Opinion
No. 29116.
May 12, 1931.
1. JUDGMENT. Judgment dismissing bill filed against complainant's vendees to confirm title, where dismissal was based on superiority of third person's title, was res judicata as against complainant and vendees who had not acquired additional title.
Where a bill was filed against persons in possession of land and another claiming to be owner of said land to confirm complainant's title and to recover for use and occupation, and the complainant in the original bill dismissed to the third party owner by retaining the bill as against parties placed in possession by the complainant, and the vendees of the complainant defend upon the ground that the third party had a superior title, and the complainant no title, and the contention was sustained by the Supreme Court on appeal and the bill dismissed, such suit effectively adjudicated the title against the complainant in that suit and is res adjudicata as against the complainant and his vendees who have not acquired additional titles to said land.
2. EQUITY. Complainant dismissing bill as to principal defendant in suit to confirm title could not maintain second suit for that purpose without offering to do equity or excusing delay, where title was adjudged against him in first suit and property was sold.
Where a complainant dismisses a bill as to a principal defendant claiming to be the owner of the land involved in a suit, and does not file another bill within a reasonable time, but permits the suit to proceed against other defendants who claim title through the third persons, and such title is adjudicated against the complainant and the property sold to a third person for a valuable consideration prior to filing a second suit, and complainant in the second suit does not offer to do equity nor show excuse for delay, he is guilty of laches, and has no standing to maintain the suit because of laches and want of offer to do equity.
APPEAL from chancery court of Harrison county; HON. S.E. TRAVIS, Chancellor.
Gardner, Brown Backstrom and J.F. Galloway, all of Gulfport, and J.T. Hume, for appellants.
In the former case it was distinctly held that it was the duty of Inglis to prevail as against the title of B.B. Galloway and that he had not so prevailed, and that C.D. Galloway and Mary A. Galloway were entitled to the possession of said land as tenants of B.B. Galloway. That being the case the title as between Inglis and B.B. Galloway is a closed matter; it was adjudicated.
Galloway v. Inglis, 103 So. 147, 138 Miss. 350.
The rule with reference to res adjudicata is that the former suit settles all questions presented, or which could have been presented in that cause. The final judgment decides all issues before the court and all issues that could have been presented to the court. The final judgment adjudicates all issues necessarily involved in the litigation, and all issues which could have been presented.
Bates v. Strickland, 139 Miss. 636, 103 So. 432; Dean v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Miss. 268, 99 So. 563; Vinson v. Mortgage Co., 116 Miss. 59, 76 So. 827; Harvison v. Turner, 116 Miss. 550, 77 So. 528; Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729, 56 So. 132, Ann. Cas. 1917C 466; Lawson v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 630; Moody v. Harper, 38 Miss. 599; Stewart v. Stebbins, 30 Miss. 66; Sauls v. Freeman, 4 So. 525, 12 Am. St. Rep. 190.
Whether one proceeds in equity to cancel as a cloud the adversary title, or bring an action at law to recover on the legal title, the judgment of the court upon the issues presented must be equally conclusive. In either case, a court of competent jurisdiction applies the law to the facts proved and involved in the material issue on which the right of the parties rests, and this is adjudication.
Chiles v. Gallagher, 67 Miss. 413; Chiles v. Champenois, 69 Miss. 603, 13 So. 840.
The principles controlling the doctrine of the law of the case, are necessarily more binding upon the courts than the law of precedent. If the trial court is permitted to ignore the decision of a case by the appellate court when it is reversed for a retrial according to the law as interpreted by the appellate court, the rights of litigants can never be finally determined. It is of the greatest importance that litigation shall have some finality. It is infinitely better that a case be wrongly decided than to never decide it.
Johnson v. Success Brick Machinery Co., 104 Miss. 217, 71 So. 178.
J.F. Galloway, of Gulfport, for appellants.
The fact that an action is prosecuted in the names of nominal parties cannot divest the case of its real character, but the issues made by the real parties and the actual interests involved, must determine what persons are precluded from again agitating the question, and who are estopped by the previous decision. On the other hand, since estoppels must be mutual, one for whose use and benefit an action is maintained is entitled to the benefit of the judgment as an estoppel against the adverse parties thereto.
