Opinion
No. 2-140 / 01-0658.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ROBERT J. BLINK, Judge.
Lyle Hull appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's award of forty-five percent industrial disability benefits. AFFIRMED.
Dennis Hanssen and Marci Tooman, of Hopkins Huebner, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins and Shirley Steffe, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Lyle Hull appeals the district court'sruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's award of forty-five percent (45%) industrial disability benefits under Iowa Code section 85.64 (1999). He contends the district court erred because the agency's decision is legally erroneous and his substantial rights have been prejudiced. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Lyle Hull worked as a laborer with AZ Manufacturing in 1995 when he sought treatment for an injury to his left arm. He brought an action against the Second Injury Fund of Iowa for recovery of benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.64. He alleged his first injury was a combination of the loss of use of his right foot due to a clubfoot and a 1974 injury to his left knee.
After a hearing, the deputy workers' compensation commissioner determined Hull's clubfoot and previous knee injury were qualifying first losses as required by section 85.64. Combining these losses with Hull's arm injury, the deputy concluded Hull suffered a 45% industrial disability. Hull appealed the decision, arguing he was totally disabled. The chief deputy worker's compensation commissioner affirmed. On appeal, the district court likewise denied Hull's claim.
II. Scope of Review . We review a district court's review of agency action for correction of errors of law. IBP v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). Our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function. Id. We are bound by the industrial commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same conclusion. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000).
III. Assessment of the Industrial Disability . Hull contends the district court erred in assessing his industrial disability at 45% instead of a total disability. He claims the agency action is erroneous and substantially prejudiced his rights by violating Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f), (i), (m), and (n). We address each argument in turn.
A . Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(m) requires the court to reverse an agency action if it is "[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Hull first argues the workers' compensation commissioner's determination of a 45% permanent partial disability is based upon an irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact because the commissioner had to have found there are jobs he could do in the community for which he could realistically compete. He contends there is no evidence in the record to support this conclusion.
In determining industrial disability, the commissioner is to consider the following factors:
the employee's medical condition prior to the injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the situs of the injury, its severity and the length of the healing period; the work experience of the employee prior to the injury and after the injury and the potential for rehabilitation; the employee's qualifications intellectually, emotionally, and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the injury; age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a result of the injury; inability, because of the injury, to engage in employment for which the employee is fitted; loss of earnings caused by a job transfer for reasons related to the injury; and the employer's refusal to give any sort of work to an impaired employee.IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 632-33 (Iowa 2000). At issue here is the question of whether there are jobs in the community that the employee can perform and for which the employee can realistically compete. Guyton v. Irving Jensen Co., 373 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa 1985).
Hull argues the commissioner's failure to make specific fact-findings and relate them to his legal conclusion lends credence to his contention that the 45% permanent partial disability award is irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable. While it is true that the commissioner has a duty to state the evidence he relies on and to detail the reasons for his conclusions in order to show the path he has taken through conflicting evidence, an agency's decision is sufficient if it is possible to work backward from the agency's written decision and deduce what must have been the agency's legal conclusions and its findings. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d at 633-34. In doing so, we fulfill our duty to broadly and liberally apply the commissioner's findings to uphold rather than to defeat the commissioner's decision. Id. at 634. That is the framework of analysis used by the district court and we apply the same analysis on appeal.
We conclude the industrial commissioner's award of 45% industrial disability was rational, logical, and justifiable.
It is normally incumbent upon an injured [worker], at a hearing to determine loss of earning capacity, to demonstrate a reasonable effort to secure employment in the area of . . . residence. Where testimony discloses that a reasonable effort was made, the burden of going forward with evidence to show the availability of suitable employment is on the employer and carrier.
Guyton, 373 N.W.2d at 105 (citing Employers Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 541 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. 1975)). Here, the commissioner did not need to consider whether suitable employment was available for Hull because the commissioner found Hull did not make a real effort to find employment after AZ informed him he could not return to work. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion. In his Social Security Disability Report, Hull stated he would not be interested in receiving rehabilitation services to help get him back to work. Indeed, Hull never sought the aid of an employment, rehabilitation, or vocational expert for the purpose of job placement or rehabilitation. When asked by way of interrogatory whether he had tried to obtain a job or engage in work of any nature, Hull simply answered, "I am totally disabled." Because Hull did not make a reasonable effort to secure employment, we find no error.
B . Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(i) requires the court to reverse an agency action if it is "[t]he product of reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly irrational." Hull argues three parts of the commissioner's decision reveal it to be the product of illogical reasoning: 1) the commissioner's finding that the doctor's lifting restriction on using both arms was unpersuasive because there was no injury to Hull's right arm; 2) the commissioner's finding that Hull had no intention of looking for any type of work; and 3) the commissioner's mention that Hull's expert made no attempt to find him employment.
We reject Hull's characterization of the commissioner's decision as illogical. Although Hull theorizes why his treating physician imposed lifting restrictions on using both arms, the commissioner correctly observed no objective evidence supports the work restrictions on Hull's right arm. As the district court stated, "It was up to [the doctor] to explain any suggested limitation." The doctor did not do so. Additionally, we have already concluded evidence supported the commissioner's view that Hull had no intention of looking for work. Finally, we find the commissioner's observation that the vocational expert made no attempt to find Hull employment reflects the degree to which the commissioner weighed the expert's testimony. See Second Injury Fund v. Braden, 459 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 1990) (noting that a credibility determination may be inherent in a commissioner's ruling). Overall, we find the commissioner's decision to be rational.
C . Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f) requires the court to reverse an agency action if:
Based upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.
Hull claims there is not substantial evidence to support the commissioner's conclusion that he is 45% disabled. In support of this argument, Hull makes reference to the arguments raised above. We find substantial evidence supports the commissioner's decision.
D . Hull finally argues the commissioner's decision is "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" in violation of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(n). We find the commissioner's 45% industrial disability assessment is reasonable and, accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.