Opinion
No. 18-6111 No. 18-6112 No. 18-6113 No. 18-6115
02-04-2020
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0084n.06 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Before: KETHLEDGE, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. A reserve officer for the Millington Police Department sexually abused several children. The parents of four of his victims brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Millington, three of its chiefs of police, and three of its mayors. The district court dismissed the parents' complaint for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.
With one exception, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its notably careful and thorough opinion. The exception is that we respectfully disagree with the court's dismissal of the claims for supervisory liability against Chiefs Stanback and Tennant. Specifically, both chiefs allegedly received the following reports: a report from O.H.'s stepmother that she thought, based on Friar's interaction with her daughter, that Friar was a pedophile; a report from the parent of a YMCA employee, alleging that Friar had photographed children in their bathing suits at the pool; and especially the repeated reports from a reserve officer who allegedly told Stanback and Tennant that Friar had been fired by another department for "sexual misconduct with young girls" and that the officer himself had observed Friar engage in "improper conduct towards young female children while on-duty." These reports plausibly gave Stanback and Tennant reason to know that Friar was likely to abuse young children if given the chance. And the chiefs' alleged failure to take any action whatsoever in response to these repeated reports, while retaining Friar as a reserve officer, plausibly amounted to deliberate indifference to or acquiescence in the abuse that followed. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2002). We further think that the relevant law made sufficiently clear, for purposes of denying qualified immunity at this stage of the case, that the actions and omissions of these two defendants violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights as alleged in the claims of supervisory liability. See, e.g., Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 243 (6th Cir. 2016); Howard v. Knox County, 695 F. App'x 107, 116 (6th Cir. 2017).
The district court's judgment is affirmed, except we reverse the district court's dismissal of the claims against Stanback and Tennant for supervisory liability; and we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.