1 Freeman on Judgments, page 939, Art. 436.
Whether one proceed in equity to cancel as a cloud the adversary title, or bring an action at law to recover on the legal title, the judgment of the court upon the issues presented must be equally conclusive. In either case, a court of competent jurisdiction applies the law to the facts proved and involved in the material issue on which the right of the parties rests, and this is adjudication.
Childs v. Champenois, 13 So. 840, 69 Miss. 603.
If title is put in issue in a suit to remove cloud it will bar a subsequent suit.
2 Van Fleet, Former Adjudication, page 808.
If the plaintiff, under the issues, has to prove several things to make out his case, a recovery by the defendant is prima facie a bar to them all.
Hahn v. Miller, 68 Iowa 745, 28 N.W. 51; Lawson v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 634-5.
The decree is not only conclusive of the rights of the parties in the particular suit, but of every fact which the judgment or decree affirms positively or by necessary implication. The estoppel precludes parties and privies from contending to the contrary of that point or matter of fact, which once having been distinctly put in issue by them, or those to whom they are privies in estate or law, has been, on such issues joined, and solemnly found against them.
Land v. Kern, 52 Miss. 341.
A judgment, estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also to every ground which might have been presented — and further: With reference to the necessity of having the subject matter of particular litigation as a whole at once before the court and not by piecemeal, the rule is correctly stated, when a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in and of adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to bring forward their whole case. The plea of res adjudicata applies, except in special cases, not only to the points upon which the court was required by the parties to form an opinion, and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belongs to the subject of litigation, and which the parties exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 24 L.Ed. 195; Smith v. Law, 10 Fed. 2d 651; White v. Ladd, 41 Or. 332, 66 P. 741, 93 Am. St. Rep. 732; Broom's Legal Maxims, 327; Crowson v. Cody, 110 So. 52.
Neither Inglis nor his privies, who are appellees here have offered in this suit to do equity by Galloway by tendering him back his purchase money, or a deed before foreclosure, or right to possession of the property.
Galloway v. Inglis, 138 Miss. 350, 103 So. 147.
A tenant may dispute the title as against the original landlord, without surrender of possession, where it has been legally extinguished or determined, so that it no longer exists, or where the tenant has been actually or constructively evicted.
Galloway v. Inglis, 103 So. 149, 138 Miss. 350.
R.C. Cowan and J.L. Taylor, both of Gulfport, for appellee.
In the case of Hume et al. v. Inglis, 122 So. Rep. 533, the matter was before the court on the same plea of res adjudicata, and it does not appear that the court thought this decree was well taken because it did not pass favorably on it and not passing favorably on it although not affirmatively deciding that the case was not res adjudicata the court did negatively decide that it was not res adjudicata for the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In the case of Galloway v. Inglis, 138 Miss. 350, at the conclusion of the testimony the complainant, recognizing that he could not recover as against B.B. Galloway, requested and was allowed to dismiss the bill as to B.B. Galloway without prejudice, but the bill was retained against C.D. Galloway and his wife and is not res adjudicata.
A supreme court decision in a case construing a deed and adjudging the rights of the parties under its terms as written, but remanding the cause for further proceeding, is not res adjudicata so as to bar an amendment of the pleadings bringing into the case for the first time an effort to reform the deed and make it effectuate the real intention of the parties.
Barataria Canning Company v. Ott, 88 Miss. 771.
Argued orally by Oscar Backstrom, for appellant.
This suit was originally filed by R. Inglis to cancel certain deeds and to reform certain deeds and to confirm title to the property described in the bill. The cause was first brought here in a suit between R. Inglis and C.D. and Mary A. Galloway and B.B. Galloway, and is reported as Galloway v. Inglis, 138 Miss. 350, 103 So. 147, where the facts as they existed at that time are fully set forth. Prior to the bringing of this appeal, and at the hearing of the cause originally, Inglis dismissed the bill without prejudice as to B.B. Galloway and recovered judgment against C.D. and Mary A. Galloway in said suit for certain moneys representing rents, etc., which judgment was reversed and bill dismissed on that appeal.
