Hulsey v. State

2 Citing cases

  1. Alexander v. State

    88 S.E.2d 277 (Ga. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    Even if the statement of the defendant was sufficient to authorize a charge upon the subjects of voluntary manslaughter or mutual combat, there was no written request so to charge, and in the absence of such a request the court is not bound to present a theory of the case based solely upon the statement of the defendant. Felder v. State, 149 Ga. 538 (1a) ( 101 S.E. 179); Brown v. State, 201 Ga. 751 (4) ( 41 S.E.2d 156); Vun Cannon v. State, 208 Ga. 608, 612 (4) ( 68 S.E.2d 586); Hulsey v. State, 209 Ga. 61 (2) ( 70 S.E.2d 766). 2. Under the evidence introduced by the State, the jury were authorized to find the defendant guilty of murder.

  2. Turner v. State

    209 Ga. 532 (Ga. 1953)   Cited 4 times

    While it is the duty of a trial judge to give in charge to the jury the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat where the evidence discloses that the killing took place in the course of a recounter in which the participants engaged with a mutual intention to fight ( Shafer v. State, 191 Ga. 722, 13 S.E.2d 798), where, as here, the State's evidence makes out a clear case of unprovoked murder, and the defendant's statement shows legal justification for the homicide, a charge upon the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat is neither required nor proper, either with or without a request therefor. Holland v. State, 166 Ga. 201 ( 142 S.E.2d 798); Johnson v. State, 173 Ga. 734 ( 161 S.E. 590); McDaniel v. State, 197 Ga. 757 (3) ( 30 S.E.2d 612); Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435 ( 67 S.E.2d 221); Hulsey v. State, 209 Ga. 61 ( 70 S.E.2d 766); The first special ground of the motion for new trial, complaining of the failure of the trial judge to charge the jury the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat was properly overruled. 3. The second special ground of the motion for new trial complains that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, if the accused was justified in shooting and killing his brother-in-law, and through inadvertence and accident he shot and killed his father-in-law through no fault of his own, he should be acquitted. While this contention states a sound principle of law ( Brown v. State, 208 Ga. 304, 308 (3), 66 S.E.2d 745), it has no application here, for the reason that, while the defendant in one portion of his statement to the jury said, "I thought my daddy-in-law fainted.