defense. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)). To determine whether an official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1) whether the official violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first).
A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. To be clearly established, there does not have to be a case that is directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,741 (2011)). In determining whether a right is clearly established, courts must not define the right “at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074.) Rather, the analysis should focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742)).
Such specificity is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,” where it is “sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. It is the plaintiff who bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the claimed violation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.”).
To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may look to cases from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit courts. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017)). However, unpublished cases cannot establish such a right because they do not constitute binding authority. El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). In rare cases, the unlawfulness of a government official's conduct may be established from the obviously unlawful nature of the defendant's conduct “even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
Plaintiff's claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution implicate his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable cause and subsequent prosecution without probable cause are constitutional violations that may be redressed under § 1983. See Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)); Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
At the outset, we conclude that Officer Smith did not violate Hunt's constitutional rights to be free from false arrest and malicious prosecution because Officer Smith had probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hunt. To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)). Similarly, to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a claimant must show that:
(1) [The] defendant commenced a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; (3) defendant “initiated the proceeding without probable cause”; (4) defendant acted maliciously or with a purpose apart from bringing plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff “suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”Watson, 183 F.Supp.3d at 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)). We note that, in a case where a claim of malicious prosecution is brought against a police officer:
Police officers (as opposed to prosecutors) may be liable for malicious prosecution if they “conceal or misrepresent material facts” to the prosecutor. Halsey, 750 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004)). In particular, an officer is liable if he “fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, makes false or misleading reports to the prosecutor, omits material information from the reports, or otherwise interferes with the prosecutor's ability to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to prosecute.”Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Finneman v. SEPTA, 267 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017)).
It is undisputed that Hunt was arrested, and proceedings were initiated against him, which ultimately ended in his favor. (Doc. 32, ¶¶ 17, 30, 34). It is also undisputed that Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, “[t]he type of constitutional injury the Fourth Amendment is intended to redress is the deprivation of liberty accompanying prosecution, not prosecution itself.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2005). As examples of the kinds of seizures that may support a claim for malicious prosecution, the Third Circuit observed that “[p]retrial custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Id. In contrast, the mere attendance at one's trial on criminal charges does not qualify as a seizure that will support a claim for malicious prosecution. Id. Thus, constitutional false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims focus on the physical restraint of a person.
In the instant case, Hunt spent five days in jail and was released on bail afterwards, subject to conditions that physically restrained him further. In our view, a jury could find that Hunt was deprived of his liberty for the purposes of this element because he had been arrested and subjected to pretrial custody and pretrial restrictions constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
However, in order for Hunt to succeed on either claim of false arrest or malicious prosecution, he must establish that Officer Smith did not have probable cause to arrest him at the time of Hunt's arrest. See Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating “[t]he proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”) For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). The inquiry into probable cause is an objective one, determined from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 585 (2018). “[S]ummary judgment for false arrest ... is proper only if no reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for any of the charged crimes.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199.
“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 911964; see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 16175-76 (1949). While the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, Beck v. Ohio, 79 U.S. at 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant. See Ker. v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
At the outset, we note that, based on the uncontested information available to Officer Smith at the time of the arrest, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of probable cause. Officer Smith contends that he had probable cause to arrest Hunt for strangulation, simple assault, or harassment based on the following facts that are uncontested and were present and available to him at the time of Hunt's arrest:
(1) A woman, later identified as Plaintiff's wife, made a 911 call about a domestic disturbance; (2) Plaintiff's wife reported that her husband
was attacking her; (3) Plaintiff's wife reported that she locked herself in the bedroom to get away from Plaintiff; (4) upon arriving at the location of the call, Officer Smith was met by Plaintiff who was displaying signs of intoxication; (5) Plaintiff told Officer Smith that he was sprayed with mace, and his left eye was swollen; (6) upon entering the apartment shared by the couple, Officer Smith detected a strong odor consistent with the smell of mace; (7) there was blood on the floor; (8) Plaintiff's wife was visibly shaken up; (9) Plaintiff's wife told Officer Smith that Plaintiff choked her with both hands; (10) Plaintiff's wife said that she thought she was going to take her last breath; (11) Plaintiff's wife wrote in her victim statement that Plaintiff began an argument with her and later choker her; and (12) Plaintiff's wife told Officer Smith and wrote in her victim statement that she was able to push Plaintiff off of her, run to get her mace and spray Plaintiff with the mace from across the room before locking herself in her bedroom.