There had been no amended or new bill filed against B.B. Galloway at the time of that decision nor during his lifetime, but some five or six months after the original bill was dismissed by this court as against C.D. and Mary A. Galloway the present bill was filed, making B.B. Galloway, C.D. Galloway. Mary A. Galloway, John T. Hume, and Mrs. Helen McNair and other persons parties to the present bill. After R. Inglis died, and before the present suit was filed, the heirs of R. Inglis conveyed the alleged lands claimed, or the rights that R. Inglis and his heirs had thereto, to the R. Inglis Company, a corporation. In the meantime, B.B. Galloway had sold to Mrs. Helen McNair the lands embraced in the former suit between R. Inglis and C.D. and Mary A. Galloway for a valuable consideration, and subsequent to the dismissal of the bill and before any amended or supplemental or new bill was filed. Mrs. McNair had in turn sold the lands to Hume for a valuable consideration. No new rights or deeds were acquired by R. Inglis or R. Inglis Company to those embraced in the former suit. The deeds involved in the former suit, and also in this suit, did not correctly describe and locate the lands involved, and there was a prayer for reformation of the deeds, and many of the parties in the present suit were made parties for this purpose only.
It was held in the former case that Inglis had neither record title nor adverse possession title, and that the Galloway title was superior to that of Inglis. In the former case it was earnestly contended that C.D. and Mary A. Galloway could not challenge the title of Inglis because they were placed in possession of the lands by Inglis and could not dispute his title. A reference to the former decision will disclose that it was therein decided that B.B. Galloway's title was superior to that of Inglis, and for the reason that Inglis had no title either by record or adverse possession that C.D. and Mary A. Galloway were not estopped to dispute his title, but could attorn to the real owner, B.B. Galloway, authorities being cited to show that, under the law of this state, where a vendor or landlord had no title and another person did have title, the parties being in possession of the land as purchasers or tenants would not have to abandon the land and yield possession to their vendor or landlord, but could contract with the true owner without physically surrendering the property to the person from whom they acquired the possession. This necessarily involved the question as to whether B.B. Galloway had title to the land and whether Inglis had any title, and we think is conclusive upon the present litigation. In other words, it constitutes res adjudicata between the title of R. Inglis and B.B. Galloway as it stood at that time. Upon no other theory could the judgment of the court be founded.
It is true that the bill had been dismissed as to B.B. Galloway without prejudice, but it was necessary for the court to consider the title of R. Inglis and that of B.B. Galloway to properly decide the issues there involved. B.B. Galloway had been made a party to the suit when it was originally filed, and the dismissal without prejudice against him was taken over his objection and protest. C.D. Galloway and Mary A. Galloway, however, depended upon the superiority of the title of B.B. Galloway over that of R. Inglis, and the judgment of the court decided that issue in favor of C.D. and Mary A. Galloway. No new rights were acquired by R. Inglis. His title deeds were not effective as conveyances, and did not convey the land. He did not promptly file a new bill against B.B. Galloway so as to save his rights from being adjudicated in the final judgment between C.D. and Mary A. Galloway on the one hand and R. Inglis on the other. Nothing was done by R. Inglis in reference to the matter, and Mrs. Helen McNair and the appellant John T. Hume acquired their rights for a valuable consideration after the judgment of this court had been rendered and become final, adjudging B.B. Galloway's title superior to that of R. Inglis.
We pointed out in the former opinion that Inglis also had no standing in court because he had not done equity by tendering a proper deed to C.D. Galloway and Mary A. Galloway in accordance with his contract and agreement prior to the alleged foreclosure, and that he could not foreclose the deed of trust given by Galloway which carried the same wrongful description as the deed of Inglis to Galloway, without first tendering Galloway a valid deed conveying the lands by proper description which he had pointed out to Galloway and placed him in possession of. In the present bill there is likewise no doing of equity on the part of the complainants. They are without standing in a court of equity, and the chancellor below was in error in rendering a decree in favor of R. Inglis Company. The judgment of the court below will therefore be reversed and a judgment entered here dismissing the bill.
Reversed, and bill dismissed.
Griffith, J., took no part in this decision.