Summary
In Hull v. Moore's Mobile Homes Stebra, 214 A.D.2d 923, 924, 625 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (3d Dep't 1995), the court ruled that plaintiffs' breach of warranty cause of action accrued at the time of delivery of the mobile home to plaintiffs and was time barred by the four-year statute of limitation.
Summary of this case from Amourgianos v. Cummins Diesel Sales Corp.Opinion
April 27, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Greene County (Connor, J.).
When plaintiffs purchased a mobile home on June 25, 1987 from defendant Moore's Mobile Homes Stebra, Inc. (hereinafter Stebra), they were provided with a one-year limited warranty issued by defendant Zimmer Homes of Pennsylvania, the manufacturer of the mobile home. Under the warranty, which ran from the date of delivery, Zimmer agreed to repair or replace without charge substantial manufacturing defects in the home. After plaintiffs took delivery of the home in August 1987, Zimmer attempted to repair certain defects in November 1987 and February 1988. Apparently its efforts were unsuccessful, for on September 6, 1990 plaintiffs wrote Zimmer asking that it again repair the defects. Zimmer's failure to respond to this demand resulted in plaintiffs commencing this action for breach of warranty. Following joinder of issue, Stebra moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it as time barred. Supreme Court granted the motion, prompting this appeal by plaintiffs.
Zimmer has apparently filed a petition in bankruptcy.
We affirm. Supreme Court correctly applied the four-year Statute of Limitations embodied in UCC 2-725 (1) since the essence of the parties' contract was for the sale of goods rather than the rendition of services (see, Triangle Underwriters v Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742-743; Sawyer v Camp Dudley, 102 A.D.2d 914). Therefore, since plaintiffs' breach of warranty cause of action is deemed to have accrued when they took delivery of the mobile home in August 1987, this action, commenced on August 2, 1993, is time barred (see, UCC 2-725). Plaintiffs' argument that their cause of action accrued on the date the warranty was breached is unavailing because the warranty herein does not extend to the future performance of the goods as it was expressly limited to repair or replacement (see, Liecar Liqs. v CRS Bus. Computers, 205 A.D.2d 868).
Plaintiffs' reliance on Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp. ( 46 N.Y.2d 606) is also unavailing. There, a roofing materials supplier provided an express promise to repair the roof it installed for 20 years. The Court of Appeals found that the promise to repair was distinct from the contract to supply roofing materials and held that a cause of action accrues upon each breach of the agreement to repair (supra, at 611; see, Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v Walter Corp., 101 A.D.2d 992, affd 64 N.Y.2d 964). In this case, since Zimmer last attempted to repair the defects in February 1988, during the one-year period the promise to repair was in effect, plaintiffs' action would be time barred since it was commenced more than four years after February 1988 (compare, Long Is. Light. Co. v Imo Indus., 6 F.3d 876, 888-890).
Mercure, J.P., Casey, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.