Opinion
A147743
01-23-2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. JV150033)
P.B. (Father) father of one-year-old C.B., appeals from the juvenile court's orders denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 388 (388 petition) and terminating his and C.B.'s mother C.A.'s (Mother) parental rights to C.B. He contends the court abused its discretion in denying the petition because he had shown that circumstances had changed and that granting the petition was in C.B.'s best interest. We reject the contention and affirm the orders.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institution Code unless otherwise stated. Mother has also appealed from the order terminating her parental rights to C.B., but her only argument is that if we reverse the order terminating parental rights for Father, we should do so for her as well. In light of our conclusion below that the court did not err in denying Father's 388 petition and terminating his parental rights to C.B., we reject Mother's contention that the order terminating her parental rights must also be reversed. --------
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A detailed summary of the facts and procedures relating to jurisdiction and disposition are set forth in our prior unpublished opinion, In re C.B. (Mar. 23, 2016, A144687) [nonpub. opn.].) We therefore incorporate by reference the factual and procedural background contained in our prior opinion.
To summarize, the Humboldt County Department Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a dependency petition on February 3, 2015, alleging that then-three-week-old C.B.'s parents were unable to meet her basic needs. C.B. suffered from serious medical issues including not being properly fed and being exposed to a serious virus despite warnings from medical staff. Mother used alcohol and methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy, and Father had a substance abuse history. Both parents had a criminal history; Father's included convictions for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant and possession of a controlled substance, and arrests for child endangerment, possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia, and violation of a court order to prevent domestic violence.
The juvenile court detained C.B. and thereafter took jurisdiction over her based on Mother's inability to care for C.B. and Father's failure to protect C.B. from Mother. At the time of disposition on March 23, 2015, there were ongoing issues of inadequate or unsafe housing, substance abuse, and mental health concerns that had not been addressed by either parent, despite the services that had been provided to them. C.B. was doing well in the same relative placement in which she was originally placed. After a contested hearing, the court removed C.B. from her parents' care and ordered reunification services for both parents. Mother appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and we affirmed the orders. (In re C.B. (Mar. 23, 2016, A144687) [nonpub. opn.].)
After the jurisdictional and dispositional orders were made, C.B.'s weight dropped significantly, and she was removed from her relative placement and placed in foster care. The relative was unable to appreciate the significance of the dramatic weight loss and was having difficulty providing a consistent and stable home for C.B. The relative filed a de facto parent request on June 26, 2015, which the juvenile court denied. C.B. adjusted well to her new home, and her weight increased and stabilized under her foster parents' care.
Mother and Father continued to have domestic violence issues, and on June 23, 2015, they engaged in a physical altercation that resulted in the removal of C.B.'s sibling and half-sibling from the home. The following day, the couple became homeless after being evicted from their trailer park due to numerous complaints of disturbances at their trailer. At a review hearing on June 25, 2015, the parents' case plans were amended to include domestic violence counseling services.
In an October 19, 2015 six-month review report, the Department recommended termination of reunification services to both parents, who had visited C.B. regularly but had not made progress in their case plans. Father had not participated in any counseling and had attended only one and a half parenting classes. Despite the fact that a domestic violence incident had resulted in the removal of his other two children, he had not participated in domestic violence services.
After a contested review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to both parents. The court recognized the positive visits but noted this was only "one part of the assessment." The court found that the existence of a sibling bond was not a salient issue for C.B., who was only ten months old and had not lived with her siblings since she was two weeks old. The court found the parents had made "zero progress" in services and that C.B. was entitled to permanency. Unable to make the requisite finding that C.B. was substantially likely to return to her parents' care by the twelve-month review hearing, the court set the case for a permanency hearing under section 366.26 (366.26 hearing).
On January 21, 2016, Father filed a 388 petition to reinstate his reunification services based upon a change of circumstances and the best interests of C.B. He had completed a series of parenting classes and had stable housing and a job. He had ended his relationship with Mother, continued to visit C.B., and had earned unsupervised visits with C.B.'s siblings. He asserted that C.B.'s best interests would be served by additional reunification services because it would allow her to eventually reunify with her siblings. The Department opposed the petition on the grounds that Father was not capable of meeting C.B.'s needs because he did not fully comprehend the nature of C.B.'s fragility, that he would not be able to keep C.B. safe from Mother's negative influences, and that he waited too long—nearly a year—into C.B.'s life before engaging in services.
After a contested hearing on Father's 388 petition, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding Father had demonstrated "some changed circumstances" but that C.B.'s best interests weighed in favor of proceeding to permanency. Thereafter, having resolved the 388 petition, the court took up the matter of a permanent plan at a contested 366.26 hearing on March 7, 2016. Father's counsel noted C.B.'s regular contact with Father, siblings, and extended family, and argued that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception and the sibling bond exception to termination of parental rights applied. The Department argued that the connection between C.B. and her biological family could never advance due to the parents' inability to make sufficient progress in services, which resulted in the visits continuing to be supervised and highly structured. The court followed the Department's recommendations and terminated Mother and Father's parental rights to C.B.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his 388 petition because he had shown that circumstances had changed and that granting the petition was in C.B.'s best interest. We reject the contention.
Section 388 provides that a previous order of the juvenile court may be modified where "the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) In issuing its ruling, the court considers "the entire factual and procedural history of the case." (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) We review the court's order denying a 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (In re B.C. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 129, 141.) Thus, "when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
Here, there was ample evidence to support the juvenile court's order. There was evidence that Father was not capable of meeting C.B.'s needs, as he did not fully appreciate the nature of her fragility and her need for a high level of care. The Department was concerned that Father's continued "friendship" with Mother negatively impacted his ability to keep C.B. safe. Father's support network expressed concern about his ability to prevent Mother from being involved with the children. He had only recently engaged in domestic violence and other services to address issues related to providing a safe, stable, and violent-free home. While Father's recent efforts were commendable, C.B.'s need for permanence and stability outweighed any countervailing forces. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [after termination of reunification services, the child's need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role]; In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 918 ["Appellant's belated compliance with reunification efforts is not definitive"].)
Father asserts the juvenile court was too simplistic in its best interest analysis because it failed to consider "a variety of factors, including 1) the seriousness of the reason for the dependency and the reason the problem was not overcome, 2) the strength of the existing bond between the children to both the parent and the caretakers, and 3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed and the degree to which it has been." There is nothing in the record, however, indicating the court did not take these factors into consideration. While the court did not enumerate and address these elements in checklist fashion, it reviewed the case and arrived at a reasoned decision in concert with these guiding factors. For example, the court was fully aware of the reasons that led to the dependency. It noted that C.B. was a "medically fragile child" and understood that Father's continued friendship with Mother was a cause of concern. The court stated that while Father's efforts were commendable, "it was too little too late." The court was aware the parents were visiting C.B. regularly but had also been notified by the Department that all visits remained supervised and structured, and that C.B., who had been in her foster home for nine months at the time of the hearing, was doing well under her foster parents' care. The court also considered the potential sibling bond, noting that the existence of a sibling bond was not a salient issue for C.B., who was still an infant, and had not lived with her siblings since she was two weeks old. The possibility of eventually reunifying with her siblings was not an issue that outweighed C.B.'s need for permanence and stability.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders denying Father's 388 petition and terminating Father and Mother's parental rights to C.B. are affirmed.
/s/_________
McGuiness, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Siggins, J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.