Failure to make a timely objection constitutes a waiver. Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, ¶ 10, 294 Mont. 444, ¶ 10, 981 P.2d 275, ¶ 10. ¶ 16 Here, C.P. and G.P. voluntarily waived the presumption of G.P.'s paternity when they failed to object to the District Court's order that the testing take place.

As we have held, offering grounds for an evidentiary objection a day after the objection was made does not constitute a timely and specific objection. Spinler v. Allen, 1999 MT 160, ¶ 38, 295 Mont. 139, ¶ 38, 983 P.2d 348, ¶ 38; see also Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, ¶ 10, 294 Mont. 444, ¶ 10, 981 P.2d 275, ¶ 10 (failure to make a timely and specific objection constitutes a waiver), and Rule 103(a)(1), M.R.Evid. (error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record . . .). The District Court noted that the damage caused by defense counsel "could have been minimized by a motion in limine to exclude any further mention of the issue," but that "Plaintiffs' counsel did not make such a motion in limine or object in any way. . . .

¶ 13 The initial inquiry is whether an issue has been properly preserved for review. An issue can be preserved in different ways, reflecting different kinds of proceedings. See Hunt v. K–Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, ¶ 10, 294 Mont. 444, 981 P.2d 275 (timely and specific objection); Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle Division, 1998 MT 108, ¶ 46, 289 Mont. 1, 961 P.2d 75 (motion in limine); McDermott v. Carie, 2005 MT 293, ¶ 24, 329 Mont. 295, 124 P.3d 168 (motion for a new trial); State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 22, 349 Mont. 371, 204 P.3d 1192 (motion to suppress). Unless a statutorily provided exception exists, or plain error is established, a reviewing court can consider only those issues that are properly preserved for its review.

I disagree. “A motion in limine is a request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary question, which the court may provide at its discretion to aid the parties in formulating trial strategy.” Hunt v. K–Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, ¶ 11, 294 Mont. 444, 981 P.2d 275. For example, in State v. Crider, 2014 MT 139, 375 Mont. 187, 328 P.3d 612, we observed that Crider had sought through a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior bad acts.

Our first inquiry is whether Montana law permits the recovery of hedonic damages in wrongful-death or survivorship actions. See Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming admission of testimony concerning hedonic damages because New Mexico law allows recovery of such damages); Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02(7), at 702-30 to 702-31 (noting situations where "state substantive law will impinge upon the trial court's admissibility decision" regarding expert witnesses; for instance, when state law establishes "elements of a cause of action or defense"). It appears that the Montana Supreme Court has not taken a firm position on the availability of hedonic damages. See Christofferson v. City of Great Falls, 316 Mont. 469, 484, 74 P.3d 1021, 1031 (2003) (declining to address the issue because it was moot); Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 294 Mont. 444, 448, 981 P.2d 275, 279 (1999) (permitting expert opinion regarding hedonic damages because defendant failed to pose a timely objection to the testimony); Henricksen v. State of Montana, 319 Mont. 307, 328, 84 P.3d 38 (allowing for, but not defining, "damages for loss of ability to pursue an established course of life"). Burlington cites a number of authorities from other jurisdictions holding either that it was not an abuse of discretion to bar expert testimony concerning hedonic damages, or that it was error to allow such testimony.

They claim that because Marcinek was not working for UFC at the time UFC first issued its policy to the Parishes in May 2007, he had no personal knowledge of the circumstances. As the Parishes did not present this legal argument to the District Court, they did not preserve it for appeal. Hunt v. K–Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, 294 Mont. 444, 981 P.2d 275. Moreover, we do not allow appellants to raise new legal arguments in their reply briefs. Arguments must be raised in an appellant's initial brief to allow the appellee an opportunity to respond.

Also, on April 25, the court filed an order setting the jury trial. In this order the court, citing Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 1999 MT 125, 294 Mont. 444, 981 P.2d 275, notified the parties that "[t]rial objections that could have been resolved by a pre-trial motion in limine will be deemed waived if not presented in a timely filed motion in limine." ¶ 12 On September 27, 2007, Stevenson filed a motion in limine requesting that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom during the trial, that collateral source evidence be excluded, that there be no argument or mention that a party has not called an available witness, and that there be no reference to the existence of motions in limine or any other effort to exclude evidence.

A motion in limine provides a vehicle for requesting guidance from the trial court prior to trial regarding an evidentiary question which the court may provide, at its discretion, to aid the parties in formulating their trial strategy. Pullum v. Robiuette, 174 S.W.3d 124, 136 n. 12 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004) (quoting United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. K-Mari Corp., 294 Mont. 444, 981 P.2d 275, 278 (1999); see also 1 McConuick on Evidence § 52, at 255-58 (Kenneth S. Brouned., 6th ed. 2006) (" McConuick on Evidence"); Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 1.03[4](f), at 1-20 to 1-21 (5th ed. 2005) (" Tennessee Law of Evidence "). It enables the trial court, prior to trial, to exclude anticipated evidence that would clearly be inadmissible for any purpose at trial.

A motion in limine provides a vehicle for requesting guidance from the trial court prior to trial regarding an evidentiary question which the court may provide, at its discretion, to aid the parties in formulating their trial strategy. Pullum v. Robinette, 174 S.W.3d 124, 136 n. 12 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2004) (quoting United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. K-Mart Corp., 981 P.2d 275, 278 (Mont. 1999); see also 1 McCormick on Evidence § 52, at 255-58 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (" McCormick on Evidence"); Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 1.03[4](f), at 1-20 to 1-21 (5th ed. 2005) (" Tennessee Law of Evidence"). It enables the trial court, prior to trial, to exclude anticipated evidence that would clearly be inadmissible for any purpose at trial. Jonasson v. Lutheran Child Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); Forsyth County v. Martin, 610 S.E.2d 512, 518 (Ga. 2005).