(Doc. 52, at 11-12). Indeed, Officer Smith avers that he charged Hunt for these crimes because the following facts were present: (1) Hunt and his wife were arguing; (2) she sprayed him in the face with mace to defend herself; (3) she locked herself in her bedroom to get away from Plaintiff; (4) she called 9-1-1 contemporaneously with the reported assault; and (5) Plaintiff choked his wife. (Id., at 13).
Here, we conclude that these facts, viewed in the totality of the circumstances and through the lens of a reasonable officer at the time of the incident, are sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Hunt for these crimes. Indeed, these facts, viewed objectively through the lens of a reasonable officer at the time of the arrest, are “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [Hunt] had committed . . . [the] offense [of strangulation, simple assault, and harassment].” Myers, 308 F.3d at 255 (citing Beck, 379 U.S. at 91).
Moreover, the state court reviewed Officer Smith's affidavit of probable cause and determined that Officer Smith did have probable cause to arrest Hunt. While state court probable cause findings do not automatically confer qualified immunity upon the defendants, police officers like Officer Hunt whose probable cause determinations have been reviewed by the courts are often cloaked with qualified immunity as a matter of law. See e.g., Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005); Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997). While Hunt claims this judicial determination was based on false statements and omissions made by Officer Smith, a review of Hunt's list of allegedly false statements and alleged omissions from Officer Smith's arrest affidavit leads us to conclude that none of these alleged statements or omissions were material to or would negate Officer Smith's determination of probable cause to arrest Hunt. Thus, we conclude that Officer Smith had probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hunt.
While Hunt makes much of the fact that Officer Smith failed to arrest his wife in conjunction with this incident, we note that any alleged culpability of Hunt's wife in what may have been a mutual affray does not negate Officer Smith's determination of probable cause to arrest and charge Hunt with these crimes. Indeed, Hunt's narrative regarding his continued anger at the failure to arrest his spouse actually undermines his civil rights claim against Officer Smith since Hunt insists that it was the district attorney, and not the officer, who made this decision. Simply put, Officer Smith cannot be faulted for following the legal guidance of the prosecutor in this case, and his actions taken at the direction of prosecutors do not give rise to civil liability.
However, even if we conclude that Officer Smith's conduct colorably violated Hunt's constitutional rights to be free from false arrest and malicious prosecution, we cannot find that his rights were clearly established in this particular factual setting because it would not be clear to “any reasonable officer that [Officer Smith's] conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. On this score, we conclude that no reasonable officer in Officer Smith's situation would have believed that arresting Hunt for the charged crimes was unlawful. Indeed, as we have noted, the following facts were available to Officer Smith at the time of the arrest: (1) Officer Smith was responding to a 9-1-1 call for domestic violence; (2) Hunt's wife informed Officer Smith that Hunt had choked her; and (3) Hunt found evidence of a struggle, including but not limited to, the smell of mace, blood on the floor, upset furniture, etc. (Doc. 52, at 11). After Officer Smith arrested Hunt, Officer Smith presented all these facts that he relied on to make Hunt's arrest in his affidavit of probable cause following the arrest. (Id.) This probable cause determination was further supported by the judicial determination of probable cause at Hunt's preliminary hearing. Accordingly, no reasonable officer would have believed they were violating Hunt's rights by arresting and prosecuting him for these crimes.
Finally, to the extent that Hunt is suing Officer Smith for allegedly testifying falsely at his preliminary hearing and trial, this claim fails for another reason: witnesses enjoy immunity from liability under the federal civil rights statutes. As the Supreme Court has explained:
[A] trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness' testimony. When a witness is sued because of his testimony, ..., “ ‘the claims of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy.' ” Without absolute immunity for witnesses, ..., the truth-seeking process at trial would be impaired. Witnesses “might be reluctant to come forward to testify,” and even if a witness took the stand, the witness “might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff” for “fear of subsequent liability.”Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012)(citations omitted, emphasis in original). Therefore, any federal civil rights claims premised upon Officer Smith's alleged status as a witness in Hunt's state criminal case also fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed. Andresen v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 9274581, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Andresen v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 9274577 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2021).
In sum, we conclude that Officer Smith did not violate Hunt's Fourth Amendment rights because Officer Smith had probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hunt for the alleged strangulation incident. Moreover, even if we concluded that this conduct amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation, we believe that Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we recommend that the Court grant summary judgment in favor of Officer Smith.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the Officer Smith's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.