Opinion
11-26-1888
HUNT v. BRADFIELD et al.
H. A. Fluck, for complainant. L. H. Sergeant, for defendants.
On bill to foreclose a mortgage.
H. A. Fluck, for complainant. L. H. Sergeant, for defendants.
BIRD, V. C. To a bill to foreclose, an answer is filed by S., who is a party, setting up that her father lost his life in the army when she was about five years of age; and that soon thereafter the government gave her a pension of $10 a month, which was continued until she arrived at the age of 16 years; and that her mother was appointed her guardian by the orphans' court, andthat, as such guardian, she received all of said pension money. The answer further sets out that although the legal title to the mortgaged premises is in the name of Mrs. Bradfield, the mother of S., she took such title for the benefit of the said S., her ward, and as guardian, and to the use of the ward; and she shows that in the deed by which she took the title it so appears, for therein is this language, after naming the party of the first part, viz., "and Elizabeth Bradfield, wife of Ezekiel Bradfield, guardian of Emily Jane Swayzy, a minor, and to and for the use of said minor when she arrives at full age." After this answer came in, the complainant amended her bill, in which she admitted that the title to said lands was taken in the name of the said Elizabeth Bradfield, as guardian for said infant; but alleging that the money received by said guardian, and for which she gave said mortgage, was expended by her in part for the payment of the purchase money which had been agreed to be paid for the land so mortgaged, and in part for improvements put thereon. Besides this issue, so attempted to be raised on this bill to foreclose, other questions have been forced into prominence, with which the court is compelled to deal, either for the purpose of settling the rights of the parties respecting those questions, or for the purpose of showing that they cannot be settled in this suit before any of these questions can be properly litigated. One of these questions relates to the cost of the education of the infant, and of her board and clothing, and what she earned in the family of her guardian, and another to the liability of the representatives of Mrs. Bradfield to account for her transactions as such guardian. What is greatly to be regretted is the fact that, although the mother and guardian lived until about the time of the daughter and ward's arriving at the age of 16, when the pension ceased, she never filed any account of the manner in which she employed these moneys of her daughter which she received each year from the government.
Here, then, are three very important facts for the court to deal with, and to dispose of, before it grants the complainant any relief: (1) The fact that the mother was the guardian, and, as such, received this money; (2) that she, of her own motion, took the title to this land, in her name, as guardian of her daughter, and for her use; (3) that she died after receiving all of the money which her ward was entitled to, without accounting for any part of it. Having taken the title in her own name, as guardian of the ward, and for her use, and nothing else appearing on the face of the deed, the presumption is very strong that she paid for it with the money of her ward. Such a presumption can only be overcome by the most cogent proof. Indeed, it is very difficult, when well-understood legal principles are given their proper weight, to avoid the conclusion that the guardian, were she alive and in court, would be absolutely estopped from denying the full force and binding effect of her own voluntary act, in thus dealing with the moneys of her ward, and then allowing it to stand unchallenged for so many years; and the presumption seems to be heightened by the conviction, arising from the conduct of the guardian, showing that it must have been her deliberate intention thus to devote the moneys of her ward and child to this particular purpose. To the contrary of this, nothing whatever appears. The position of Mrs. Bradfield being thus defined, we can easily fix the rights of those who claim under her. The mortgagee, who took from her, can have no better title than she had to convey. He is not in the position of a bona fide purchaser; for he could not have been deceived, in contemplation of law, because, if she had any title whatever, her title deed would have shown the strength or frailty of such title; and that he is chargeable with full knowledge of, whether it was recorded or not.
Mr. Bradfield, who survives his wife, says that the understanding was that the title to the property was to have been taken in his name, and that he furnished a large part of the purchase money, and that he gave a note for $25, and that this note was afterwards paid by him out of the moneys raised bythe giving of this mortgage; and he also says that the balance of the moneys were expended in making valuable improvements on the premises; and these facts the complainant sets up as ground of equitable relief. But I can find no authority for this contention, nor does any reason therefor present itself to my mind. Besides, there is, as I regard the rights of the parties, an insuperable difficulty in the disposition of this question, with anything like a show of justice, in the fact that no accounting was ever had by and between Mrs. Bradfield, the guardian, in her life-time, and her ward, or between any one else and the ward since the death of the guardian. Certainly no one will say that, on a simple bill to foreclose, the account between the guardian and ward can be gone into; and this objection has especial force when it is remembered that no one is before the court to represent the deceased guardian. Hence, in my judgment, before this land can be relieved of the claim which Mrs. Bradfield, as guardian, voluntarily fastened on it, by taking the title in her name as guardian to the use of her ward, there must be an accounting, and it must be made to appear that the pension money was expended as has been claimed. As there are no allegations in the bill charging that the pension money was so expended, neither is there any that the title was put in the name of the ward by mistake; so that upon neither of these points has any issue been made by the pleadings which precludes the consideration of them in this case, although considerable testimony has been offered on the subject. And it seems to me to be wholly impracticable to allow the pleadings to be amended, since there does not appear to me to be any possibility of avoiding the objection of multifariousness. These difficulties being in my path, I have not thought it to be my duty to look into the merits of the case as between the guardian and ward, nor as between the ward and the stepfather. But, after all, has the complainant any special claim to equitable relief because it is said that the money so secured was devoted to the benefit of the land by the payment of a note of $25, and by the erection of buildings thereon? I do not find anything in the case to found such an equity upon. There is nothing to prove that the money was loaned for any such special purpose, or that it was ever intimated to the mortgagee that it was borrowed for that particular purpose. Therefore, whatever the equities between these parties may be, or may be made to appear to be, I can discover no way of pronouncing judgment between them under this bill, except to advise that the bill be dismissed, with costs.